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iABSTRACT
This dissertation aims at contributing to the body of literature covering the field of
entrepreneurial finance. More specifically, the study focuses on the valuation and
syndication of venture capital investments. The dissertation comprises a theory review
and four essays, each of which makes distinct but complementary contributions to both
theory and practice.
The first essay of this dissertation constructs and tests a binomial pricing model for
staged venture capital investments. Using the valuation data of 421 U.S. venture capital
transactions and 176 initial public offerings, the essay finds that the pricing model is
consistent with previous knowledge on the risk-return profile of venture capital
investments. The results further confirm the hypothesis that early-stage ventures have
higher implied risk and implied volatility of returns than more established ones. The
results of the essay imply that pricing models that assume constant volatility, unlike the
binomial model, are not likely to be applicable in venture capital or similar project
valuation settings.
The second essay demonstrates how investor prominence affects the valuations of
venture capital backed companies. Employing a thorough data set of over 32,000 U.S.
venture capital investments between 1990 and 2000, the essay shows that certification
ability gives prominent venture capitalists bargaining power that they utilise when
investing in ventures for the first time. In line with the asymmetric information and
signalling theories, it is found that the reputation of existing venture capital investors
adds value in future financing rounds. The results are robust to potential selection
biases, alternative measures of investor prominence, the existence of additional value
adding mechanisms, and different sampling periods.
The third essay examines the relationship between investment syndication and the
efficiency of venture capital firms. Arguments derived from the theoretical motives for
syndication predict that syndication relationships allow venture capitalists to be more
efficient in completing investments and in making their portfolio companies public.
Utilising an extensive data set on the venture capital investments of the 100 largest U.S.
venture capital firms between 1986 and 2000, the essay demonstrates that syndication
has an impact on venture capitalists’ efficiency in both of these areas. The frequency of
syndicating investments accelerates the process of investing in new portfolio companies,
whereas the diversity of the syndication relationships improves the venture capitalists’
ability to create public companies from their portfolio companies. Furthermore, the
essay demonstrates that uncertainty moderates the impact of syndication on firm
efficiency. Firms with uncertain venture portfolios benefit more from syndication
relationships.
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The fourth essay compares resource-based and social structural explanations for the
network positions and the performance of venture capital firms. A distributed lag
analysis of an extensive data set of the 100 largest U.S. venture capital firms and their
syndicate structures between 1986 and 2000 suggests that venture capital firms in central
network positions increase their market share of portfolio company initial public
offerings in subsequent years. Consistent with the social structural argument, the results
further demonstrate that prior network positions tend to determine future positions. An
analysis of causality reveals that past network position tends to dominate the observable
quality of firm resources as a determinant of the subsequent performance and position of
the firm. The results further imply that the structure of venture capital syndication
networks is rigid and involves high barriers to entry, and that the acquisition of general
partners contributes to changes in existing network positions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
During the last decade, venture capital investing grew enormously. According to the
records of Venture Economics, a U.S. research firm, venture capital disbursements grew
25-fold between 1990 and 2000. The growth was rapid both in the North America, the
origins of venture capital, and in Europe and Asia. Despite the radical downturn in
venture capital investment activity after the high-technology stock market collapse in
2000 and 2001, the macroeconomic role of venture capital is still the same as when the
formal venture financing industry began to establish in the United States soon after
World War II. Venture capital firms exist in order to provide financing for new, high-
risk, and growing companies, thereby fuelling economic growth and renewal.
Companies that have received venture capital funding have created nearly one third of
the total market value of all public companies in the United States (Gompers and
Lerner, 2001: 12). The venture capital industry has also served as an accelerator of
innovative output. Venture funding accounted for as much as 14% of all U.S. innovative
activity in 1998 (Kortum and Lerner, 2000).
Previous academic research on venture capital has covered several areas. Researchers
have extensively analysed and documented the venture capital investment process
(Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et al., 1985; 1987; Sahlman, 1990; Gompers,
1995), venture capital contracting, agency problems, and incentives (Admati and
Pfleiderer, 1994; Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996; Kirilenko,
2001), the value added of venture capital investors (Sapienza, 1992; Hellman and Puri,
2000; 2002), and venture capital initial public offerings (Barry et al., 1990; Gompers and
Lerner, 1998; Brav and Gompers, 1997; Stuart et al., 1999).
Despite a wide variety of previous research on venture capital investing, several areas
provide possibilities to expand the current body of knowledge significantly. Firstly, the
valuation, risk, and return of venture capital investments have lacked rigorous empirical
and theoretical research until recent years, partly due to the lack of access to data on the
realised valuations of investments. Previous research has examined the risk and return of
venture capital investments on an aggregate level of the fund or the firm (Huntsman and
Hoban, 1980; Ruhnka and Young, 1991), or from a macroeconomic perspective using
individual venture capital investments as the unit of analysis (Gompers and Lerner,
2000; Cochrane, 2001). Gompers and Lerner (2000) tested how money inflows into
venture capital funds affect the valuations these funds pay for their investments.
Cochrane (2001) examined selection bias in the analysis of venture capital valuations
and rates of return. However, previous research has lacked attempts to model the value
and the risk-return structure of venture capital investments. Similarly, empirical
evidence on venture capital valuations is still scarce.
2Secondly, the impact of the investor on the new venture has attracted a stream of
research on the value added of venture capitalists (e.g., Hellmann and Puri, 2002). A
handful of studies has also analysed the ability of venture capitalists to resolve
informational asymmetries in the going public process (Barry et al., 1990; Megginson
and Weiss, 1991; Gompers, 1996). However, previous knowledge on the impact of the
investor on venture capital valuations prior to the exit is thin. Especially, researchers
have not yet addressed whether the prominence and reputation of venture capital
investors affect company valuations.
Thirdly, research on the syndication of venture capital investments has focused on the
motives of syndication (Lerner, 1994b; Brander et al., 1999; Lockett and Wright, 2001;
Anand and Piskorski, 2001) and the structure of venture capital syndication networks
(Bygrave, 1988; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Syndication networks represent a key
vehicle for venture capitalists to exchange information and resources (Bygrave, 1988),
and to establish social status (Podolny, 2001). However, previous research has addressed
neither the performance implications of network position nor the performance
implications of different syndication strategies.
This dissertation contributes to these three areas of research on venture capital. By
building hypotheses on the basis of received theories, the dissertation presents four
essays on the valuation and syndication of venture capital investments. The essays
contain novel empirical and theoretical results that expand the current body of
knowledge on venture capital and related topics. Besides contributing to theory, the
findings have important practical implications to venture capitalists seeking to maximise
their performance, entrepreneurs seeking the optimal solution for financing their
venture, and public policy makers.
1.2 Research problem and objectives
This dissertation focuses on examining the following research problem: What is the
impact of the prominence of venture capital investors on the valuations of new ventures,
and what implications does the choice of investment syndication strategy have on
investor prominence? This overall research problem can be divided into four individual
sub-problems.
Firstly, I analyse how well a binomial option-based pricing framework performs in the
analysis of the valuations and the risk-return structure of venture capital investments.
While the valuation of new ventures is a process that involves significant uncertainties,
research in real options has shown that venture capital investments are conceptually
decomposable into a series of options. The theory also suggests that the valuation of
venture capital investments could be enhanced with appropriate models. Empirical
testing of option-based pricing frameworks adds to the understanding of the feasibility of
such models, and expands the current body of knowledge on the risk-return structure of
venture capital investments.
3Secondly, I examine the impact of the prominence of venture capital firms on the
valuations of entrepreneurial ventures. Outside investors confront informational
asymmetries when investing in new ventures, but the presence of prominent venture
capitalists inside the venture may reduce the impact of these asymmetries. Similarly,
prominent venture capitalists may be able to bargain lower valuations for their own
investments into new ventures because their presence might reduce informational
asymmetries and thus add value in future financing rounds that involve new outside
investors.
Thirdly, I examine whether the choice of syndication strategy affects the efficiency of
venture capital firms. Venture capitalists can adjust their syndication strategies across a
spectrum of two variables, the frequency of syndication and the diversity of syndication
relationships. Potentially, both the frequency and the diversity of syndication have an
impact on the efficiency of the venture capital firm in completing deals and in
converting the portfolio companies into successful exits. Efficiency has a direct impact
on the performance of the firm and thus, according to the definition used in this
dissertation, reinforces the prominence of the focal venture capital firm.
Finally, I analyse whether positions in the syndication network of venture capital firms
are major determinants of the subsequent performance of these firms, and whether past
positions or the observable quality of resources determine subsequent positions. By
syndicating investments with one another, venture capital firms acquire positions in a
collaboration network. Firms that are central in the network and thus serve as exchange
partners to several other firms have high status, gain informational benefits and have an
enhanced access to the resources of the exchange partners. On the contrary, peripheral
firms have low status and inferior access to information and partners’ resources. Thus, a
central position may improve firm performance. However, previous research provides
competing explanations on the dominant determinant of positions. On one hand, the
resource-based view of the firm stresses that the quality of the firm’s resources
determines its position. On the other hand, the social structural view argues that prior
positions and exchange relationships are the primary determinants of position.
1.3 Research approach and methods
Throughout the dissertation, I focus on testing hypotheses derived from received
theories using quantitative empirical methods. In contrast to the other essays, the first
essay is partly constructive, as a valuation framework is derived and empirically tested.
The other essays concentrate solely on building theory-based hypotheses and testing
them empirically. The research approach requires an extensive review of previous
theoretical and empirical research in several areas, and excludes potentially interesting
explorative findings, but also enables drawing robust conclusions from the results. By
building on previous theoretical and empirical research, by developing novel yet
empirically testable hypotheses on the research questions, by running rigorous empirical
4tests on the hypotheses, and by drawing theoretically and practically relevant
conclusions from the results, this dissertation aims at contributing to the body of
knowledge on venture capital and several related areas of theoretical research.
The core venture capital investment data sets collected from the Venture Economics
Disbursements database are supplemented in each essay using data from several other
sources, including Venture Economics Fund commitments database, Venture
Economics Firms database, Securities Data Corporation’s New Issues database, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Initial Public Offering prospectuses (EDGAR
database), past issues of Pratt’s Guides to Venture Capital Sources, the résumés of
individual venture capital firm general partners, and U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago interest rate databases. The hypotheses are tested using quantitative statistical
methods. These methods include ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (essay 1),
heteroskedasticity-consistent full maximum likelihood Heckman sample selection
regression (essay 2), time series – cross sectional maximum likelihood generalised least
squares (GLS) regression with fixed effects (essay 3), and time series – cross sectional
maximum likelihood GLS regression with distributed lags and fixed effects (essay 4).
1.4 Scope and limitations
This dissertation focuses on the valuation and syndication of venture capital
investments. The scope is limited to independently managed risk capital that focuses on
equity or equity-linked investments in privately held, high-growth companies,
sometimes referred to as standard venture capital investments (Gompers and Lerner,
1999b). The scope excludes buyouts, consolidations, mezzanine and distressed debt
investments, and other forms of private equity.
The empirical data of this dissertation is geographically limited to the United States.
The reason to focus on the U.S. venture capital industry is that the USA is practically
the only part of the world with a long enough history of established venture capital
activity to enable the analysis of the research questions. A large amount of empirical data
is required in order to answer the key questions raised in this dissertation, and some of
the questions also require longitudinal data sets. Another reason to focus on the U.S. is
that focusing on a single country reduces unobserved country-specific heterogeneity in
the sample, and allows drawing more robust – albeit less general – conclusions from the
empirical results.
The main limitation of this dissertation is the source of venture capital investment data.
Most of the data related to venture investments comes from the Venture Economics
database. While this database is the official source of investment data of the U.S.
National Venture Capital Association, and the data have been extensively used in
previous research published in the top-tier journals (e.g., Lerner, 1994a; Lerner, 1995;
Gompers, 1995; Gompers, 1996), relying too much on one source might cause observer
bias and lead to wrong interpretations of the results. Although all the essays of this
5dissertation supplement the Venture Economics data in several ways using independent
sources, the core entries related to individual venture capital investments or financing
rounds are always from Venture Economics records. However, previous research has
identified in detail the relatively minor deficiencies of the Venture Economics database
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999b), and this dissertation attempts to take into account these
and other problematic issues observed during the research process as fully as possible. As
a result, I do not expect the choice of data sources to introduce any systematic biases to
the results.
1.5 Definitions
Several terms in this dissertation require rigorous definitions. Firstly, the topic of this
dissertation is venture capital. The U.S. National Venture Capital Association defines
venture capital as “money provided by professionals who invest alongside management
in young, rapidly growing companies that have the potential to develop into significant
economic contributors” (NVCA, 2002). In a similar manner, Wright and Robbie (1998)
define venture capital as investment by professional investors of long-term, unquoted,
risk equity finance in new firms where the primary reward is capital gain supplemented
by dividend yield. Gompers and Lerner (1999b: 11) define venture capital as
“independently managed, dedicated pools of capital that focus on equity or equity-
linked investments in privately held, high-growth companies”.
Especially in the United States, a distinction is often made between “venture capital”
and “private equity”. Whereas venture capital refers to the investment activities of
professional funds that purchase equity or equity-linked stakes in new, unquoted firms,
private equity includes funds devoted to venture capital, leveraged buyouts,
consolidations, mezzanine and distressed debt investments, and a variety of hybrids such
as venture leasing and venture factoring (Gompers and Lerner, 1999b). Non-venture-
capital private equity investments are often associated with companies that have already
reached later stages of development and may even be quoted on a stock exchange.
These investments are most often related to the restructuring of existing companies.
Venture capital is, however, much more than a certain subset of the financial markets.
Gompers and Lerner (1999b) refer to venture capital as a cyclical process that starts
from fundraising and proceeds to investing the funds into promising companies,
monitoring them, adding value to them, returning capital to the limited partners, and
restarts with the raising of new, follow-on funds. Viewing venture capital as a cycle
stresses the empirical fact that venture capital is a continuous process in which the
ability to raise follow-on funds and continue business largely depends on the success of
the previous funds (Gompers and Lerner, 1999b).
Active involvement in the development of the portfolio companies also characterises
venture capital. Venture capitalists aim at adding value to their portfolio companies
through various activities, including monitoring financial and operational performance,
6recruitment of management, arranging financing from complementary sources, serving
as a sounding board to the entrepreneur team, arranging incentive plans, providing
access to auditors, lawyers, and investment banks, and setting company policies
(Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza, 1992; Hellman and Puri, 2000; 2002).
Another important factor that separates venture capital from other similar types of
financial institutions or sources of risk capital is the organisation of the investment
activities (Sahlman, 1990). Venture capital is typically organised in limited partnerships
holding funds that are professionally managed by general partners. The capital is raised
from limited partners that are most often institutional investors such as pension funds.
The general partners are compensated with 20-25% of the funds’ returns, and a 1.5-3%
fixed fee on capital under management (Gompers and Lerner, 1999a), while the limited
partners get the rest. The funds have a limited lifetime, usually 10 years, although
extensions are frequently granted (Sahlman, 1990). When investments are liquidated,
funds are returned to the limited partners either in the form of portfolio company shares
or cash (Gompers and Lerner, 1998).
Valuation refers to two distinct issues in this dissertation. Firstly, valuation means the
process of placing a monetary value on an investment opportunity. This definition does
not restrict the concept to cover only certain procedures of quantitative analysis; rather,
valuation is the process of determining the subjective monetary value of an investment
opportunity. This definition of valuation applies in this dissertation in the context of
valuation models and processes. The second meaning for valuation is the joint result of
the valuation process and buyer-seller negotiations. In this context, valuation refers to
the price of an investment, a security, or a company that the buyer and seller agree upon
prior to completing a transaction.
Syndication. Wilson (1968) defined a syndicate as “a group of individuals who must
make a common decision under uncertainty that will result in a payoff to be shared
jointly among them”. In the context of financial markets, syndicates are groups of
investors that jointly make an investment decision. These syndicates are commonly
formed among lenders (syndicated loans) and equity investors, venture capitalists in
particular. In the context of venture capital, Bygrave (1987; 1988) and Lerner (1994b)
recognised a syndication relationship when at least two venture capitalists invested in
the same venture in the same financing round. In this dissertation, syndication refers to
organised co-investment by at least two venture capital firms in the same venture at the
same time.
Prominence. According to the Webster and Oxford Current English dictionaries, the
word “prominent” means something that stands out, is widely and popularly known, or
leading within a comparable group. A direct synonym for prominence is “eminence”.
Eminent is something “standing out so as to be readily perceived or noted” or “standing
above others in some quality”. “Prominent” is also close to “prestigious”, a word
referring to something that has standing or estimation in the eyes of people, or a
7commanding position in people's minds. Being prestigious is also closely related to
having “high status”; however, status is clearly a more social concept than prominence.
Status means “the rank in relation to others … in a social order, community, class, or
profession” or “the relative rank in a hierarchy of prestige”. While prominence is
something outstanding determined according to observable external characteristics,
status and prestige are the outcomes of a social recognition process. Status and prestige
are less directly related to observable external characteristics and more dependent on the
evaluator in question. In this dissertation, prominence refers to the quality of an
economic actor measured using the observable external characteristics of the actor, such
as past performance or experience.
1.6 Structure of the dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organised as follows. Chapter two of this
introductory section provides an overview of relevant research on the venture capital
topic and related theories. Chapter three is a summary of the four essays of this
dissertation. The first essay is called “Valuation of Venture Capital Investments:
Empirical Evidence”. It is followed by the second essay “Certification of Venture
Capital Investments: The Impact of Investor Prominence on Company Valuations”, the
third essay “Syndication and the Efficiency of Venture Capital Firms”, and the fourth
essay “How the Rich Become Richer in Venture Capital: Firm Performance and
Position in Syndication Networks”.
2 AN OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT RESEARCH
2.1 Venture capital
2.1.1 Brief history
As discussed in the previous section, venture capital refers to money invested by
professional investors in young, rapidly growing companies that have the potential to
develop into significant economic contributors. The activity of financing entrepreneurs
has naturally existed almost as long as entrepreneurs themselves. Entrepreneurs have
long had ideas that require more capital to implement than have entrepreneurs
themselves. While debt financing could solve the lack of capital, new, high-growth,
high-risk ventures that expect several years of negative earnings have typically been
forced to seek alternative sources of money. At the time of Hammurabi, the Babylonian
partnerships attempted to solve these issues (Gompers and Lerner, 1999b).
Venture capital represents one established solution to financing high-risk, high-reward
ventures. The roots of the formal venture industry are in the United States and date back
to the post-war 1940s. MIT, Harvard Business School, and local business leaders set up
the first modern venture capital firm, American Research and Development (ARD) in
1946 to commercialise the technologies developed for World War II. While the success
of ARD’s investments was very variable, its investment in Digital Equipment
Corporation in 1957 grew from $70,000 to $355 million, and generated almost half of
ARD’s lifetime profits (Gompers and Lerner, 1999b). The first venture capital limited
partnerships were formed in the late 1950s led by Draper, Gaither, and Anderson.
However, Gompers and Lerner (1999b) report that funds governed by limited
partnerships exceeded 50% of the total venture pool only as recently as 1982. Thereafter,
independent limited partnerships have governed approximately 80% of total U.S.
venture capital funds.
Money inflows into venture capital and disbursements into portfolio companies have
experienced two periods of fast growth (Figure 1). The first growth period followed the
1979 amendment of the U.S. “prudent man” rule governing pension fund investments
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999b). The change allowed pension funds to invest in high-risk
assets, including venture capital, and led to a significant expansion of the venture capital
pool. The $0.56 billion of fundraising in 1979 quickly grew to $4.2 billion in 1983.
However, the explosion of the venture capital market in the late 1990s totally outweighs
the first growth period of the industry. The years 1998 to 2000 saw a tremendous
expansion of the Internet and related industries following Netscape’s IPO in August
1995. Fundraising shot up from $18 billion in 1997 to $110 billion in 2000, and
disbursements followed the same growth pattern. New venture capital partnerships were
9formed at a pace never seen before. Investments were made in new ventures at an
outrageous frequency, and IPO exits could be realised in less than two years of the first
seed investment at extremely attractive valuations.
The favourable IPO market that lasted until the March 2000 collapse of the Nasdaq and
Internet shares was most likely a major contributor to the seemingly unlimited
expansion of the venture capital industry. An attractive exit market formed the basis for
“getting rich quickly”, and obviously raised expectations about potential exit valuations
for new venture capital investments. However, the long downward slide of the public
equity market after early 2000 caused a drastic drop in venture capital activities. In 2001
and early 2002, the IPO window was no longer open, and a growing number of Internet-
related bankruptcies raised investors’ doubts about the sustainability of the current level
of venture capital activity. Investments soon slowed down significantly. U.S. venture
capital fundraising and disbursements quickly tumbled by 60% to 70% of the 2000 peak.
2001 saw only $47 billion in venture capital disbursements and $40 million in
fundraising, and in early 2002 the industry slowed down even more. The late 1990s
clearly represented a period when a great deal of money was chasing too few high-
quality deals – following a similar but significantly magnified pattern as that
documented by Gompers and Lerner (2000) in their study of the impact of fund inflows
on venture capital valuations before 1996.
 Figure 1 Rolling 12-month level of fundraising (dashed line) and disbursements
(solid line) by U.S. venture capital investors in 2001 dollars between
January, 1969 and June, 2002. Compiled from Venture Economics
databases in October, 2002.
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2.1.2 Key areas of previous research
In this section, I go through most of the venture capital research published in refereed
journals, including some of the key books on the topic. More weight is given to the areas
most relevant to this dissertation. These areas include investment valuation, the
certification role of investors, and the syndication of investments.
Literature reviews. Venture capital is a multifaceted topic, and it is not possible to
consider all aspects of previous research in this short review. I point out here some
review articles and books that can provide a more comprehensive view of the area.
Timmons and Bygrave (1986) can perhaps be regarded as the first authors to publish an
overview of venture capital investing and research. While Tyebjee and Bruno (1984)
modelled the venture capital investment process, Timmons and Bygrave (1986)
provided the first holistic overview of the professional entrepreneurial financing
industry. Following that, Sahlman (1990) published a widely cited paper on the
structure and governance of U.S. venture capital organisations. His work documented
the organisation of venture capital investing, the deal-making process, deal structuring,
and other characteristics typical of venture capital financial institutions. Soon after the
temporary fall in venture capital activity in the early 1990s, Bygrave and Timmons
(1992) published a popular book Venture Capital at the Crossroads, summarising the
key characteristics of venture capital investing and recent developments in the
marketplace. In their review papers, Barry (1994) and Wright and Robbie (1998)
summarised a large portion of the venture capital research conducted before their
efforts.
One of the most comprehensive review books on venture capital research was published
by Gompers and Lerner (1999b). Although the book summarises mostly the authors’
own research, it covers almost all phases of the venture capital cycle from fundraising to
returning the funds to the limited partners. The book was supplemented in 2001 with a
more practitioner-oriented volume (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). Many of the key pieces
of venture capital research that are cited in current papers, including this dissertation,
have appeared in the “financial economics” stream of venture capital research led by the
Harvard professors, Gompers and Lerner.
Valuation, risk, and return. Previous research reports attractive returns for venture
capital investments. Huntsman and Hoban (1980) made one of the first structured
attempts to analyse the risk-return trade-off of venture capital investments. They found
that venture capital investments offer attractive returns, on average 18.9% year-on-year,
but that the rate of return on the investment portfolio is highly sensitive to the number
of successful investments it contains. Small venture capital portfolios also tended to have
a significant probability of yielding rates of return below zero, suggesting that the
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minimal capital requirement for a venture capital fund is relatively large, at least several
millions of U.S. dollars in 1980.
Ruhnka and Young (1991) developed a framework for venture capitalist risk perceptions
and risk-reduction strategies. Additionally, they provided empirical evidence regarding
the stage-wise risk of venture capital investments. While venture capitalists require an
average rate of return of 65-70% for seed-stage investments, exit stage investments can be
accepted at 25-35% return. Thus, early-stage investments are regarded as significantly
more risky than later-stage investments. Furthermore, venture capitalists require
compensation for their efforts in developing the venture. Manigart et al. (2002) surveyed
the determinants of venture capitalists’ required rates of return in five countries. They
found that VCs with more intensity of involvement require higher rates of return, and
that the rate of return declines with the stage of development of the venture.
The analysis of venture capital valuations is not as straightforward as the analysis of
public market valuations or share prices. Because of the fluctuations in the supply and
demand of venture capital, investment valuations are not always determined according
to the rules of efficient markets. Gompers and Lerner (2000) examined how the inflow
of capital into venture funds affects the valuations of these funds’ new investments.
Their results indicate that fund inflows tend to inflate venture valuations, because excess
money available for investments intensifies competition for a limited number of
attractive targets. Furthermore, Gompers and Lerner (2000) did not find changes in
valuations to be related to the ultimate success of the ventures. Contrary to the efficient
market hypothesis, changes in the supply of capital were found to have an immediate
impact on the valuations venture capitalists place on new investments.
Furthermore, analysing venture capital valuations and the true return on investments is
difficult because typical data sets available to researchers suffer from selection bias
(Cochrane, 2001). Returns calculated from observed venture capital valuations and exits
are biased because ventures that fail or remain private do not produce valuation
observations. The return to IPO is an upward biased measure of the ex ante returns to
potential venture capital investors. Cochrane (2001) found that a selection bias
correction significantly attenuates the overly high average arithmetic returns observed
for these investments.
Distribution of control and the structuring of shareholder agreements should also have a
direct impact on venture capital valuations. Kirilenko (2001) presented a model of a
relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur engaged in the formation
of a new firm. Through theoretical modelling, he showed that the venture capitalist
demands disproportionately higher control rights than his equity investment, and that
the entrepreneur is compensated for the loss of control through improved valuations.
Investor certification. The potential certification ability of venture capitalists was
recognised in the financial economics stream of research after the role of underwriters
in the equity issuing process had been intensively examined by Leland and Pyle (1977),
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Campbell and Kracaw (1980), and Booth and Smith (1986), among others. Megginson
and Weiss (1991) performed one of the first thorough tests of the ability of venture
capitalists to certify the prices of initial public offerings. The presence of venture
capitalists in issuing firms results in significantly lower initial returns and gross spreads,
and therefore serves to maximise the net proceeds to the firm. Megginson and Weiss
(1991) listed three tests that must be met for third-party certification to be reliable to
outside investors. Firstly, the certifying agent must have reputational capital at stake that
would be forfeited by giving a false certification. Secondly, the value of the agent’s
reputational capital must be larger than the largest possible one-time wealth transfer or
side payment that could be obtained by false certification. Thirdly, it must be costly for
the issuing firm to purchase the services of the certifying agent, and this cost must be an
increasing function of the scope and potential importance of the information asymmetry
regarding intrinsic firm value.
Further research supports the price-certifying role of venture capitalists. In the light of
Canadian empirical data, Amit et al. (1998) concluded that venture capitalists exist
because the market for entrepreneurial finance is characterised by informational
asymmetries and moral hazard. Because venture capitalists can reduce these market
failures, they have an advantage over other investors in providing funds for new ventures.
Nevertheless, venture capitalists tend to prefer projects where informational asymmetries
are less severe.
Venture capitalists recognise that an ability to certify is valuable, and therefore attempt
to gain reputation on the market. Gompers (1996) found that new venture capitalists
seek to establish a reputation by making portfolio companies public earlier than more
established venture capitalists in order to raise capital for new funds. Young venture
capitalists are also associated with issues related to less credible certification. They serve
a shorter time on the board prior to IPO and hold smaller equity stakes in ventures.
Financial markets recognise that venture capitalists can certify the quality of recently
listed companies. Gompers and Lerner (1998) examined how venture capitalists
distribute shares to the limited partners after a portfolio company IPO, and how the
distribution affects the value of the portfolio company. Their evidence suggested that the
market reacts to distributions as it reacts to insider trading; the abnormal return of the
ventures around the distribution dates is significantly negative. Thus, the loss of venture
capitalist certification acts as a negative signal to the market.
Syndication. Research on the syndication of venture capital investments was initiated by
Bygrave (1987; 1988). Using a resource exchange model, Bygrave (1987) reasoned that
the relative amount of syndication is explained primarily by the degree of uncertainty
associated with an investment rather than by the sum of money invested. Additionally,
sharing information appeared to be a more significant reason for syndication than
spreading financial risk. As a result, venture capitalists should gain access to the network
of other investors by having knowledge that other firms need (Bygrave, 1987). Bygrave
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(1988) further examined the structure of venture capital syndication networks. While
U.S. venture capitalists appeared to be loosely connected as an overall group, venture
capitalists focusing on companies in a highly innovative industry, and companies in
certain geographical areas, appeared very tightly coupled. Bygrave (1988) pointed out
that the network of high-technology VCs disseminates deal-related information relatively
quickly.
In addition to the sharing of information, five other rationales have been proposed to
explain why venture capital firms syndicate. Venture capitalists may syndicate to share
financial value at risk (Lockett and Wright, 2001), to improve decision-making by joint
decisions (Lerner, 1994b), to window dress (Lerner, 1994b), to improve capabilities to
add value (Brander et al., 1999), and to establish social status (Podolny, 2001).
Experienced venture capitalists typically syndicate first-round investments with investors
having a similar level of experience (Lerner, 1994b). Because experienced venture
capitalists tend to be selective in their choice of first-round syndication partners, access
to the opinions of other investors is a motivation for syndication. In later rounds, less
experienced venture capitalists are invited to join the syndicates. In contrast, when
established firms join as new investors in later rounds, the valuation has often increased
sharply before the investment. This provides support for the window dressing hypothesis.
However, equity stakes show relatively little variation between financing rounds,
suggesting that syndication seeks to maintain ownership shares constant in order to avoid
exploiting informational advantages (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994; Lerner, 1994b).
The improvement of the capacity to add value to the portfolio companies may also
motivate syndication. Brander et al. (1999) compared the value-added hypothesis, the
selection hypothesis, and the financial risk-sharing hypothesis as explanations for
syndication, and did not find evidence to support financial risk-sharing as a major
rationale for syndication. Instead, their results favoured the value-added hypothesis.
Similarly, Lockett and Wright (2001) compared competing finance, resource-based, and
deal flow explanations for the syndication of venture capital investments. The motives of
syndicating a deal appeared to be driven more by financial considerations than the
exchange of firm-specific resources or deal flow. However, the resource exchange
argument, i.e., value added, was far more important for venture capitalists focusing on
early-stage investments rather than buyouts.
The social structure of syndication networks affects both the flow of information and the
propensity to syndicate investments. Sorenson and Stuart (2001) examined syndication
and the spatial distribution of U.S. venture capital investments. While venture capitalists
in general are geographically and industry-wise extremely focused, syndication networks
diffuse information across these boundaries, and expand the spatial radius of exchange.
Venture capitalists that build axial positions in the syndication network invest more
frequently in spatially distant companies. Position in the syndication network also affects
the possibilities venture capitalists have for establishing new syndication relationships.
14
Anand and Piskorski (2001) found that firms in central positions in the syndication
network can establish co-operation relationships with other firms regardless of their
financial resources. Conversely, peripheral firms can establish ties only if they possess
financial resources. Thus, central venture capitalists tend to sustain their positions over
time.
Performance of VC firms. Relatively few studies have examined the performance of
venture capital firms. One approach is to look at the returns of venture capital funds on
the money invested (Brophy and Gunter, 1988; Bygrave, 1989; Chiampou and Kallet,
1989). This stream has to some extent suffered from a lack of data on the actual internal
rates of returns of venture capital funds. However, all three studies have been able to
gather a representative dataset of U.S. or multiple-country VCs by conducting surveys or
by examining a selected sample of venture capital firms. Generally, the results state that
venture capital funds provide returns in excess of 15% per annum, but that the standard
deviation of the returns is very high compared to public market securities. Another
approach would be to look at the returns on the individual investments that ultimately
constitute the performance of a venture capital firm. However, selection bias and the
limited amount of data available for non-public companies has severely limited the
adoption of this approach (Cochrane, 2001).
Relationship between venture capitalists and limited partners. This stream includes
research on the organisation of venture capital activities and fundraising, contracting
between investors and venture funds, incentives of venture capitalists to act in the
interest of the limited partners, and the compensation of the venture capital firm’s
general partners. Among others, Sahlman (1990), Gompers and Lerner (1996), Black
and Gilson (1998), Gompers and Lerner (1999a), and Gifford (1997) have examined
the topic.
The venture capital investment process and selection criteria, first modelled by Tyebjee
and Bruno (1984), have been exhaustively examined using the survey method
(MacMillan et al., 1985; MacMillan et al., 1987; Rea, 1989, Rah et al., 1994), and the
real-time policy capturing methodology (Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000). Similarly,
related information acquisition strategies have been compared to those of bankers
(Rosman and O’Neill, 1993). In contrast to typical bankers, venture capitalists typically
focus on strategic data rather than historical financial data or projections when making
investments (Rosman and O’Neill, 1993). Gompers (1995) analysed the optimal staging
of venture capital investments, and noted that staging investments creates value to both
the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. In addition, several other authors have
examined the investment process (Table 1).
Governance and contracting. The structuring of contracts between venture capitalists
and entrepreneurs has been a popular topic of venture capital research. The agency
perspective on contracting (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is particularly popular in the
finance-oriented papers (Sahlman, 1990; Sahlman, 1993; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994;
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Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Hellmann, 1998) as well as some papers in the
management stream (e.g. Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Fiet, 1995). The agency
perspective typically assumes that the entrepreneur is an agent for the venture capitalist,
who acts as the principal, providing funds at the entrepreneur’s disposal. Conflicts in the
parties’ interests create ex ante agency costs that can be offset by properly structuring the
investment contracts. For example, the gap between the entrepreneur’s and the venture
capitalist’s future cash flow expectations can be closed by issuing call options to the
entrepreneur (Sahlman, 1990). Managing the agency issues also requires venture
capitalists to establish appropriate control mechanisms to oversee the portfolio
companies (Lerner, 1995), and, strictly speaking, requires VCs to hold their equity stake
constant across financing rounds (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994).
Investor value-added. Do venture capitalists add value other than money, and do they
have a different role from traditional financial intermediaries? Rosenstein (1988)
explored the board work of venture capital backed new ventures, and found that boards
consist of outsiders rather than insiders, that some outside members had a high degree of
expertise, and that board meetings frequently revised strategic issues. Venture capitalists
can also add value through learning effects. Barney et al. (1996) found that experienced
entrepreneurs value both managerial and operational advice less than inexperienced
entrepreneurs, but that current firm performance is not related to the evaluation of VC
advice. Sapienza (1992) surveyed U.S. entrepreneurs on the role of venture capitalists,
and noted that innovation intensity, frequency of contacts, open communication, and a
conflict-free relationship between the VC and the entrepreneur enhance the impact of
venture capital on company performance. MacMillan et al. (1988), Gorman and
Sahlman (1989), Rosenstein et al. (1993), and Sapienza et al. (1996) further examined
the mechanisms through which venture capitalists add value in their portfolio
companies. Venture capitalists assist new ventures in monitoring financial and
operational performance, recruitment of management, arranging financing from
complementary sources, serving as a sounding board for the entrepreneur team,
arranging incentive plans, providing access to auditors, lawyers, and investment banks,
and setting company policies.
Evidence also suggests that venture capitalists play roles over and beyond those of
traditional financial intermediaries. Gompers and Lerner (1999c) compared a large
sample of corporate venture capital transactions to ordinary venture capital transactions.
The data supported the existence of complementarities that allow corporations to add
value to portfolio firms. Maula (2001) and Maula and Murray (2001) concluded that
venture capitalists have complementary value-adding roles with other types of investors,
such as corporate venture capitalists. Hellman and Puri (2000) found that venture
capital financing is associated with a significant reduction in the time to bring a product
to market, and that venture capital financing is related to the choice of product market
strategy. Thus, venture capitalists are significantly involved in the activities of their
portfolio companies. Hellman and Puri (2002) noted that venture capital financing is
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also related to a variety of professionalisation measures, such as human resource policies,
the adoption of stock option plans, the hiring of a vice president of marketing, and the
replacement of the CEO.
Venture capital backed initial public offerings. The financial economics stream of
venture capital research has notably focused on examining initial public offerings,
potentially because the IPO enables the application of the IPO anomaly and efficient
market hypotheses, and because share price data are easily available from the IPO
onwards. New ventures are also valued for the first time in a competitive marketplace at
the time of the IPO. Barry et al. (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991), Lerner (1994a),
Gompers (1996), Gompers and Lerner (1998), Lin and Smith (1998), and Gompers and
Lerner (1999d) have published the key papers concerning IPO underpricing and the
venture-capital backed IPO as an event. Venture capital backed IPOs suffer from
smaller underpricing because of the certification effect. Similarly, VC-backed IPOs
perform better in the long run than non-VC-backed IPOs (Brav and Gompers, 1997;
Jain and Kini, 2000). The general long-term underperformance of IPOs results mainly
from small, non-VC-backed IPOs (Brav and Gompers, 1997). The presence of venture
capitalists also improves the survival probability of IPO issuing firms (Jain and Kini,
2000).
Table 1 summarises the key refereed articles, books, and recent working papers on
venture capital. The table does is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, I have
attempted to point out the most frequently cited and relevant pieces of research on
venture capital in refereed academic journals and key books. In this classification, the
financial economics stream includes the following journals that have published articles
on venture capital: Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of
Financial Studies, Journal of Business, Financial Management, RAND Journal of
Economics, Journal of Law and Economics, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of
Corporate Finance, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, and Accounting and
Business Research. The Journal of Private Equity is not included in the list because of
its less formal, practitioner nature. Venture Capital: An International Journal of
Entrepreneurial Finance is also omitted because this journal is not yet included in the
Social Sciences Citation Index. The entrepreneurship and management stream
includes the Administrative Science Quarterly, Academy of Management Journal,
Strategic Management Journal, Management Science, Journal of Business Venturing,
Journal of Management Studies, R&D Management, International Small Business
Journal, and Omega. Articles published in Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research are
not included in this summary unless they have been published in one of the refereed
journals. The “sociology and other” column in Table 1 attempts to capture other
venture capital articles relevant to this dissertation that have appeared in journals not
belonging to the two mainstreams of venture capital research.
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Table 1 Refereed journal articles, selected books, and recent working papers on venture
capital
JF = Journal of Finance, JFE = Journal of Financial Economics, RFS = Review of Financial Studies, JB =
Journal of Business, FM = Financial Management, RAND = RAND Journal of Economics, JLE = Journal
of Law and Economics, JBF = Journal of Banking and Finance, JBFA = Journal of Business Finance and
Accounting, JCF = Journal of Corporate Finance, NBER = National Bureau of Economic Research, ASQ =
Administrative Science Quarterly, AMJ = Academy of Management Journal, SMJ = Strategic
Management Journal, MS = Management Science, JBV = Journal of Business Venturing, JMS = Journal
of Management Studies, ISBJ = International Small Business Journal, AJS = American Journal of
Sociology, EJOR = European Journal of Operational Research, OM = Omega, RDM = R&D Management,
WP = Working paper.
Topic / Stream Financial economics Entrepreneurship and management Sociology and other
Review articles
and books on VC
Sahlman (1990, JFE)
Barry (1994, FM)
Wright and Robbie (1998, JBFA)
Gompers and Lerner (2000)
Gompers and Lerner (2001)
Timmons and Bygrave (1986, JBV)
Bygrave and Timmons (1992)
Bygrave et al. (1999)
Relationship
between VC and
limited partners
Sahlman (1990, JFE)
Gompers and Lerner (1996, JLE)
Black and Gilson (1998, JFE)
Gompers and Lerner (1999a, JFE)
Gifford (1997, JBV)
VC investment
process
Sahlman (1990, JFE)
Fried and Hisrich (1994, FM)
Gompers (1995, JF)
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984, JMS)
MacMillan et al. (1985, JBV)
MacMillan et al. (1987, JBV)
Rea (1989, JBV)
Hall and Hofer (1993, JBV)
Rosman and O’Neill (1993, JBV)
Chua and Woodward (1993, JBV)
Rah et al. (1994, JBV)
Steier and Greenwood (1995, JMS)
Muzyka et al. (1996, JBV)
Boocock and Woods (1997, ISBJ)
Shepherd (1999, MS)
Zacharakis and Meyer (1998, JBV)
Zacharakis and Meyer (2000, JBV)
Shane and Cable (2002, MS)
Siskos and
Zopounidis (1987,
EJOR)
Governance,
control, and VC
– entrepreneur
agreements
Sahlman (1990, JFE)
Admati and Pfleiderer (1994, JF)
Lerner (1995, JF)
Trester (1998, JBF)
Bergemann and Hege (1998, JBF)
Hellman (1998, RAND)
Fenn and Liang (1998, JBF)
Baker and Gompers (2000, WP)
Kirilenko (2001, JF)
Bruno and Tyebjee (1985, JBV)
Ruhnka and Young (1987, JBV)
Dean and Giglierano (1990, JBV)
Bowden (1994, JBV)
Sapienza and Gupta (1994, AMJ)
Fiet (1995, JMS)
Barney et al. (1996, JBV)
Sapienza and Korsgaard (1996, AMJ)
Syndication of
VC investments
Lerner (1994b, FM) Bygrave (1987, JBV)
Bygrave (1988, JBV)
Brander et al. (1999, WP)
Lockett and Wright (2001, OM)
Sorenson and Stuart
(2001, AJS)
Anand and Piskorski
(2001, WP)
Risk, return, and
valuation in VC
Huntsman and Hoban (1980, FM)
Gompers and Lerner (2000, JFE)
Kirilenko (2001, JF)
Ruhnka and Young (1991, JBV)
Seppä and Laamanen (2001, RDM)
Cochrane (2001, WP)
Manigart et al. (2002, JBV)
Investor value-
added in VC-
backed firms
Gompers and Lerner (1999c, NBER)
Hellman and Puri (2000, RFS)
Hellman and Puri (2002, JF)
Rosenstein (1988, JBV)
MacMillan et al. (1988, JBV)
Gorman and Sahlman (1989, JBV)
Sapienza (1992, JBV)
Rosenstein et al. (1993, JBV)
Sapienza et al. (1996, JBV)
Barney et al. (1996, JBV)
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Table 1 (continued)
Certification by
VCs; VC
prominence and
reputation
Barry et al. (1990, JFE)
Megginson and Weiss (1991, JF)
Gompers (1996, JFE)
Gompers and Lerner (1998, JF)
Amit et al. (1998, JBV)
Stuart et al. (1999, ASQ)
Podolny and
Feldman (1997,
WP)
Podolny (2001, AJS)
VC-backed initial
public offerings;
IPO event
Barry et al. (1990, JFE)
Megginson and Weiss (1991, JF)
Lerner (1994a, JFE)
Gompers (1996, JFE)
Gompers and Lerner (1998, JF)
Lin and Smith (1998, JCF)
Gompers and Lerner (1999d, JLE)
Baker and Gompers (2000, WP)
Stuart et al. (1999, ASQ)
Performance of
VC-backed
companies; long-
run performance
of VC-backed
IPOs
Brav and Gompers (1997, JF)
Jain and Kini (2000, JBFA)
Ruhnka et al. (1992, JBV)
Performance of
VC firms
Brophy and Guthner (1988, JBV)
Chiampou and Kallet (1989, JBV)
Bygrave (1989, JBV)
Cochrane (2001, WP)
Other Elango et al. (1995, JBV)
Freear and Wetzel (1990, JBV)
Norton and Tenenbaum (1993, JBV)
Florida and Kenney (1988, JBV)
Manigart (1994, JBV)
2.2 Asymmetric information, signalling, and certification
Summary of the theories
Asymmetric information refers to market information that certain economic actors
possess but others do not. While the traditional neo-classical literature on economics
generally assumes perfect markets and equally distributed, symmetric market
information across actors, Akerlof (1970) demonstrated how the unequal distribution of
information affects economic exchange. Using the market for used cars as an example,
Akerlof showed how quality uncertainty can cause a market failure. In the market for
used cars, and several generalisations of it, buyers face difficulties in verifying the quality
of the cars they intend to buy from previous owners that have, in contrast, developed an
accurate understanding on the actual quality of the cars. However, the owners of good-
quality cars cannot convey their quality information reliably to the buyers. The owners
of ‘lemons’, or cars of inferior quality, will claim their cars to be of good quality because
they know that it is impossible for buyers to distinguish good cars from bad cars. Since
all rational sellers claim their cars to be of good quality, the equilibrium price should be
uniform across the market. However, because informational asymmetries prevent the
buyers from distinguishing ‘lemons’, buyers require a discount that offsets their risk of
adverse selection based on the average quality of cars in the market. Sellers, however,
would be willing to place only ‘lemons’ for sale at that price. This causes the market to
collapse: Akerlof (1970) shows that the result is a complete market failure, in which no
transactions take place at any price.
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In addition to the car market, Akerlof (1970) suggested several applications for his
theory, including insurance, the job market, the cost of dishonesty, and the credit
markets in underdeveloped countries. He also hypothesised that the theory could
explain the existence of several economic institutions counteracting the adverse effects
of informational asymmetries, such as guarantees, brand names, enterprise chains,
licensing practices, and education. Akerlof’s theory on asymmetric information has
served as a basis for many further theories, including those of market signalling and
certification, and was awarded the Nobel prize for economic sciences together with
related work by A. Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz in 2001.
Signalling refers to activities by which the effects of informational asymmetries can be
reduced. Signals, on the other hand, are the characteristics that reduce informational
asymmetries. Signalling was first formulated as part of economic theory by Spence
(1973; 1974), although Akerlof (1970) suggested several mechanisms that exist in real
life because they reduce informational asymmetries between buyers and sellers.
According to Spence’s (1974:10) definition, the observable and alterable characteristics
of an economic actor are potential or actual signals, depending on whether they actually
affect others’ quality assessments of the focal actor. Signals may include both elements
that increase the amount of information other actors possess about the focal actor, and
elements that alter their beliefs about the focal actor. As Spence (1974:1) writes,
“Market signals are activities or attributes of individuals in a market which, by design or
accident, alter the beliefs of, or convey information to, other individuals in the market.”
Spence (1973; 1974) formulated the signalling theory using the job market as an
example, but the results are directly applicable to several other economic transactions.
In the presence of neither signals nor observable but unalterable characteristics known
as indexes, employers make their hiring decisions based on the unconditional
probability that an applicant, drawn randomly from the applicant pool, will be
productive. Such complete asymmetry of information between the employer and the
applicant penalises applicants that are actually productive, and improves the position of
applicants that are unproductive since the employer will pay all new hires the expected
marginal product of the average applicant.
If signalling is possible (or indexes exist), the situation changes notably. Instead of
estimating the unconditional probability of the applicant’s being productive, the
employer can estimate the conditional probability of employee productivity, given the
observable characteristics of the applicant. Some of the potential signals may turn out to
have an impact on the conditional probability estimate of productivity that the employer
makes on the basis of past experience. For example, an employer would provide
applicants with a high education level a higher level of salary if the employer’s previous
experience indicated that high education yielded higher productivity. After observing
the true productivity of the new hire, the employer would adjust his assessment of the
effect of education on the conditional probability of an applicant being productive. As a
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result, productive applicants have an incentive to convey signals of their actual quality to
the employer in order to maximise their pay.
However, there are conditions affecting the ability to signal. In order to be actual, i.e.
reliable and effective, signals must fulfil two conditions (Spence 1974: 15). Firstly,
signals must be costly to adjust. If there were no costs, all actors would adjust their
signals to yield the maximum gain, and signals would have no informational content.
Secondly, the adjustment cost must be negatively correlated with actual quality
(productive capability in the context of the job market). Higher-quality actors should be
able to adjust their signals at a lower cost than low-quality actors. Spence (1974: 18-26)
shows that the negative correlation between adjustment costs and actual quality is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for signalling to take place. For signalling to be
effective, it is further required that a sufficient number of signals within the appropriate
cost range of signalling exists (Spence 1974: 26).
Signalling has been a popular topic in the finance literature because informational
asymmetries between buyers and sellers are particularly pronounced in capital markets.
Entrepreneurs and existing shareholders may possess superior information about their
firm in comparison with prospective outside investors – in the same way as Akerlof’s
(1970) car-sellers with regard to their cars. Similarly, borrowers know their willingness
and ability to pay back the loan better than lenders. However, moral hazard prevents
both firm insiders and borrowers from conveying their inside information reliably to the
market. There may be substantial returns on dishonestly overstating the quality of the
firm’s future prospects or the borrower’s ability to pay back the loan, and the verification
of the true characteristics of the firm or the borrower by outside parties may be costly or
impossible.
Leland and Pyle (1977) are frequently cited for their initial formulation of a signalling
hypothesis for the debt market. Entrepreneurs face great difficulties in conveying their
private information about the quality of their project in the market because they have an
incentive not to do so – they face the moral hazard problem. Although the information
that entrepreneurs can convey does not fulfil the conditions of a signal, the actions of
entrepreneurs can be observed and utilised as signals of the project’s quality. In
particular, Leland and Pyle (1977) demonstrated that the willingness of entrepreneurs to
invest in their own project while raising debt produces an actual signal of the true
quality of the project. Lenders will place a value on the project that reflects the
information transferred by the signal. Signalling is reliable because entrepreneurs need
to take larger equity positions in their own firms than they would if information transfer
were possible, and thus face additional costs.
Financial intermediaries that provide market participants with objective information
could, in principle, reduce the adverse effects of asymmetric information in the market.
However, intermediaries that evaluate entrepreneurs’ projects also face a moral hazard
problem because their evaluation actions are unobservable to the market, and because
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honest mistakes in evaluation are possible. Intermediaries may thus have an incentive
not to use as many resources in information production as they claim to have used.
Campbell and Kracaw (1980) argued that a financial intermediary can mitigate this
moral hazard problem by investing its own wealth in the project. Intermediation alone
does not resolve the problems of informational asymmetries and moral hazard. Rather, a
sufficient capital outlay of the intermediary’s own wealth in the project is required to
make cheating sub-optimal.
Further studies have extended the basic framework of financial intermediation and
informational asymmetry. Motivated by Leland and Pyle (1977) and Campbell and
Kracaw (1980), Chan (1983) showed how informed intermediaries increase the welfare
of investors by inducing entrepreneurs to offer high-return projects. Myers and Majluf
(1984) demonstrated that, together with other issues, and consistent with informational
asymmetries, issuing shares when management has inside information results in a fall in
the share price. Insiders have information that outside investors do not have, which
enables insiders to exploit situations where outsiders may have overestimated the future
cash flows to be received by investors in a new issue.
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) presented a generalisation of Leland and Pyle (1977).
Since issuers have more information about the true future cash flows of the firm, firms
should signal both the expected value and the risk of their projects in initial public
offerings. In order to do so, firms convey an additional signal, offer underpricing, in
addition to the ownership signal of Leland and Pyle (1977). Welch (1989) modelled
how high-quality firms underprice their IPOs in order to obtain a higher price in a
subsequent seasoned offering. These firms use underpricing as a signal of the actual
quality of the firm. Low-quality firms, on the other hand, must invest in mimicking
high-quality firms, and with some probability their mimicking is revealed between the
IPO and the subsequent seasoned offering. Underpricing by truly high-quality firms can
then add sufficient signalling costs to these imitation cost to induce low-quality firms to
reveal their true status voluntarily.
Gale and Stiglitz (1989) demonstrated that the traditional IPO signalling models
(Leland and Pyle, 1977; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989) break down if insiders are allowed
to sell equity more than once. Future possibilities of selling equity allow the firm to
cover the costs of signalling falsely in the beginning. Thus, it is very difficult, if not
impossible, for company insiders to signal the true quality of their firm in practice.
Certification refers to the ability of third parties to reduce the quality uncertainty about
parties associated with them. Although the word ‘certification’ had already been used by
Akerlof (1970) in the context of institutions counteracting informational asymmetries,
the formal certification hypothesis of Booth and Smith (1986) established the concept in
the context of financial markets and intermediaries. Booth and Smith (1986) modelled
the ability of underwriters to certify the price of risky issues in markets characterised by
asymmetric information between insiders and prospective outside investors. The
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certification hypothesis derives from previous reputational signalling arguments that
demonstrate how non-salvageable capital expenditures can serve as effective bonds to
guarantee the quality of a firm’s products (Klein and Leffler, 1981). Customers view
non-salvageable investments as commitments to product quality. Similarly, Booth and
Smith (1986) argue that prospective investors view the reputational capital commitment
of the underwriter of a share issue as a commitment to the quality of the issue. In effect,
investment banks ‘lease’ their brand name to the issuing firm to certify that the issue
price reflects all inside information.
Booth and Smith (1986) additionally developed three key criteria for credible
certification in the context of capital markets. Firstly, underwriters can become credible
by accumulating reputational capital that is at stake at every subsequent issue. Secondly,
new underwriters can build reputation by underpricing issues in the short run and
absorbing the underpricing loss. Thirdly, reputable underwriters can protect their
reputation by voluntarily making restitution purchases if the issue appears to be
overpriced. Empirical evidence regarding the ability to certify the prices of initial public
offerings supports these predictions. Johnson and Miller (1988) found that prestigious
underwriters underprice less than non-prestigious bankers, that low initial returns are
caused by differences in offering risk alone, and that the low initial returns exhibited by
prestigious bankers are caused by the tendency to associate with less risky issues more
frequently than non-prestigious bankers. Furthermore, Beatty and Ritter (1986)
demonstrated that there exist a monotonic relationship between the expected
underpricing of an initial public offering and the uncertainty of investors regarding its
value. The more uncertain an offering, the more it will be underpriced. Additionally,
they showed that investment bankers who “cheat” on issue pricing will lose either
potential investors (too low underpricing) or potential issuers (too high underpricing).
Carter and Manaster (1990) established a methodology to measure underwriter
reputation using a finer grid than that of Johnson and Miller (1988), and examined the
effect of underwriter prestige on IPO underpricing and riskiness. They constructed a
prominence score on the basis of the position of the investment banks’ names in a large
sample of IPO tombstone advertisements. The higher the name appeared, the more
prestigious the bank was considered to be. Carter and Manaster (1990) found that their
prestige score was significantly and negatively related to the extent of underpricing, and
that more prestigious investment banks underwrote less risky issues. Thus, underwriter
prominence represents a signal of quality to the market. Megginson and Weiss (1991)
constructed an underwriter reputation measure based on the IPO market share of
investment banks, and found that bank reputation is negatively related to the extent of
underpricing of offerings. Furthermore, Carter et al. (1998) compared the performance
of three different underwriter prestige measures. They found that underwriter
prominence is not only negatively related to the underpricing of IPOs but also tends to
reduce the long-run underperformance of IPO issuing firms.
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Extending the contributions of these previous researchers, Chemmanur and Fulghieri
(1994) developed a model of the impact of investment bank reputation on the cost of
issuing shares, providing several important empirical implications. Firstly, the greater
the reputation of an investment bank, the more effective it is in reducing the impact of
information asymmetry in the equity market. Secondly, the greater the underwriter’s
reputation, the larger the fees charged. Thirdly, the proceeds to a firm selling equity, net
of underwriter fees, increase with underwriter reputation.
Asymmetric information, signalling, and certification in the venture capital context
In the context of venture capitalists and their portfolio companies, informational
asymmetries exist between existing shareholders and prospective outside investors
principally in the same sense as asymmetries exist between the insiders and outsiders of
any firm. Insiders are better informed of the actual future prospects of the venture, and
rational outside investors recognise the possible incentives for the insiders to overstate
the value of the firm when issuing equity.
Following the general theories developed to explain the role of financial intermediaries
in resolving informational asymmetries between company insiders and outside investors,
several authors have analysed the role of venture capitalists as such intermediaries. Barry
et al. (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) focused on the ability of venture
capitalists to resolve informational asymmetries in initial public offerings. Because of
their certification abilities, venture capitalists help firms to access higher-quality
underwriters than firms without venture capitalist backing. Furthermore, as the
certification hypothesis predicts, the underpricing of venture capital backed IPOs is
significantly smaller than that of other IPOs. The market interprets the presence of
venture capitalists as a signal of the actual quality of the issuing firm. Evidence from
longer-term certification of venture capitalists also exists. Brav and Gompers (1997)
analysed the long-run performance of venture capital backed and non-venture capital
backed initial public offerings and found, consistent with the informational asymmetries
hypothesis, that venture capital backed offerings outperform others in the long run.
Megginson and Weiss (1991) argued that venture capitalists can certify the price of
initial public offerings because three essential criteria of credible certification are
fulfilled. Firstly, VCs have reputational capital at stake because they are present in the
IPO market on an on-going basis and because they continuously participate in a stream
of direct equity investments in new ventures. VCs thus have an incentive to establish a
trustworthy reputation in order to access the IPO market on favourable terms in the
future. Furthermore, the greater a venture capital firm’s perceived access to the IPO
market, the more attractive it is to entrepreneurs. Similarly, a reputation for competence
will allow venture capitalists to establish enduring relationships with limited partners
that provide the funds to be invested.
The second criterion for credible certification is that the value of the venture capitalist’s
reputational capital must exceed the maximum possible benefit from false certification.
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Sahlman (1990) documented that the very high returns of successful venture capitalists
are directly related to the age, size, and historical performance of the VC fund, that
successful VCs are able to establish profitable follow-on funds, and that the VC labour
market is efficient with constant monitoring of individual performance. Consequently,
Megginson and Weiss (1991) argued that investments in reputational capital are
necessary for venture capitalists to stay competitive in the industry and capital markets.
Thirdly and finally, certification by venture capitalists should be credible because it is
costly for the issuing firm to obtain the certificate, and because low information quality
firms find certification more costly than high information quality firms. Venture
capitalists require significant returns for their investments, depending on the stage of
development, i.e. the information quality, of the venture. The annual required rates of
return may be as high as 75% for early-stage ventures (Ruhnka and Young, 1991),
whereas the required rate of return varies between 25% and 35% in the case of later-
stage ventures. In addition, venture capitalists structure their deals so that a large part of
the actual risk is shifted to the entrepreneur, thereby creating high costs of certification
for low-quality firms. Such deal structures include, for example, the use of staged
investment, the use of convertible preferred stock, and the option to replace the
entrepreneur (Sahlman, 1990). In addition, low-quality firms find it difficult to obtain
financing at all, because venture capitalists effectively evaluate and screen their
prospective investments, and invest in a small percentage of initially recognised
ventures.
Besides being a measure of the ability to certify IPO prices, the prominence of venture
capital firms also affects their incentives to make lower-quality portfolio companies
public. Gompers (1996) analysed the relationship between venture capitalist
prominence and the incentives to make portfolio companies public, and found that
young venture capital firms tend to rush for portfolio company IPOs in order to create
initial reputation, and to demonstrate their ability to evaluate the quality of their
portfolio companies.
Critiques might point out that informational asymmetries are not necessarily applicable
to the venture capital setting because entrepreneurs might not actually have more
information about the prospects of a new venture than experienced outside investors,
especially in the early stages of the venture’s development. Additionally, venture
capitalists typically have an experience of several hundred evaluations of business
proposals, which should make them more competent in evaluating a new business than
a single entrepreneur with possibly inflated expectations for his idea. Quality uncertainty
in Akerlof’s (1970) sense might thus not exist.
While the argument of the evaluation experience of venture capital investors is probably
true, it is unlikely that venture capital investors would have evaluation capabilities that
could resolve all the informational asymmetries inherent in their investments. It is also
likely that evaluation capabilities and thus certification abilities vary among venture
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capitalists. Furthermore, the wide body of theoretical research on the role of financial
intermediaries as parties resolving informational asymmetries in equity issues suggests
that venture capitalists fulfil the criteria of a third party with a certifying ability. For
example, the condition of committing one’s own capital to the project (Campbell and
Kracaw, 1980) is fulfilled because VCs invest significant amounts of their own capital in
the new ventures that they attempt to certify (Gompers and Lerner, 2001: 108), and
because venture capitalists’ compensation is determined largely by the success of their
investments (Gompers and Lerner, 1999a). Similarly, VCs have been demonstrated to
acquire reputational capital (Gompers, 1996), and fulfil the key criteria for credible
signalling (Megginson and Weiss, 1991).
Finally, the fact that venture capitalists have developed several mechanisms that attempt
to resolve the informational asymmetries inherent in the investment process (Sahlman,
1990) supports the existence and importance of informational asymmetries in the
venture capital context. These mechanisms include due diligence rights, staged
investment, monitoring rights, and typically tight contractual arrangements that give
several rights and options to venture capitalists. As a result, informational asymmetries
are likely to play a significant role when new ventures with venture capitalist backing
issue equity to outside investors.
2.3 Social structural view and social network theory
Summary of the theory
Theories of social networks have had important implications on how organisational
activities are viewed by researchers and practitioners. Sociological theories were
gradually introduced into organisational research in order to supplement the over-
rationalised models of neo-classical economics that treated economic actors as atomic
and fully rational (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995).
The view of markets as social structures emerged in the 1980s (e.g., White, 1981; Baker,
1984) as economic sociology began to argue that markets are not atomised and purely
rational. One of the most cited pieces of work in economic sociology and the social
structural view is the paper by Granovetter (1985), who regarded economic action as
embedded in the social structure of the economic actors. The behaviour and institutions
analysed in economic systems are constrained by ongoing social relations so that it is
inappropriate to construe them as independent. While classical and neo-classical
economics operate with an atomised, undersocialised conception of human action, and
reformist economists tend to provide an over-socialised explanation of the same actions,
the concept of embeddedness should avoid the extremes of both views. Furthermore,
Granovetter pointed out that prior interactions with other economic actors are an
important source of information about the quality of these actors, using illustrations
such as “the widespread preference for transacting with individuals of known
reputation”, or actors resorting to “trusted informants”. The interfaces between business
26
organisations and markets, and market relations, are also affected by social structures
(Baker, 1990). As a result, corporations can directly manipulate the number and
intensity of market ties with other organisations.
The social structural view emerged as a popular framework for analysing the formation
of interorganisational alliances in the 1990s (Gulati, 1995). Prior alliances between
firms create a network of ties, a social network in which most firms are embedded. This
network acts as an important source of information about the reliability and capabilities
of current and potential partners. As a result, social networks of prior alliances play an
important role in shaping future alliance formation. Previously allied firms are likely to
engage in further alliances with each other. Furthermore, by integrating both critical
contingencies and social structural factors in the same model, Gulati (1995) united the
network and resource dependence theories in the study of interorganisational ties.
By extending previous, dyad-focused research on strategic alliances, Gulati (1998)
suggested that social networks are valuable conduits of information that provide both
opportunities and constraints for firms, and have important behavioural and
performance implications for their alliances. The more organisations can get
information through the network, the better they perform and the more opportunities
they have to establish new interorganisational relationships. Building upon the previous
studies, Baum et al. (2000) examined the impact of alliance network composition on the
performance of start-ups. While establishing alliances improves performance, variation
in alliance network composition rapidly produces significant differences in firm
performance.
Extending prior findings, Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) demonstrated that although
organisations enter alliances with each other to access critical resources, they rely on
information from the network of prior alliances to determine with whom they co-
operate. The probability of a new alliance between two organisations increases with
their prior mutual alliances, common third parties, and joint centrality in the alliance
network. Furthermore, the higher the structural differentiation of the emerging network,
the more organisational decisions about new partnerships are guided by endogenous
network considerations rather than by exogenous factors such as access to resources
(Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). The crowding and prestige of an actor’s network position
also explain relationship formation (Stuart, 1998). Firms with previous alliances benefit
from a form of relationship that provides them with privileged access to potential
exchange partners.
Firm-level examinations of the role of network resources in determining alliance
formation also indicate that accumulated network resources from prior alliances are
influential in firms’ decisions to enter new alliances (Gulati, 1999). However, prior
relationships and positions do not provide the only explanation for the formation of new
linkages. Ahuja (2000) argued and demonstrated that linkage-formation propensity is
explained by simultaneously examining both inducement and opportunity factors. He
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posited that three forms of accumulated capital – technical, commercial, and social –
can affect a firm’s capability to form linkages. Sociological dynamics can not fully
explain network formation. Rather, resource-based motives are also significant.
In addition to the social structural view fostered by economic sociology, social status is
one of the concepts of classic sociology that is relevant in the examination of the
positions and networks of economic actors. In his classic article on the reward systems of
science, Merton (1968) recognised the self-reinforcing positive effects of status. Eminent
scientists tend to receive a disproportionate amount of credit for their contributions, and
collaborative papers tend to produce a disproportionate degree of credit for the author
with the greatest reputation. People remember primarily the author they are already
familiar with from the past – the author with the higher status. This phenomenon, the
‘Matthew Effect’ (Merton, 1968), has since been documented in several contexts (e.g.
Podolny, 1993).
Status is an important concept in economic exchange because greater actor status
increases the utility derived from the association with or consumption of a good
(Podolny, 1993). Status also acts as an indication of the quality of the actor.
Furthermore, an actor’s network of relations mediates the link between quality and
status for two reasons. Firstly, the embeddedness of action in social relations can prevent
contact between producers and consumers that could potentially change the latter’s
opinion of the former. For example, low-status goods may not at all be considered
reasonable substitutes for high-status goods, and low-status producers cannot establish a
contact with purchasers of high-quality goods. Secondly, social relations also mediate
between status and quality because status flows through the interlinkages between
organisations.
Furthermore, status is a function of market uncertainty (Podolny, 1994). Organisations
become highly selective in their exchange relationships when uncertainty increases. In
times of uncertainty, organisations are more likely to exchange with partners familiar
from the past. When quality cannot be directly observed, economic actors increasingly
rely on status as the signal of the underlying quality of the exchange partner. An increase
in uncertainty thus causes organisations to enter into exchange relations with other
organisations of similar status (Podolny, 1994).
Social power and centrality form the basis for the measurement of status. Cook and
Emerson (1978) showed that power is an attribute of position in a network structure.
Bonacich (1987) constructed a generalisation of network centrality measures that
accounts for both power and centrality, depending on the symmetry or asymmetry of the
interactions. Bonacich’s measure soon became the standard centrality and status
measure in sociology (Podolny, 1993).
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The social structural view and social network theory in the venture capital context
In venture capital research, the social structural view and theories on social networks
have been tested in the empirical context of investment syndication networks. In his
analysis of the structure of U.S. venture capital syndication networks, Bygrave (1988)
used network measures and methodology drawn from sociology. While his approach was
not driven by the social structural view, the treatment of the group of syndication dyads
as a network of embedded economic action (Granovetter, 1985) established the first link
between venture capital research and social network theory.
The social structure of the network of venture capital firms significantly affects the
formation of investment syndicates. Drawing on two competing theories – resource
dependence and the social structural view – Anand and Piskorski (2001) tested whether
the possession of financial resources or prior network position determines future network
position. While peripheral venture capitalists found it difficult to syndicate with central
venture capitalists except if they held considerable financial resources, central VCs
could establish ties with other central firms despite limited monetary resources. Thus,
central venture capitalists tended to maintain privileged positions even if they did not
have attractive financial resources. The results of Anand and Piskorski (2001) support
both the exogenous and the endogenous view of network formation. While central firms
do not suffer the penalty of not possessing financial resources, and can sustain their
positions because of endogenous network formation, peripheral firms can take advantage
of exogenous network formation if they have attractive resources to exchange.
Adopting a status-based perspective, Podolny (2001) examined how the position of
venture capital firms in the network of syndication relationships affects their choice of
market segments. Whereas high status tends to drive venture capitalists towards less risky
market segments, the presence of structural holes in the network implies a shift from
low-risk to high-risk segments. Strategy choice and market behaviour are thus embedded
in the network of syndication relationships. Interfirm networks also affect the spatial
patterns of exchange in venture capital (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). While information
generally circulates within geographic and industry spaces, VCs that build axial
positions in the network can more often manage investments in spatially distant
companies.
2.4 Resource-based view of the firm
Summary of the theory
In her seminal work, Penrose (1959: 67) defined a firm’s resources as “physical things a
firm buys, leases, or produces for its own use, and the people hired on terms that make
them effectively part of the firm.” According to Penrose, the firm is a bundle of both
physical and human resources that enable it to exploit its “productive opportunity”. The
growth of the firm depends on and is limited by its resources and the managerial
competencies available to utilise the resource base.
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The term “resource-based” was introduced by Wernerfelt (1984). He criticised the then
dominant view of the firm as a collection of product-market positions, and argued that
firms are instead a collection of resources. Similarly, Rumelt (1984) suggested that the
combination of unique resources and relationships handled by the management
determines a firm’s competitive positioning.
However, resources are only those assets that will potentially generate economic benefit
and competitive advantage for the firm, and thus resources should have four distinctive
characteristics (Barney, 1991). Firstly, resources must be valuable to the firm, either in
terms of lower input costs or higher prices of outputs. Secondly, resources must be rare
or firm-specific. If resources are commonly held, they will not differentiate firms from
one another, and thus would not provide competitive advantage. Thirdly, resources
must be imperfectly imitable to sustain the competitive advantage in the long run.
Imperfect imitability, or inelastic supply (Barney, 1991) can be achieved if resources are
path dependent, causally ambiguous, or socially complex. Finally, resources must not be
substitutable. If resources could be replaced using strategically equivalent substitutes,
they would not provide competitive advantage. These factors imply that resources
cannot be instantaneously developed. Rather, they require time to accumulate.
Although Barney’s (1991) paper has become a key piece of research on the resource-
based view, other authors have contributed to the initiation of the research stream after
Wernerfelt (1984). Dierickx and Cool (1989) identified five factors that influence the
substitutability and imitability of resources. Firstly, time compression diseconomies
imply that it takes time to accumulate resources, and that a stream of investments of
constant size in resource accumulation produces diminishing returns over time.
Secondly, asset mass efficiencies are a source of competitive advantage because the
possession of an initial stock of resources tends to enhance the accumulation of
additional resources. Thirdly, assets may be interconnected so that the ability to
accumulate resources depends on the level of other resource stocks. Fourthly, assets
erode over time unless investment in keeping up the stock of resources is maintained.
Finally, causal ambiguity makes it difficult to identify and replicate the process of
accumulating the resource stock.
Further research on the resource-based view of the firm has extended the resource-based
theory from inside the firm to interorganisational relationships, such as alliances (e.g.
Das and Teng, 2000; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). The resource-based view has
additionally served as a starting point for several other related streams of research, such
as the knowledge-based view (e.g. Grant, 1996).
Resource-based view in the venture capital context
There is relatively little formal empirical literature on the resource-based view in the
venture capital context. From the portfolio company perspective, the research stream
focusing on the value added of venture capitalists is perhaps the most closely related
area of venture capital research (MacMillan et al., 1988; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989;
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Rosenstein et al., 1993; Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1996; Hellman and Puri 2000;
2002). While these papers generally examine venture capitalists as financial institutions,
and do not derive hypotheses explicitly from the resource-based view of the firm or from
any other clearly identifiable theory base, the arguments of these papers clearly refer to
resources as a competitive advantage.
The main question of the research stream on venture capitalists’ value added is whether
VCs add value in portfolio companies other than money. Money itself is a critical
resource for portfolio companies, but research has considered venture capitalists to be
active investors offering various value-adding services to their portfolio companies.
These activities include monitoring financial and operational performance, recruitment
of CEO and management, arranging financing from complementary sources, serving as
a sounding board for the entrepreneur team, arranging incentive plans, providing access
to auditors, lawyers, and investment banks, and setting company policies (MacMillan et
al., 1988; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Rosenstein et al., 1993; Sapienza, 1992;
Sapienza et al., 1996; Hellman and Puri, 2000; 2002). The value-adding activities
clearly aim at providing resources or accelerating the accumulation of resources within
portfolio companies. In particular, the role of venture capitalists in providing access to
financial and human resources is stressed in the literature on the value added of venture
capital firms.
There is even less literature focusing on venture capital firms from the resource-based
perspective. Previous research has identified that venture capital firms need, in
principle, three kinds of resources (Bygrave, 1987). Firstly, VCs need financial resources
– the capital to be invested in the portfolio companies. The second necessary resource is
a supply of potential investment targets, i.e. promising new ventures short of capital.
Finally, the VC firm must have applicable human resources. It must find competent
general partners and support staff to select and steer the portfolio companies. At various
times, these resources may be abundant or in short supply.
In spite of the lack of formal resource-based research on venture capital firms, a number
of studies have examined resource exchange in venture capital syndicates partly based
on resource-based theory. Bygrave (1987; 1988) examined the syndication of venture
capital investments using a resource dependence framework and resource-based
arguments to analyse the formation of venture capital co-investment relationships.
Bygrave (1987) found that the sharing of information and knowledge seems to be more
important than the sharing of financial resources as a reason for syndication. This is
fostered by the need to specialise in investments of a certain stage of development or
industry in order to add value to the investments.
Anand and Piskorski (2001) examined the role of financial resources and network
positions in the formation of venture capital syndicates. While peripheral firms need
financial resources to establish co-operative relationships with very central firms, other
central firms can establish syndication relationships despite the possible lack of financial
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resources. Anand and Piskorski (2001) argue that these findings support the social
structural view of venture capital syndication, but point out that the underlying reason
for establishing co-operative relationships must to some extent be the parties’ ability to
provide resources to each other.
2.5 Real options
Summary of previous research
The financial option-pricing theory by Black and Scholes (1973) solved many of the
difficulties in pricing financial derivatives. Soon after these findings, similarities between
financial derivative contracts and real investment opportunities began to attract interest
among researchers. Myers (1977) first identified the analogy between financial options
and real options. Specifically, he noted that the equity of a company has similar
characteristics to a call option. In effect, equity holders have a contingent claim on the
firm’s future cash flows.
The first applications of real option valuation were natural resource investments
(Tourinho, 1979). These applications provide a sound basis for applying real options
theory, since the market prices of natural resources are readily observable, and the
stochastic process of the market prices can be estimated using ideas from financial
options in a straightforward way. Brennan and Schwartz (1985) continued in this
application area by valuing gold mine reserves.
As the research stream started to expand, option pricing was connected to capital
budgeting, and models for the valuation of different types of real options began to arise.
McDonald and Siegel (1985; 1986) modelled abandonment options and options to
defer investment. A variety of different real options were identified and analysed during
the 1980s. Trigeorgis (1993b) summarised the research into different types of real
options by dividing real options into six categories. In principle, companies face options
to defer, options to stage investment, options to alter operating scale, options to switch,
and options to grow. Finally, according to Trigeorgis, there may be multiple real options
that interact. These options are described in more detail in Table 2, which also contains
the major contributors to the specific research fields.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the valuation of natural resource investments
remained an important area of real option research (Paddock et al., 1988; Morck et al.,
1989; Kemna, 1993). However, several new application areas were developed, such as
real estate (Stulz and Johnson, 1985; Williams, 1993; Quigg, 1993; 1995), research and
development (Morris et al., 1991; Newton and Pearson, 1994), mergers and acquisitions
(Hathaway, 1990; Smith and Triantis, 1995), and manufacturing (Aggarwal, 1991). The
options approach also received initial acceptance in management research (Kogut,
1991).
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Table 2 Common real options (partly adapted from Trigeorgis, 1993b and
Lander and Pinches, 1998)
Category Description Important in Selected references
Option to
defer
Management holds a lease on
valuable land or resources. It can
wait to see if output prices justify
constructing a building or plant, or
developing a field.
All natural resource extraction
industries; real estate
development; farming; paper
products
Tourinho, 1979; Bernanke,
1983; Titman, 1985;
McDonald and Siegel, 1986;
Lee, 1988; Paddock et al.,
1988; Pindyck, 1991; Ingersoll
and Ross, 1992; Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994; Kulatilaka,
1995; Quigg, 1995; Lee, 1997;
McGrath, 1997
Time to build
option
(staged
investment)
Staging investment as a series of
outlays creates the option to
abandon the enterprise in mid-
stream if new information is
unfavourable. Each stage can be
viewed as an option on the value of
subsequent stages, and valued as a
compound option.
All research and development
intensive industries, especially
pharmaceuticals; long
development capital-intensive
projects, e.g. large-scale
construction or energy-
generating plants; start-up
ventures
Baldwin, 1982; Majd and
Pindyck, 1987; Carr, 1988;
Trigeorgis, 1991; Sahlman,
1993; Teisberg, 1993;
Trigeorgis, 1993a; Kulatilaka,
1995; Smit, 1997
Option to
alter
operating
scale
If market conditions are more
favourable than expected, the firm
can expand the scale of production
or accelerate resource utilisation.
Conversely, if conditions are less
favourable than expected, it can
reduce the scale of operations. In
extreme cases, production may
temporarily halt and start up again.
Natural resource industries such
as mine operations; facilities
planning and construction in
cyclical industries; fashion
apparel; consumer goods;
commercial real estate
Brennan and Schwartz, 1985;
McDonald and Siegel, 1985;
Kulatilaka, 1995; Pindyck,
1988; Kogut, 1991; Mauer and
Triantis, 1994
Option to
abandon
If market conditions decline,
management can abandon current
operations permanently and realise
the resale value of capital
equipment and other assets in
second-hand markets.
Capital-intensive industries,
such as airlines and railways;
financial services; new product
introductions in uncertain
markets
Bonini, 1977; Howe and
McCabe, 1983; McDonald and
Siegel, 1986; Kulatilaka, 1995;
Berger et al., 1996
Option to
switch (e.g.
outputs,
inputs, or
risky assets)
If prices or demand change,
management can change the output
mix of the facility. Alternatively,
the same outputs can be produced
using different types of inputs.
Output shifts:
Any good sought in small
batches or subject to volatile
demand, e.g., consumer
electronics, toys, specialty
paper, machine parts and cars
Input shifts:
All feedstock-dependent
facilities, e.g., electric power,
chemicals, crop switching and
sourcing
Margrabe, 1978; Stulz, 1982;
Baldwin and Ruback, 1986;
Kulatilaka, 1995; Ikenberry
and Vermaelen, 1996
Growth
options
An early investment is a
prerequisite or link in a chain of
interrelated projects, opening up
future growth opportunities.
All infrastructure-based or
strategic industries, especially
high-tech, research and
development, or industries with
multiple product generations or
applications; multinational
operations; strategic
acquisitions
Myers, 1977; Pindyck, 1988;
Brealey and Myers, 1991;
Chung and Charoenwong, 1991;
Kulatilaka, 1995; Smith and
Triantis, 1995; Willner, 1995;
Berk et al., 1999
Multiple
interacting
options
Real-life projects often involve a
‘collection’ of various options, both
upward-potential enhancing calls
and downward-protection put
options present in combination.
Their combined option value may
differ from the sum of separate
option values; that is, they interact.
Real-life projects in most
industries discussed above
Trigeorgis, 1993a; Brennan
and Schwartz, 1985; Childs et
al., 1998; Laamanen, 1999
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From the mid-1990s onwards, research in real options and the valuation of investments
under uncertainty grew rapidly (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The research on real options
reached a critical mass with several models for different theoretical purposes and
applications, such as performance comparisons of different valuation paradigms, option
interdependencies, strategic options, and infrastructure options (Trigeorgis, 1995; 1996).
However, practical implementation issues have been ignored to a large extent in the
literature on real options. Researchers have largely focused on developing sophisticated
mathematical formulations of complicated valuation models, of which not all are likely
to be feasible in practice. The complexity and mathematical rigour in modelling tends
to inhibit many of the reverse-engineering possibilities that are highly valuable to real-
life decision-makers (Lander and Pinches, 1998).
Real options in the venture capital context
Previous research has applied real options to three areas in venture capital: venture
capital contracting, related agency conflicts, and valuation. Firstly, venture capital
contracts include several option-like features that aim at increasing the value of the
contract compared to a situation where no such features exist. Sahlman (1993) listed
three important contractual options typically included in venture capital agreements
with staged capital commitments. Firstly, by staging capital commitment, the venture
capitalist gains an option to abandon the venture at each stage. Secondly, the venture
capitalist gains an option to re-value the project at each stage as new information arrives.
Thirdly, the venture capitalist gains an option to increase the amount of capital
committed at each stage. Sahlman (1993) also shows that the series of options to
abandon creates a win-win situation for the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist, as
compared to up-front financing. The series of options thus creates additional value to
the contract. Gompers (1995) provides broad empirical evidence regarding the existence
of the option to abandon.
Secondly, direct entrepreneur – venture capitalist agency conflicts have been analysed
using options theory. Bergemann and Hege (1998) identified that the ownership share
of the entrepreneur reflects the value of a real option. The option is based on the control
of funds. Since the entrepreneur controls the allocation of funds invested in the
company, the allocation process is largely unobservable to the investor. Thus, the
entrepreneur may use the funds, for example, for his private purposes. Bergemann and
Hege (1998) argued that the solution to this agency conflict must take into account the
inter-temporal incentives for the entrepreneur. In contracting, the entrepreneur must be
compensated for both the foregone private benefits and for the downgrading of his
expectations about the future of the project. The longer the experimentation horizon,
the larger is the option value of the diversion.
Thirdly, Willner (1995) made one of the only attempts to model the value of a start-up
firm utilising option-pricing theory. He pointed out that many start-ups have the
characteristics of growth options but that traditional option methodology is inadequate
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for valuing them. Willner (1995) criticised the assumption of a continuous cash flow
generation process behind the traditional option methodology, and presented a jump
model for the pricing of start-up companies. However, Willner’s (1995) assumption of a
simple exponential growth process with upward jumps may be considered somewhat
restrictive. Additionally, there is little empirical evidence regarding the performance of
the model in practice.
3 SUMMARY OF THE ESSAYS
3.1 Valuation of venture capital investments: Empirical evidence1
The first essay of this dissertation constructs and tests a binomial option-based pricing
model for staged venture capital investments. Valuing high-growth, high-uncertainty
firms is a major challenge faced by most venture capital firms. A typical venture capital
valuation procedure involves an analysis of potential future cash flows, an analysis of
comparative firms’ stock prices or IPO performance, and an analysis of the price-to-
earnings ratio or the price-to-sales ratio of the venture. Yet, the resulting valuations of
these growth firms often seem to defy the common wisdom on growth firm valuation –
being exceptionally high during the boom years of 1998 – 2000, and slumping down
extremely rapidly after the collapse of share prices in the technology sector in March
2000.
In general, the theory of investment has made significant advances and enables
elaborate analyses of real options and option interactions (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994;
Trigeorgis, 1996; Brennan and Trigeorgis, 2000). Even the uncertainty inherent in
venture capital investments has been conceptually shown to be decomposable into a set
of options (Sahlman, 1990). Yet, the lack of empirical evidence showing the practical
applicability of option-based pricing models would seem effectively to inhibit their
adoption in practice. To address these questions, the first essay constructs a simple
binomial option-based pricing model for staged venture capital investments, tests the
model using actual valuation data, and analyses the risk-return structure of venture
capital investments using the model.
The empirical sample of the essay consists of 597 venture capital financing rounds made
in 176 U.S. venture capital backed companies that were listed on a U.S. stock exchange
in 1998 and 1999. The data set is compiled from the Venture Economics
Disbursements database, the SDC New Issues database, SEC IPO prospectuses, and the
U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago interest rate database. The statistical tests are
conducted using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models.
                                                
1 This essay was originally published in R&D Management 31(2), 2001, pp. 215-230. Reprinted with the
permission of Blackwell Publishers.
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The essay provides the following key results. Firstly, the binomial option-based pricing
model constructed in the essay is found to be consistent with previous knowledge of the
risk-return structure of VC investments. The implied volatility and the risk of VC
investments decreases as ventures reach higher stages of development. Secondly, the
predictive power of the binomial option-based model is found to be marginally better
than that of corresponding traditional models that use risk-adjusted rates of return and
actual success probabilities. The risk-neutral valuation estimates seem to be relatively
unbiased, since the mean and median estimation errors are found to be small.
Nevertheless, the variance of the estimation error is still considerable, which is
consistent with the ‘common sense’ observation that venture capital investments often
result in extreme outcomes.
The main implication of the essay is that option-based pricing models seem to have
relevance in venture capital applications. Even the simple risk-neutral binomial model
of the essay can provide a useful methodology for analysing the risk-return structure of
these investments. An important implication of this paper for researchers is that the risk
and implied volatility associated with privately held companies indeed decrease as they
reach higher stages of development. Thus, pricing models that assume constant volatility
are not likely to be applicable in venture capital or R&D project settings. However, the
results of the essay demonstrate that the problems of valuing new, high-growth
companies are difficult to solve merely by constructing new valuation models. The
uncertainty about the input parameters required to assess the value of a new venture
using any valuation framework remains, nevertheless, extremely high.
3.2 Certification and bargaining power in venture capital: The impact
of investor prominence on company valuations
The second essay demonstrates how the prominence of venture capital firms affects the
valuations of new ventures. According to theories of asymmetric information and
certification, prominent investors should be able to reduce the quality uncertainty
between new ventures and outside investors. Reducing quality uncertainty implies that
outside investors should be willing to pay more for ventures that have certifying
investors, and that certifying investors should possess bargaining power over the price of
the venture’s shares when investing for the first time in the venture.
In spite of the wide body of literature on the price-certifying role of third-party
specialists, previous research has mainly focused on the initial public offering and the
public markets (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Booth and Smith, 1986; Carter and Manaster,
1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Gompers, 1996; Carter et al., 1998). It has largely
ignored the venture capital setting and the highly uncertain private financing stages,
although certification should be most valuable when only little public and symmetric
information about the investment targets is available. Apart from the compensation of
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issue underwriters, previous research also lacks evidence regarding the bargaining power
of third parties over the price of the certification they provide.
Drawing on theories of asymmetric information, signalling, and certification, the second
essay addresses these two key questions. Firstly, it tests whether the prominence of
existing insider venture capitalists affects the valuation of the venture in subsequent
financing rounds when new outside investors invest in the venture (certification).
Secondly, the paper tests whether the prominence of new outside investors affects the
price they need to pay for the shares of the venture (bargaining power).
The essay is based on a large data set of 32,311 financing rounds in 13,048 U.S. venture
capital backed companies between 1990 and 2000. The data set is gathered from the
Venture Economics’ Disbursements database, the Venture Economics’ Fund
Commitments database, the Securities Data Corporation’s New Issues database, and
Securities and Exchange Commission’s IPO prospectuses. Venture capital valuations
are analysed using both hedonic pricing models, where all price observations are
regressed on a set of explanatory variables, and first differences of the venture valuations.
The essay utilises full maximum likelihood Heckman sample selection models to
overcome potential selection biases in the data set of venture capital valuations.
The results document that investor prominence has a significant effect on venture
capital valuations. Consistent with the theoretic predictions, the essay shows that
certification ability gives prominent venture capitalists bargaining power that they utilise
when investing in ventures for the first time. Furthermore, the essay demonstrates that
the prominence of existing venture capital investors improves valuations in future
financing rounds.
The essay suggests and attempts to eliminate several alternative explanations for the
results, including winner-picking by prominent venture capitalists, tangible value-adding
activities of the venture capitalists instead of certification only, and the period of the
study. Most importantly, the essay shows that the impact of investor prominence is
contingent on uncertainty, eliminating the possibility that only value-adding capabilities
would explain the findings. More uncertain ventures gain more benefit from the
presence of prominent insider investors, and are willing to offer larger discounts to new,
prominent outside investors than to less uncertain ventures. Because the effect of
prominence is contingent on uncertainty, prominent investors have certification abilities
that affect venture valuations. The findings do not, however, argue for or against the
potential tangible value-adding capabilities of venture capital investors. Rather, these
capabilities are likely to be complementary to the certification phenomenon
documented in the results.
In addition to the contributions on the theories of asymmetric information and
certification in the context of venture capital, the essay makes a number of
methodological and practical contributions. Firstly, the essay provides an approach for
measuring the prominence or reputation of venture capitalists. IPO market share is a
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consistent measure of prominence, being strongly correlated with investment
experience, and slightly less strongly with the age of the venture capital firm. Secondly,
the results imply that prominent venture capitalists reduce the cost of follow-up
financings. Finally, the results also suggests that investor prominence can and will be
leveraged in valuation negotiations with entrepreneurs.
3.3 Syndication and the efficiency of venture capital firms
The third essay sheds light on how syndication relationships affect the performance, and
thus the prominence, of venture capital firms. More specifically, the essay examines the
relationship between syndication and the efficiency of venture capital firms. While
previous research has extensively examined the reasons for establishing syndication
relationships, significantly fewer insights are provided into the impact of syndication on
the venture capital firm and on its ability to generate returns on its investments. To
provoke a structured discussion on the actual benefits and drawbacks of venture capital
syndication, this paper sets out to examine if and how syndication relationships affect
the efficiency of venture investors. The essay draws on six previously identified potential
motives for syndication, particularly the value-added motive (Bygrave, 1987; Brander et
al., 1999), the decision-making motive (Lerner, 1994b), the information-sharing motive
(Bygrave, 1987), and the window dressing motive (Lerner, 1994b).
The hypotheses of the essay predict that syndication has an impact on the efficiency of
venture capital firms. Essentially, it is posited (1) that the frequency of syndicating
investments improves the venture capital firms’ efficiency in creating public companies
from portfolio companies, and their efficiency in completing deals, (2) that the diversity
of syndication relationships improves the venture capital firms’ efficiency in creating
public companies from their portfolio companies, but can either increase or decrease
their efficiency in completing investments, and (3) that portfolio uncertainty intensifies
the impact of the frequency and diversity of syndication on firm efficiency. Venture
capitalists who appropriately manage their frequency of syndication and the diversity of
their syndication relationships should be able both to complete more investments with a
given amount of resources and time, and to create proportionally more public
companies from the companies that end up in their portfolio.
The essay is built upon an extensive longitudinal data set of the investments by the 100
largest U.S. venture capital firms between 1986 and 2000. The data set is compiled from
over 50,000 investments recorded in the Venture Economics database, hand-collected
data from the past issues of Pratt’s Guide to Venture Capital Sources, and IPO data from
Securities Data Corporation’s New Issues database. The analysis of the essay utilises
time series – cross sectional generalised least squares (GLS) regression methods.
The results provide support for the hypotheses on the impact of syndication on the
efficiency of venture capital firms. The key lever of enhancing the ‘hit rate’, or the
efficiency in creating public companies from the portfolio companies, appears to be the
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diversity of syndication relationships. Furthermore, investors who frequently engage in
syndicates can leverage their syndication partners to increase their efficiency in
completing deals. Additionally, the results demonstrate that uncertainty moderates the
relationship between syndication and the efficiency in creating public companies. The
more uncertain the venture capital firm’s investment portfolio, the more syndication
affects the efficiency of the firm. The positive contingency on portfolio uncertainty also
allows to reject the window dressing hypothesis as a potential alternative reason for the
findings.
The essay has several important implications. Firstly, the results provide understanding
on proper syndication strategies for venture capitalists. Both the diversity and frequency
of syndication relationships appear important in terms of efficiency especially when
uncertainty is high. Diversity, however, seems to be more powerful in explaining
efficiency in the creation of public companies from the portfolio companies. Diversity
improves the “hit rate” of venture capitalists. Thus, having a diverse set of syndication
partners is a potential success factor in venture capital investing especially in the case of
early-stage investments.
Secondly, venture capitalists can use syndication as a vehicle to adjust their deal
completion efficiency. Frequent syndication with a limited number of syndication
partners results in a larger number of deals being completed within a given period. The
“throughput” of the firm thus increases with the frequency of syndication. However, as
the diversity of syndication relationships increases, deal completion rates and the
“throughput” may start to decrease, although our results suggest that the effect is not
significant. Nevertheless, venture capitalists should attempt to balance their frequency of
engaging in investment syndicates and the diversity of their syndication relationships to
find an optimal combination of impact on the “hit rate” and the “throughput” of their
firm.
3.4 How the rich become richer in venture capital: Firm performance
and position in syndication networks
The fourth essay examines how positioning in syndication networks affects the
performance of venture capital firms, and how these firms gain central positions in the
network. Previous research has shown that both the resource-based theory of the firm
and the social structural view predict that well-connected firms with central positions in
collaborative networks should perform better than peripheral firms (Ahuja, 2000). The
theories posit that venture capitalists that have gained a central position in the
syndication network should, consequently, be able to achieve above-average
performance as a result of resource-based or social structural benefits. However, the
theories provide different explanations on what causes firms to obtain central positions.
The essay focuses on testing two competing hypotheses in order to examine the causality
of the hypothesised relationship between firm performance and network position. On
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one hand, the social structural hypothesis implies that prior position be the major
determinant of future position. On the other hand, resource-based reasoning suggests
that past performance should certify the resources of the focal firm, attract exchange
partners, and improve the network position of the focal firm.
The essay is built upon an extensive longitudinal data set of the investments by the 100
largest U.S. venture capital firms between 1986 and 2000. The data set is compiled from
over 50,000 investments recorded in the Venture Economics database, hand-collected
data from the past issues of Pratt’s Guide to Venture Capital Sources, and IPO data from
Securities Data Corporation’s New Issues database. The analysis of the essay utilises
distributed lag generalised least squares (GLS) regression methods with distributed lag
constructions of the variables. The longitudinal sample also allows tests of causality to be
performed (Granger, 1969).
The results of the essay demonstrate that network positions contribute to actual
performance, and that past positions constitute a dominant determinant of future
positions. Firms in central network positions increase their market share of portfolio
company initial public offerings in subsequent years. However, while past performance
is strongly associated with subsequent performance, prior network positions tend to
determine current positions. Past performance is not associated with subsequent position
centrality. Instead, past network position appears to represent a significant determinant
of both subsequent performance and subsequent network position. Changes in the
number of general partners are found to contribute to changes in existing network
positions, initially suggesting that the personal networks of individual partners may
transform into firm networks over time after partner acquisition.
The results have several implications. Firstly, the essay supports the social structural
view of inter-firm co-operative networks. The results suggest that venture capital firms
gain centrality by other means than signalling the quality of their resources, and that the
structure of venture capitalist syndication networks is rigid, and involves high barriers to
success for newcomer firms. Furthermore, the results suggest that new venture capital
firms may find it rewarding to seek central network positions by actively building
exchange relationships through syndication.
Table 3 provides a summary of the four essays of this dissertation, and Figure 2 illustrates
the positioning of the essays in the venture capital industry.
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Table 2 Summary of the essays
Essay 1 Essay 2 Essay 3 Essay 4
Title Valuation of venture
capital investments:
Empirical evidence
Certification and
bargaining power in
venture capital: The
impact of investor
prominence on company
valuations
Syndication and the
efficiency of venture
capital firms
How the rich become
richer in venture
capital: Firm
performance and
position in syndication
networks
Key
questions
What is the risk-return
structure of venture
capital backed
companies like?
How well does a
binomial pricing model
perform in the
valuation of such
companies?
Can prestigious venture
capitalists certify the
quality of new
ventures?
Do prestigious venture
capitalists utilise their
bargaining power over
the valuation of new
ventures?
Do the frequency of
syndication and the
diversity of syndication
relationships affect the
efficiency of venture
capital partnerships?
Does uncertainty
moderate the impact of
syndication on firm
efficiency?
Does the network
position of a venture
capital firm affect its
future performance?
Does the quality of
resources or prior
network position
explain the future
network position of a
venture capital
partnership?
Theory
base
Option-pricing theory Theory of asymmetric
information
Signalling theory
Certification hypothesis
Syndication theories Social structural view
vs. resource-based view
of the firm
Focus Portfolio company Venture capital firm –
portfolio company
relationship
Venture capital firm Venture capital firm
Unit of
analysis
Financing round Financing round Firm-year observation Firm-year observation
Research
design
Quantitative empirical,
cross-sectional
Quantitative empirical,
longitudinal
Quantitative empirical,
longitudinal
Quantitative empirical,
longitudinal
Sample 597 valuation
observations on U.S.
venture capital backed
companies, 1998 –
1999
Data comprises 421
valuations from venture
capital financing rounds
and 176 IPO valuations
32,311 traditional
venture capital
financing rounds in
U.S. ventures, 1990 –
2000
Data includes 5,679
rounds with disguised
valuation data
100 largest U.S.
independent private
venture capital
partnerships, 1986 –
2000
Data comprises 10,057
ventures and 29,967
financing rounds
(54,700 rounds in
constructing network
measures)
100 largest U.S.
independent private
venture capital
partnerships, 1986 –
2000
Data comprises 10,057
ventures and 29,967
financing rounds
(54,700 rounds in
constructing network
measures)
Key
methods
Descriptive quantitative
methods; OLS
regression
Heteroskedasticity-
consistent full
maximum likelihood
Heckman sample
selection regression
Maximum likelihood
generalised least
squares (GLS)
regression with fixed
effects
Maximum likelihood
generalised least
squares (GLS)
regression with
distributed lags and
fixed effects
Main data
sources
Venture Economics
Disbursements database
SDC New Issues
database
SEC IPO prospectuses
U.S. Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago
interest rate database
Venture Economics
Disbursements and
Fund commitments
databases
SDC New Issues
database
SEC IPO prospectuses
Venture Economics
Firms, Fund
commitments, and
Disbursement databases
SDC New Issues
database
SEC IPO prospectuses
Past issues of Pratt’s
Guides to Venture
Capital Sources
General partners’
résumés
Venture Economics
Firms, Fund
commitments, and
Disbursement databases
SDC New Issues
database
SEC IPO prospectuses
Past issues of Pratt’s
Guides to Venture
Capital Sources
General partners’
résumés
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Table 3 (continued)
Essay 1 Essay 2 Essay 3 Essay 4
Key results 1. The binomial option-
based pricing model of
the essay is consistent
with previous
knowledge on the risk-
return structure of VC
investments
2. The predictive power
of the binomial option-
based model is
somewhat better than
that of corresponding
DCF models, but
estimation errors are
still large
3. The implied volatility
(risk) of VC
investments decreases
as ventures reach
higher stages of
development
1. Prominent outside
venture capital
investors exercise
bargaining power over
the valuation of a
venture when investing
for the first time in it
2. Prominent venture
capitalists that have an
insider position in a
venture resolve quality
uncertainty over the
venture, resulting in
higher valuations by
new outside investors
3. The more
uncertainty, the more
valuable is the
certification by
prominent VCs
1. The diversity of
syndication
relationships improves
VCs’ overall efficiency
and efficiency in
creating public
companies from the
portfolio companies
2. The frequency of
syndicating investments
improves VCs’ overall
efficiency and especially
efficiency in completing
deals
3. Uncertainty
intensifies the impact of
both frequency and
diversity on firm
efficiency
1. A central position in
syndication networks
improves VC firm
performance
2. Prior position is a
major determinant of
future position in VC
syndication networks
3. VC firms in the most
central positions tend to
sustain their positions
over time, creating high
barriers to success for
newcomer firms
4. Changes in the
number of general
partners contribute to
changes in existing
network positions
Figure 1 Positioning of the essays in the venture capital industry
Venture capital fundVenture capital fundVenture capital fund
Management
firm and
managing
partners
Portfolio companies
Limited partners
Essay 4
Essay 3
Essay 2
Essay 1
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ESSAY 1:
VALUATION OF VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Abstract
This paper constructs a simple binomial valuation model in modelling the risk-
return profiles of venture capital investments, and tests the model using the valuation
data of 421 U.S. venture capital transactions and 176 initial public offerings. It is found
that the model is consistent with the previous knowledge on the risk-return profile of
venture capital investments. The results also confirm the hypotheses that early-stage
ventures have higher implied risk and implied volatility of returns than more established
ones.
Additionally, the paper analyses the predictive power of the binomial pricing model,
and compares it to corresponding ‘traditional’ models that utilise risk-adjusted rates of
return. We construct one-step ex post return forecasts for the sample ventures, and
compare the results with actual realised returns. The findings indicate that the fit of the
binomial model is better than the fit of the corresponding ‘traditional’ models.
The results imply that option-based methods have empirical relevance in the
analysis of the risk-return structure of privately held companies and projects. However,
the results demonstrate that the valuations of venture capital backed companies often
result in extreme outcomes that are difficult to capture with any ex ante pricing model.
This essay was originally published in R&D Management 31(2), 2001, pp. 215-230.
Reprinted with the permission of Blackwell Publishers.
1 INTRODUCTION
Consider a firm that has a unique business concept, significant growth opportunities,
and no real positive cash flow to show the profit potential of the venture. Valuing such
high-growth, high-uncertainty firms is a major challenge faced by most venture capital
firms. A typical venture capital valuation procedure involves an analysis of potential
future cash flows, an analysis of comparative firms’ stock prices or IPO performance, and
an analysis of the price-to-earnings ratio or the price-to-sales ratio of the venture. Yet, the
resulting valuations of these growth firms seem to defy all the common wisdom on
growth firm valuation.
The option value of uncertainty has been studied extensively in the research on
investments for two decades (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996; Brennan
and Trigeorgis, 2000). Even the uncertainty inherent in venture capital investments has
been conceptually shown to be decomposable into a set of options. Sahlman (1993)
identifies three major options inherent in venture capital investments: the option to
abandon investment, the option to re-value a project, and the option to increase capital
commitment. In general, the theory of investment has made significant advances, and
already enables elaborate analyses of real options and option interactions. Yet, the lack
of empirical evidence regarding the practical applicability of option-based pricing
models would seem effectively to inhibit adoption in practice.
This paper sets out to test a binomial option-based valuation model with a large sample
of venture capital investments. The results contribute both to theory and to practice in at
least two ways. Firstly, despite the wide variety of option-pricing applications, there have
been no empirical tests of the applicability of option-based pricing models in venture
capital investment decision making. Secondly, real option valuation, in general, has
been tested empirically in only a few published papers, including those of Paddock et al.
(1988), Quigg (1993), Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996), and Moel and Tufano (1998).
More empirical evidence is clearly needed to further validate the applicability of option-
based valuation methods to real investment opportunities in general.
This paper contributes to existing venture capital valuation methodologies by providing
the first empirical study in which the applicability of an option-based valuation
methodology is tested. Using the ex post valuation data from 421 U.S. venture capital
transactions and 176 initial public offerings, it is possible to test a binomial valuation
model in modelling the risk-return profiles of venture capital investments. Knowing the
ex post values of the target firm at each stage of the venture capital investment process
enables us to determine the implicit risk-neutral probabilities that the venture capitalists
would need to determine to correctly price the investments. Similar risk-return profiles
of venture capital investments have been examined previously in surveys and small-
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sample studies, but there are no previous established structures or structured approaches
for analysing the risk-return profiles of venture capital investments.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section develops the binomial
valuation model for venture capital investments and the testable hypotheses on the
consistency of the model. The third section describes the data and methodology used in
the empirical testing of the model. The fourth section examines the consistency of the
model empirically. The fifth section analyses the ex post predictive power of the model
by comparing estimated to realised returns. Finally, conclusions are presented in section
six.
2 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Previous research
The valuation of venture capital backed companies is difficult, since the shares of these
companies are unquoted and illiquid, and the uncertainty associated with these
investments is high before the investors reach an exit2 (Wright and Robbie, 1998).
Option-based methods have been suggested as one possible improvement to the existing
techniques. Utilising option-pricing theory, Willner (1995) made one of the few
attempts to model the value of a start-up firm. He pointed out that many start-ups have
the characteristics of growth options, but that traditional option methodology is
incompetent in valuing them. Willner (1995) criticised the assumption of a continuous
cash flow generation process behind the traditional option methodology, and presented
a jump model for the pricing of start-up companies. However, Willner’s (1995)
assumption of a simple exponential growth process with upward jumps may be
considered somewhat restrictive. Additionally, there is little empirical evidence
regarding the performance of the model in practice.
Jägle (1999) suggested that sequential new product development processes could be
modelled with a binomial tree and utilising a simple option-based pricing methodology.
Using a pharmaceutical R&D project as an example, he argued that the decisions
derived from a corresponding traditional discounted cash flow (DCF) model may differ
significantly from decisions derived from the theoretically more sound option-based
model. Jägle (1999) further argued that the traditional DCF approach is problematic,
since one cannot observe the correct discount rate for each phase of the R&D project.
Thus, traditional DCF techniques may fail to value correctly future cash flows that are
conditional on the success of the previous stages of product development.
The life-cycle of venture capital backed companies is frequently modelled as a
sequential series of stages (e.g., Plummer, 1987). Companies are seen to advance
                                                
2 ‘Exit’ refers to the realisation of investments in a public offering or a private trade sale.
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gradually from the seed stage to the start-up stage, then to the first stage, to the second
stage, and so on, to finally reach the exit stage. At the exit stage, the shares of the
company become liquid in a public offering or a trade sale. However, many companies
never reach the exit stage because of a bankruptcy or the ‘living dead’ phenomenon
(Ruhnka et al., 1992). ‘Living dead’ companies stay alive and progress modestly, but
their shares remain illiquid and they are no longer able to raise additional venture
capital financing.
The risk-return profile of such staged venture capital investments has been studied
previously with survey and interview methods (Wetzel, 1981; Ruhnka and Young, 1987;
Chiampou and Kallett, 1989; Ruhnka and Young, 1991). In addition, psychological risk
theory has been applied to explain the profiles found (Ruhnka and Young, 1991). The
existing research shows that the risk of loss associated with venture capital investment
decreases steadily as the venture reaches later stages of development. Moreover, the
venture capitalists’ rate of return requirement has been found to decline in a similar
fashion.
Because of the lack of data available, large-scale empirical studies on the returns and
valuations of venture capital transactions did not appear until the mid-1990s. Earlier
studies were based on much smaller samples. Bygrave and Timmons (1992) reported
evidence of venture capital returns and transaction valuations from two surveys with
samples of less than 100 each, whereas Houlihan Valuation Advisors (1998) examined
the pricing of 1,247 private U.S. venture capital investments in ventures that went
public between January 1993 and June 19973.
Bygrave and Timmons (1992) reported the results of Bygrave and Stein (1989) and
Bygrave and Stein (1990). They found that the return on the venture capital investment
at the IPO was 22.5 times for the first round, 10.0 times for the second round, and 3.7
times for the third round. The results imply diminishing risk as the venture reaches later
stages of development.
In a similar fashion, Houlihan Valuation Advisors (1998) conclude that the sequential
order of the financing round is a significant factor in determining the value increase
from the previous round to the next. Later rounds are associated with higher valuations,
even independent of the company’s stage of development. Additionally, they found that
the step-ups in value4 decreased with the stage of development of the company’s
business and with increases in amounts raised in any particular round. Company
location and industry type had also predictive power in company valuations. However,
Houlihan Valuation Advisors (1998) did not find evidence regarding the time variation
                                                
3 Houlihan Valuation Advisors used the VentureOne database to access the transaction data.
4 Houlihan Valuation Advisors (1998) defined step-up in value as the increase in a company’s pre-money
valuation between two financing rounds, calculated as the pre-money valuation at a round divided by
the pre-money valuation at a prior round.
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of step-ups in value, as no specific years appeared significant in determining the
differences of the step-ups in value.
2.2 Model structure
Motivated by Jägle’s (1999) pricing model, we use a simple binomial valuation
framework for analysing the valuation histories of the ventures in our sample. The
model is based on the principles of risk-neutral option valuation originally put forward
by Black and Scholes (1973) and later expanded by Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979).
Such a discrete-time binomial model is conceptually applicable to venture capital
backed companies, since the value of these privately held companies is observable only
at a few discrete points of time.
Consider first an asset, the current value of which is denoted as S, and construct a one-
period binomial tree so that the asset’s value can be either +S  or −S  at the end of the
period. Let the actual probabilities of these states be p and 1-p, accordingly.
The traditional present value framework suggests that the value of the asset, S, is equal
to its probability weighted expected value at the end of the period, discounted by the
risk-adjusted rate of return R. In other words, for period i of length t,
( )
( ) iti
iiii
i R
SpSpS
+
−+
=
−+
1
1
.
(1)
Option-pricing techniques alleviate the need to use risk-adjusted rates of return by
utilising risk-neutral pricing. If it is possible to set up a risk-free hedge portfolio of
options and an exactly offsetting position in the underlying asset, the value of the hedge
portfolio is unaffected by changes in the asset price. Thus, future positions can be
discounted using the risk-free rate of return. The probabilities of the future states of the
binomial model are in this case known as risk-neutral probabilities. The risk-neutral
probability q is defined so that the value of S is, in an arbitrage-free world, equal to
( )
( ) itif
iiii
i r
SqSqS
,1
1
+
−+
=
−+ (2)
where we denote the risk-free rate of one period with rf . Figure 1 illustrates the
traditional one-step binomial tree and the corresponding risk-neutral tree.
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Figure 1 Left side: One-period risk-neutral pricing model with risk-neutral
success probabilities and a risk-free rate of return. Right side: One-
period traditional pricing model with actual success probabilities and a
risk-adjusted rate of return.
We model each stage of a venture capital investment as a one-step binomial tree
discussed above. Each stage has thus two outcomes: ‘good’ and ‘bad’. We assume that
the good outcome results in an increase in value by multiplier k (k > 1), and that the
bad outcome results in a decrease in value by multiplier 1/k. Each stage is followed by a
similar one-step tree that represents the next stage. The final outcome is the value of the
liquid shares of the venture at exit.
To establish the risk-neutral binomial model for venture capital investments, we define
our notation as follows. For each stage i, the risk-neutral probability of success is iq , the
time length of the stage is it  and the applicable risk-free discount rate for the stage is ifr .
The model will then result in the tree structure shown in Figure 2.
The reason to do the conversion to the risk-neutral world is that the traditional present
value framework (1) is problematic in venture capital situations. The problem in
applying this model to venture capital situations is that we must know the appropriate
risk-adjusted rate of return for each stage, as Jägle (1999) points out in the case of
sequential R&D projects. In addition, we should be able to separate between the risk
included in the success probabilities and the risk included in the risk-adjusted rate of
return. The capital asset pricing model suggests that the non-diversifiable or private part
of risk should be reflected by the success probabilities, and the diversifiable or market-
priced part of risk should be included in the risk-adjusted rate of return. However, Jägle
(1999) argues that this view is incomplete because the amount of systematic risk varies
every step, and because the commercial part of the private risk is not independent of
economic conditions.
The risk-neutral framework should offer improvement to some of these problems. It is
possible to use the risk-free rate of return throughout the analysis, and the unknown risk-
neutral success probabilities are no more difficult to estimate from a data set than the
actual success probabilities needed in the traditional framework.
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Figure 2 Venture capital investments as risk-neutral success / failure binomial
trees
We now derive the necessary equations for applying our risk-neutral binomial valuation
framework. From (2), we can solve the one-period risk-neutral probability q for stage i as
follows:
( )
−+
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−
−+
=
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i
t
ifi
i SS
SrS
q
i
,1 (3)
We set iii SkS =
+  and iii SkS ⋅=
− /1  in (3), as suggested above, and require iki ∀> 1 .
The ratio of two consecutive venture valuations yields an estimate for ki if the value of
the venture increases and for 1/ki if the value decreases. Thus, we obtain an estimate for
qi each period as follows:
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Let %8, =ifr  and 2=it . When we now let k vary, we obtain a conventional risk-return
trade-off plotted on the left side of Figure 3, in which the risk-neutral success
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probabilities q act as a proxy for risk and k as a proxy for return in the good state of
nature. The binomial pricing model assumes that larger returns should be associated
with smaller risk-neutral success probabilities, and that the relationship between q and k
is decreasing and convex.
If we accept that the upside return measure k is consistent with Black-Scholes option-
pricing models, we can also establish a direct relationship between volatility (risk) and
observed returns (k). According to Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein’s (CRR) binomial tree
models, implied volatility could then be calculated from return data as follows.
i
i
i
t
i
t
k
ek ii
ln
=
=
σ
σ
(5)
This formula shows that the conventional CRR models assume that larger returns
should be associated with larger implied volatility, and that the relationship between σ
and k is increasing and convex. The right side of Figure 3 illustrates this risk-return
trade-off when t = 2 years.
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Figure 3 Left side: The relationship between k (a proxy for return) and q (a
proxy for risk) when t = 2 years and rf = 8%. Right side: The
relationship between k and Cox-Ross-Rubinstein implied volatility σ 
when t = 2 years.
It is certainly difficult to believe that the assumptions of conventional CRR trees would
hold in the case of venture capital backed private companies. Firstly, the assumption of
asset prices following Geometric Brownian Motion is clearly problematic, as these
companies often experience sudden progresses or failures that vastly affect the value of
the venture. Jump processes offer somewhat improved possibilities to the pricing of this
kind of assets (Merton, 1976; Willner, 1995). Secondly, venture capital assets are not
traded continuously and the pricing process is not entirely competitive. Furthermore,
value-related information is largely asymmetric and not easily available to investing
parties. Despite these major shortcomings, it is still interesting to investigate how the
Cox-Ross-Rubinstein type of implied volatility – a traditional proxy for risk – is actually
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related to the value and fundamental characteristics of new ventures. A CRR
approximation makes this possible, since we can calculate what the implied volatility
would have been at each financing round of the venture. This increases our
understanding on the implied risk of the ventures at different stages of development.
We finally note that each stage of development of the model in which venture capital
financing occurs represents in effect an option to abandon the venture, as explained by
Sahlman (1993). The venture capitalists will not invest if the venture’s future does not
look sufficiently bright. Not investing results in an early exit presumably at a low price, a
bankruptcy of the venture, or the ‘living dead’ phenomenon in which the venture stays
alive but experiences only modest progress and makes investors unable to realise their
investments. Thus, each stage may result in abandonment and a modest or zero
outcome for equity holders.
2.3 Hypotheses for model consistency
To demonstrate that the risk-neutral binomial valuation model is a reasonable and
consistent framework for the valuation analysis of new ventures, we construct six testable
hypotheses. We base the hypotheses on previous research on the risk-return profile of
venture capital investments, which indicates that the risk of loss associated with these
investments decreases as the venture reaches higher stages of development. Thus, the
proxy for risk derived from the model should behave accordingly.
According to the survey of Ruhnka and Young (1987), venture capitalists expect that the
risk of loss associated with venture capital investments decreases steadily as a venture
reaches higher stages of development. Their results indicate that the aggregate risk of
loss is as high as 66% for seed investments, and around 20% for bridge financings.
Wetzel (1981) reports results in line with Ruhnka and Young (1987). Both report also
that the venture capitalists’ required rate of return declines as the venture reaches higher
stages of development. Plummer (1987) supports this observation.
All these studies also indicate that it is more probable that a venture will fail in the early
stages of development rather than in the later stages of development. There is
considerably more uncertainty present in ventures that are in an early stage of
development than in ventures that are about to make an initial public offering.
Therefore, as the venture advances from the first stage of development to the second
stage, the risk of loss decreases more than if the venture advances from stage four to stage
five. Thus, we first hypothesise that the risk-neutral probability of reaching a subsequent
financing round will be smaller for early-stage ventures than later-stage ventures.
Similarly, the implied volatility of returns will be larger for early-stage ventures than
later-stage ventures.
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Hypothesis 1a: The risk-neutral probabilities of the binomial model are smaller
for ventures in early stages of development than for ventures in later stages of
development.
Hypothesis 1b: Cox-Ross-Rubinstein implied volatility is larger for ventures in
early stages of development than for ventures in later stages of development.
In many cases, ventures do not follow the sequential order of the development stages. It
is possible for a venture to develop rapidly and ‘jump’ over certain development stages to
raise additional venture capital financing at a higher stage of development. For example,
a start-up venture may be able to raise a large amount of financing and proceed to the
bridge stage without additional financing rounds – and thus possibly without indications
of company value. Similarly, it is possible that a venture experiences slow progress and
raises two venture capital financing rounds at the same stage of development.
Consider now two observations of the valuation of the same venture that are not from
consecutive stages of development. Let the first observation be from the start-up stage of
development and the second one from the bridge financing stage. Consider then two
similar observations that are from consecutive stages of development, perhaps from the
seed stage and the start-up stage. In the first case, the aggregate risk of loss is reduced
more than in the second case because the venture has advanced through more stages of
development in the first case (Wetzel, 1981; Ruhnka and Young, 1987). This leads us to
hypothesise that the risk-neutral success probabilities should be smaller for ‘longer’ steps
and larger for ‘shorter’ steps. In other words:
Hypothesis 2a: The risk-neutral probabilities of the binomial model are
negatively related to the period between two financing rounds.
The relationship between the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein type of implied volatility and the
time between two financings, however, is not as obvious. It is clear that the risk of loss
usually decreases with time as described in the previous hypothesis, leading to larger
returns for longer periods between financing rounds, and thus to larger implied
volatilities. However, since the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein implied volatility is defined in this
binomial tree as the ratio of the logarithm of k (the return) and the square root of t
(time), longer periods between two financing rounds may actually lead to smaller
implied volatilities. Thus, we hypothesise as follows.
Hypothesis 2b: Cox-Ross-Rubinstein implied volatility is dependent on the time
length of the period between two financing rounds.
The riskiness of a private venture should decrease also if the commitment of outside
investors increases. If a venture has already undergone many venture capital financing
rounds, the risk of loss should have decreased substantially as a result of the certification
and commitment provided by the investors (Stuart et al., 1999). According to the
certification argument, changes in value should be smaller for those companies that
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have already had many rounds of venture capital financing. As a consequence, we
hypothesise that the more the venture has already raised venture capital financing
rounds, the larger should be the risk-neutral probability, and the smaller the implied
volatility of returns.
Hypothesis 3a: The risk-neutral probabilities of the binomial model are positively
related to the number of financing rounds that the venture has raised previously.
Hypothesis 3b: Cox-Ross-Rubinstein implied volatility is negatively related to the
number of financing rounds that the venture has raised previously.
3 DATA
3.1 Data sources
The empirical sample consists of 597 investment rounds made into 176 U.S. venture
capital backed companies that were listed on a U.S. stock exchange between January 2,
1998 and December 31, 1999. Of these rounds, 421 represent venture capital financings
and 176 IPOs. The sample includes all companies that went public during that period
and for which valuation data for at least one venture capital financing round and the
IPO were available.
We obtained the valuation data from Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) Venture
Economics databases. This extensive source of venture capital investment data has been
used in previous venture capital research (see e.g. Bygrave, 1989; Gompers, 1995; or
Gompers and Lerner, 1998), but previous studies have not used the company valuations
from this database, as they were made public only at the end of 1999. The sample of
valuations of this paper consists of the disclosed post-money valuations5 that were
available in the database in January 2000. The source includes valuation data on only
part of the venture capital financing rounds that the ventures have raised, and for some
ventures there is only one financing round with a disclosed value. However, limiting the
sample to those ventures that had an IPO provides an additional data point for each
venture. As a result, we have at least two valuation data points for each venture. Thus,
we can obtain at least one risk-neutral probability and implied volatility estimate for all
the ventures of our sample.
In addition to the valuations, we used the Venture Economics data to determine the
amount of financing in each round, the number of venture capital rounds that each
company had raised, the dates of the financing rounds, the venture’s stage of
development in each round, and the venture’s industry classification according to
Venture Economics.
                                                
5 ‘Post-money valuation’ is a frequently used concept in venture capital. It is defined as the price per share
of the financing round multiplied by the number of shares outstanding after the financing round.
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In all argumentation and analysis that follows, we use the classification of venture
capital financing stages used by Venture Economics. The firm classifies each financing
round as an early stage financing, an expansion stage financing, or a later stage
financing. These classes are further divided into smaller subgroups. We code the
development stages with dummy variables in order to separate the early, the expansion,
and the late stages of development. The coding is presented in Table 1.
Table 1 The coding of the development stages
The table presents the classification that Venture Economics uses to classify the stages of development
of ventures. The right-hand columns represent the coding of these stages used in this paper.
Dummy variable coded
Stage of development Consists of stages EARLY LATER
Seed
Start-up
Early stage
First stage / Early stage
1 0
Second stageExpansion
Third stage / Expansion
0 0
Later stage Bridge / Buyout
IPO
0 1
The data on the initial public offerings was obtained from Securities Data Corporation’s
Venture IPO database. We used the data on the offer price and the number of shares
outstanding after the IPO to calculate the venture’s market capitalisation at IPO. This
figure was used as the exit value of the venture. The IPO date was taken from the same
database. Furthermore, we validated the IPO share price and the number of shares
outstanding after the offering using data from the IPO prospectus of each venture.
Prospectuses were obtained from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s
EDGAR service.
The risk-free interest rate data were obtained from the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago files. Daily closing yields of the 5-year U.S. Treasury bill were used in all
calculations. If the date of a financing round, as disclosed in the Venture Economics
database, appeared to be a holiday, no risk-free rate for this date was available. In these
cases, we used the closing yield of the nearest possible date.
3.2 Limitations of the sample
The data on the venture capital investment rounds are limited in certain respects.
Firstly, the observations include only successful ventures that were able to proceed to
the initial public offering. This fact may bias the data so that steadily rising valuations
may occur more often than if the sample contained also the less successful ventures.
Secondly, it may be that the private valuations are disclosed only when they have
developed positively as compared to the previous financing round. Disclosing lower
valuations than before might invite negative publicity for the venture, and perhaps make
it more difficult to attract investors in the future. Thirdly, it seems that valuations
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associated with the seed and start-up stages are less frequently disclosed than later-stage
valuations. Venture capitalists may wish to disclose company valuations only at later
stages when the uncertainty about the quality of the deal is smaller. Fourthly, database
and prospectus data contain only a limited amount of information on each venture.
Venture capital investments are characterised by private information that is not
uniformly distributed across potential investors (Wright and Robbie, 1998), and our data
set is unlikely to record all such information. Thus, our sample potentially lacks certain
relevant value-related information. However, we stress that the sample entries are still
close to the ‘best available’ public data at the time when this paper was constructed.
3.3 Operationalisation of variables
We define the necessary variables in Table 2. Two dependent variables, the risk-neutral
success probability and the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein implied volatility, are examined
separately in the analyses. These variables are defined in equations (4) and (5). The
parameter k is calculated as the venture’s post-money value at a financing round divided
by the post-money value at the previous financing round, if the value increases, and as
the inverse ratio of these values if the value decreased.
We use four independent variables to test hypotheses 1 – 3. Firstly, we examine the
effect of the venture’s stage of development with two dummy variables defined in Table
1. ‘EARLY’ indicates that the venture was in an early stage of development (i.e. seed /
start-up / first stage) in the previous financing round. Similarly, ‘LATER’ indicates that
the venture was in a later stage of development (i.e. bridge / buyout / IPO).
Secondly, we test the effect of the period between the two financing rounds (t). It is
simply defined as the fraction of years between the two financing rounds. Additionally,
we use a transformed form of the time variable,
t
1 , in the case of the implied volatilities
to better capture the effect of time on the significance of the other regression variables.
This transformation derives from the definition of the implied volatility in equation (5).
Thirdly, we analyse the effect of prior venture capital commitments using the number of
previous venture capital financing rounds. All rounds that Venture Economics had
recorded as separate financings were included in the variable.
In addition to the independent variables, we control for several other phenomena.
Firstly, we take into account the total amount of venture capital financing injected into
the venture in the financing round. This is important because post-money valuation is
defined as the value of the venture after a financing round, including the amount of
money invested. This implies that large venture capital investments automatically lead
to large increases in post-money valuations. Thus, controlling for the total amount of
venture capital financing in each round mitigates the potential bias in post-money
valuations caused by the typical increase in the amount of capital provided in later
rounds.
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Secondly, we control for the industry sector of the venture. Ruhnka and Young (1991)
hypothesise that ventures in different industries may have different risk characteristics.
Discussions with practitioners indicate strong support for this claim. To take these
differences into account, we include industry dummy variables in the regression models.
The variables INFO and BIO classify the ventures into information technology
companies, medical- health-life-sciences companies, and companies that belong to
neither of these categories6. In more detailed analysis, finer industry divisions had no
qualitative effect on the results.
Finally, we take into account the public market return between the two financing
rounds. It is evident that there should be a tight correlation between venture capital
valuations and public market valuations (Gompers and Lerner, 2000). Thus, omitting
public market conditions might lead to a situation where the risk-neutral success
probabilities or implied volatilities only capture general short-term trends in company
market valuations. We operationalise the public market return as the return of the
Nasdaq Composite index between the previous financing round and the current round.
We define this return as (I1-I0) / I0, where I0 is the value of the index at the time of the
prior round, and I1 the value of the index at the time of the current round.
Table 2 Operationalisation of variables
Dependent variables Name Explanation
Risk-neutral success probability q Defined by equation (4). k is calculated as the
ratio of the current round post-money valuation
and the previous round post-money valuation.
Cox-Ross-Rubinstein implied volatility σ Annual implied volatility in percent. Defined by
equation (5). k is calculated as above.
Independent variables Name Explanation
Venture was at an early stage of development? EARLY Dummy variable. = 1, if the venture was at an
early stage of development at the prior
financing round. = 0 otherwise.
Venture was at a later stage of development? LATER Dummy variable. = 1, if the venture was at a
later stage of development at the prior financing
round. = 0 otherwise.
Time from the previous round t Fraction of years between the prior and the
current financing round
Number of prior financing rounds RND Number of venture capital financing rounds the
company raised prior to the current round
Control variables Name Explanation
Return from the Nasdaq Composite index
between two consecutive financing rounds
CH_NAS Absolute return from the index I. Return = (I1-
I0)/I0 where 0 = prior round and 1 = this round
Industry class was information technology? INFO Dummy variable. = 1, if the venture operates in
information technology. = 0 otherwise.
Industry class was biotechnology / medical? BIO Dummy variable. = 1, if the venture operates in
biotechnology / medical. = 0 otherwise.
Total amount of venture capital financing raised
in the round
RNDTOT Total investments in millions of U.S. dollars
                                                
6 Venture Economics refers to these as ‘non-high-technology companies’.
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3.4 Summary information and descriptive statistics
The data contain 597 financing rounds and corresponding valuations of 176 ventures.
Of these financings, 176 represent IPOs and 421 represent venture capital investment
rounds. We have, on average, 3.4 observations per firm. Thus, there are on average 2.4
observations at venture capital financing rounds and one at the IPO. The observations
are concentrated in the latter part of the 1990s. Over 94% of the data points are from the
year 1996 or later.
The sample ventures operate mainly in the high-technology industries, as is typical for
venture capital backed companies in general. Venture Economics classifies 163 of the
total 176 ventures as information technology companies, six as medical, health, and life
sciences companies, and seven as non-high-technology companies. Seventy-seven of the
information technology ventures operate in an Internet specific industry. Almost all the
medical, health, and life sciences ventures operate in the biotechnology industry. Non-
high-technology ventures included companies from several industries.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. The average overall risk-neutral
success probability is 0.28 and the corresponding annual implied volatility 158%. The
companies have raised on average 4.2 financing rounds, and the average interval from
the previous financing round is 0.94 years. Because of the extremely bullish market
conditions during the sample period, the NASDAQ Composite index returned on
average 53.6% in the period between the current and the previous financing round. The
companies raised on average 40 million dollars in all the financings (median 24 M), and
on average 74M USD in the initial public offering (median 60M USD). The average
market capitalisation at the IPO was also comparatively large, 476M USD (median
330M USD). In addition, the step-ups in post-money valuations from one venture
capital financing to the next were notable: on average companies experienced over four-
fold increases. Thus, the sample venture capitalists realised generous returns on paper
even in the private financing stages. The risk-free rate of return was modest during the
sample period and averaged only 5.65%.
The left side of Figure 4 plots the relationship between k (a proxy for return) and the
risk-neutral success probability q (a proxy for risk) for the sample observations. The
graph shows that the risk-neutral success probabilities are closely grouped along a
decreasing and convex trajectory. The right side of Figure 4 shows the relationship
between k and the annual Cox-Ross-Rubinstein implied volatility σ. The data points are
scattered widely across the figure, but nevertheless imply a positive relationship between
risk and return.
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Variable Name Unit Mean Median Std.
deviation
Risk-neutral success probability q 0…1 0.28 0.26 0.16
Cox-Ross-Rubinstein implied volatility σ Annual % 158% 135% 121%
Number of prior financing rounds RND Integer 4.20 4.00 2.16
Time from the previous round t Years 0.94 0.73 0.94
Return from the Nasdaq Composite index
between two consecutive financing rounds
CH_NAS % 53.6% 32.2% 65.7%
Total amount of venture capital financing
raised in the round
RNDTOT MUSD 40.9 24.0 46.1
Risk-free rate of return rf Annual % 5.65% 5.71% 0.53%
Times increase in value in the good state
of nature
k > 1 4.78 3.12 5.42
Dummy variable N
Venture was at an early stage? EARLY 0/1 115
Venture was at a later stage? LATER 0/1 67
Industry class was information
technology?
INFO 0/1 393
Industry class was biotech / medical? BIO 0/1 11
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Figure 4 Left side: The relationship between k (a proxy for return) and q (a
proxy for risk) for the empirical sample. Right side: The relationship
between k and annual σ for the empirical sample.
4 INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS
To test hypotheses 1 – 3, we perform ordinary linear regression analyses on the risk-
neutral success probabilities and the implied volatilities calculated from the data. We
calculate the risk-neutral success probabilities from the data using equation (4) and the
implied volatility using (5). We check that the variables fulfil necessary distributional
assumptions, and make a logarithmic transformation when it is necessary to ensure
normally distributed error terms.
We estimate altogether five models (Table 4). The first three are OLS regressions in
which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the risk-neutral success
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probability. We first insert all independent and control variables into the regression
model. In the second model, we omit the public market return variable CH_NAS since
it is strongly correlated with t. The effect of t alone can thus be observed from regression
two. Model 3 is similar to model two expect that the dependent variable is not q but its
natural logarithm. This transformation ensures that the distributional assumptions of the
OLS regression are fulfilled better.
Models four and five are full OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the
Cox-Ross-Rubinstein implied volatility. Model four includes the same explanatory
variables as model one, and model five repeats this analysis using a transformed time
variable 
t
1  that comes from the definition of the implied volatility (5). From model four
one can see the linear relationship between the period, t, and the implied volatility.
From model five one can verify that the independent variables remain significant
although the variation due to t itself is explained in full with
t
1 .
The results provide strong support for hypotheses 1a, 1b, 3a, and 3b. The risk-neutral
probabilities are indeed smaller for early-stage ventures and positively related to the
number of prior financing rounds. Implied volatility is larger for early-stage ventures and
negatively related to the number of prior financing rounds. Furthermore, hypothesis 2b
is supported, but hypothesis 2a is rejected. Implied volatility is significantly and
negatively related to the period between two financing rounds (t), and positively related
to
t
1 . However, the risk-neutral probabilities are not statistically significantly related to
the period between the two financing rounds in models one and two. Only when the
risk-neutral success probabilities are transformed using a logarithmic transformation,
and the public market return variable is omitted in model three, t appears to be
significantly and negatively related to q, as hypothesised. However, including the public
market return variable makes the significance disappear, and thus we cannot accept
hypothesis 2a.
The control variables indicate that the total amount of venture capital financing
injected into the company in the financing round is a significant determinant of the
risk-neutral success probabilities and the implied volatilities. Larger amounts of money
injected into a venture tend to result in higher changes in post-money valuations, which
increases implied volatility and decreases the risk-neutral success probabilities. The
information and communications technology industry dummy is significant and
negatively related to the risk-neutral success probabilities and positively related to
implied volatility. The biotechnology industry dummy is also positively related to
implied volatility in model four, but not significantly negatively related to the risk-
neutral success probabilities. Additionally, the public market return represents a weakly
significant control variable.
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Table 4 Regression results for the determinants of the risk-neutral success
probabilities and implied volatility. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
risk-neutral success
probability q
Dep.
variable:
Ln (q)
Dependent variable: Cox-Ross-
Rubinstein implied volatility σ
Independent variables Exp. sign (1) (2) (3) Exp. Sign (4) (5)
Constant 0.834
(10.9)
0.869
(12.2)
1.03
(3.70)
-1.30
(2.20)
-3.65
(-7.34)
Number of prior financing rounds RND + 0.017
(4.76)
0.017
(4.93)
0.067
(4.93)
- -0.045
(-1.76)
-0.061
(-2.67)
Venture was at an early stage of
development?
EARLY - -0.041
(-2.27)
-0.039
(-2.15)
-0.158
(-2.24)
+ 0.320
(2.27)
0.326
(2.74)
Venture was at a later stage of
development?
LATER + 0.006
(0.30)
0.004
(0.19)
0.041
(0.52)
- 0.060
(0.38)
-0.156
(-1.16)
Time from the previous round T - 0.008
(0.63)
-0.006
(-0.75)
-0.075
(-2.51)
-/+ -0.621
(-5.90)
Time from the previous round,
transformed t
1 +/- 1.05
(14.2)
Control variables
Return from the Nasdaq index
between two consecutive rounds
CH_NAS -0.026
(-1.26)
0.369
(2.31)
0.094
(1.12)
Industry class was information
technology?
INFO -0.088
(-2.55)
-0.089
(-2.56)
-0.373
(-2.77)
0.573
(2.14)
0.580
(2.54)
Industry class was biotechnology /
medical?
BIO -0.043
(-0.77)
-0.050
(-0.90)
-0.312
(-1.45)
1.23
(2.87)
0.504
(1.36)
Log of the total amount of VC
financing raised in the round
LNRNDTOT -0.053
(-7.79)
-0.056
(-9.32)
-0.229
(-9.69)
0.281
(5.36)
0.341
(7.99)
N 421 421 421 421 421
F-statistic 15.2 17.2 19.2 14.1 38.7
R2 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.43
The support for the hypotheses implies two main points. Firstly, the binomial pricing
model seems to be consistent with prior knowledge on the risk-return profile of venture
capital investments. Secondly, although many of the assumptions of the Black-Scholes
and Cox-Ross-Rubinstein option-pricing models are not likely to be valid in the case of
venture capital investments, Cox-Ross-Rubinstein implied volatilities calculated from
actual investment data decrease with the venture’s stage of development and prior
venture capital commitments, as hypothesised. It is at least evident that the binomial
pricing models examined are not in conflict with the existing knowledge on the risk-
return structure of venture capital investments.
5 EXPLANATORY POWER AND COMPARATIVE FIT OF
THE MODEL
5.1 Analysis method
Although the binomial pricing model seems to be consistent with theory and empirical
evidence, more information on the performance and accuracy of the model is needed to
apply the methodology in practice.
71
We next demonstrate what kind of fit one could achieve by mechanically applying the
binomial pricing model to venture capital investment data. That is, we demonstrate the
accuracy of the results one could expect when the binomial pricing model is applied to
venture capital settings. The tests do not attempt to replicate real-life analysis situations,
in which more detailed information on the actual quality of the target ventures would be
available. Rather, we attempt to compare the performance of the risk-neutral binomial
model to the performance of a similar model utilising traditional risk-adjusted discount
rates and actual success probabilities.
We analyse the explanatory power and comparative fit of the risk-neutral binomial
valuation model by constructing one-step ex post forecasts for the parameter k, which
represents the times increase in the venture’s value in the good state of nature. These
forecasts are first compared to the actually realised values of k. Secondly, we compare
them to the values of k predicted by a corresponding ‘traditional’ binomial pricing
model that utilises actual probabilities and traditional risk-adjusted rates of return. One
period of this corresponding traditional model is presented on the right side of Figure 1.
We use k as the proxy instead of actual valuations since k represents a relative measure
of the development of the venture’s value. This allows us to avoid the bias due to the
difference in the size of the ventures.
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, we attempt to generate accurate forecasts on the
unknown parameter q based on the stage of the venture, the industry sector of the
venture, and several other parameters. Next, we calculate the corresponding k from the
binomial model using these estimated q:s as the risk-neutral success probabilities, and
compare these to the actually realised values of k.7
We solve k from the binomial model formulas as follows.8
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The analysis procedure is similar in the case of the ‘traditional’ binomial models that use
actual probabilities and risk-adjusted rates of return. The only difference is that we use p
                                                
7 We additionally performed the analysis using two independent random samples. The original sample
was split into two data sets, one of which was used to estimate the parameters for q. The other data set
was then used to assess the predictive power of the estimated values of k. The results were similar to
those presented in this paper, and we omitted the random sampling to keep the text more accessible.
8 Note that the negative root in (6) does not make sense as k > 1.
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instead of q, as in Figure 1, to denote the state probabilities and that the risk-adjusted
rate of return (Ri) is used instead of the risk-free rate in the above equations (4) and (6).
The risk-adjusted rate of return is obtained for each stage of development from previous
survey studies by Ruhnka and Young (1987, 1991) and Wetzel (1981). These estimates
can be regarded as indications of the best available estimates on the venture capitalists’
required rates of return for ventures at different stages development. The rates of return
are listed in Table 5. We identify the stage of development of each venture at each
financing round on the basis of the Venture Economics classifications, and assign an
appropriate required rate of return from Table 5 to the financing rounds. Two values are
recorded, one from Ruhnka and Young (1987, 1991) and one from Wetzel (1981).
Table 5 Venture capitalists’ required rates of return for different stages of
development as reported in earlier research
Rate of return demanded
Stage reported in the paper Coded as stage Ruhnka & Young (1987, 1991) Wetzel (1981)
Seed Seed 73.0% 50.0%
Start-up Start-up 54.8% 50.0%
Third stage Second 42.2% 37.5%
Fourth stage Expansion 35.0% 30.0%
Exit stage Later 35.0% 22.5%
5.2 Calculation of the parameter estimates
Using similar regression analysis as in the hypothesis testing section, we estimate the
parameters of the regression model that would best determine the unknown risk-neutral
success probabilities q. We use the risk-neutral probabilities as the dependent variable,
and the same independent and control variables as in the hypothesis testing.
A similar regression analysis is performed for the ‘traditional’ binomial model, for which
we estimate a model that would best determine the unknown actual probabilities p. The
dependent variable p is calculated from the data using (4) in precisely the same way as
in the case of the risk-neutral probabilities q, but the risk-adjusted rate of return is used
instead of the risk-free rate of return. In the regression models, the independent variables
are the same as in the case of the risk-neutral probabilities.
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 6. They indicate that the risk-
neutral probabilities may be approximated with the equation
LNRNDTOTBIOINFONASCH
tLATEREARLYRNDq
053.0043.0088.0_026.0
008.0006.0041.0017.0834.0
−−−−
++−+= (7)
For the ‘traditional’ model utilising Wetzel’s risk-adjusted rates of return, the actual
success probabilities may be approximated with the equation
LNRNDTOTBIOINFONASCH
tLATEREARLYRNDpW
081.0141.0197.0_099.0
129.0001.0071.0019.029.1
−−−−
+−−+= (8)
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and for the ‘traditional’ model utilising the risk-adjusted rates of return of Ruhnka and
Young (1987, 1991) with the equation
LNRNDTOTBIOINFONASCH
tLATEREARLYRNDpRY
079.0154.0183.0_099.0
100.0009.0063.0015.026.1
−−−−
+−−+= (9)
Table 6 Linear models for the risk-neutral and actual success probabilities
The table presents the linear models that are later used to generate estimates of the unknown actual and
risk-neutral success probabilities. Model one is used to generate estimates on q, the risk-neutral success
probability. Model two is used to generate estimates for pW, the actual success probability for the
binomial model that utilises Wetzel (1981) risk-adjusted rates of return. Model two is used to generate
estimates for pRY, the actual success probability for the binomial model that utilises Ruhnka and
Young’s (1987, 1991) risk-adjusted rates of return. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Dependent
= q
Dependent
= p, Wetzel
Dependent
= p, R&Y
Independent variables (1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.834
(10.9)
1.29
(10.8)
1.26
(11.1)
Number of prior financing rounds RND 0.017
(4.76)
0.019
(3.48)
0.015
(2.84)
Venture was at an early stage of
development?
EARLY -0.041
(-2.27)
-0.071
(-2.49)
-0.063
(-2.30)
Venture was at a later stage of
development?
LATER 0.006
(0.30)
-0.001
(-0.04)
-0.009
(-0.29)
Time from the previous round t 0.008
(0.63)
0.129
(6.07)
0.100
(4.92)
Control variables
Return from the Nasdaq index
between two consecutive rounds
CH_NAS -0.026
(-1.26)
-0.099
(-3.05)
-0.099
(-3.21)
Industry class was information
technology?
INFO -0.088
(-2.55)
-0.197
(-3.63)
-0.183
(-3.54)
Industry class was biotechnology /
medical?
BIO -0.043
(-0.77)
-0.141
(-1.62)
-0.154
(-1.86)
Log of the total amount of VC
financing raised in the round
LNRNDTOT -0.053
(-7.79)
-0.081
(-7.67)
-0.079
(-7.80)
N 421 421 421
F-statistic 15.2 22.4 19.9
R2 0.23 0.30 0.28
These equations are used to calculate an estimate for q and the two p:s for each case in
the sample. These estimates of q and p are then used to generate three different
estimates of the corresponding k, the return in the good state of nature, using equation
(6). The three estimates of k are then compared to the actually realised values of k and
to each other. We use the actually realised 5-year bond yield as the risk-free rate, the
appropriate risk-adjusted return from Table 5 as the risk-adjusted rates of return, and the
actually realised period between the two financing rounds as t.
Our reasoning is as follows. If the estimates of k are close to the actual k, the models
perform well. If they are on average systematically different from the actual k, the
models perform badly. We perform both an analysis of bias and efficiency and a
regression analysis on the estimates and the actual values.
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5.3 Analysis of bias and efficiency
Firstly, we analyse the bias and efficiency of the estimates of k. Table 7 presents the
mean and median estimation errors and standard deviations for the sample. On average,
the forecast error is 2.9% (median -6.9%) for the model utilising risk-neutral
probabilities, indicating that the model produces rather unbiased estimates of actual
valuations. The results for ‘traditional’ models utilising actual success probabilities and
risk-adjusted rates of return are similar. The mean error for the ‘Wetzel’ model is 2.2%
(median -8.8%) and for the ‘Ruhnka and Young’ model 1.7% (median -11%).
The standard deviation of the forecast error is large for all models. This implies that
although the forecasts seem to be fairly right on average, errors are large in both
directions when they occur. The result is not a surprise, since previous research on
venture capital has shown that the outcomes of venture capital investments include both
extreme returns and total losses – these investments result in anything but the average.
The model utilising risk-neutral parameters performs only slightly better than the
‘traditional’ models.
Table 7 Estimation error statistics
The table presents the mean and median estimation errors and standard deviations of the error when the
estimated k and the actual k are compared to each other. The estimation errors are calculated as
follows: estimation error = (estimated k – actual value of k) / (actual value of k).
Model Mean error Median error Std dev. of error
Using risk-neutral probabilities and risk-free rate of
return
2.9% -6.9% 65%
Using actual probabilities and Wetzel (1981) rates of
return
2.3% -9.5% 70%
Using actual probabilities and Ruhnka and Young (1987,
1991) rates of return
1.7% -11.4% 69%
5.4 Analysis of explanatory power and comparative fit
Finally, we analyse the explanatory power and comparative fit of the risk-neutral and the
‘traditional’ models by using ordinary least squares regression. Using the actual k as the
dependent variable and the estimate of k as the independent variable, we expect to find
a significant linear relationship between the forecasts and the actually realised values for
all the models. If the estimates of k are good, the regression coefficient should not be
significantly different from one and the constant should not be significantly different
from zero. This is a frequently used methodology in evaluating security pricing models
(e.g. Kaplan and Ruback, 1995).
Table 8 presents the results of the regressions where the variation of the actual k is
explained with the estimate of k. Panel A includes the results for the risk-neutral
binomial model, Panel B for the traditional model with Wetzel’s (1981) risk-adjusted
rates of return, and Panel C for the traditional model with Ruhnka and Young (1987,
1991) risk-adjusted rates of return. Two regressions are presented for each model: 1) the
dependent variable is the actual k, and the independent variable is the estimate of k; 2)
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both the dependent and the independent variables are transformed using a logarithmic
transformation. This procedure is preferable to better fulfil the distributional
assumptions of the regression model.
Table 8 shows that all the models have at least some predictive power, and that the
regression coefficients are highly significant. The models on the left side of the table
show that the risk-neutral binomial model outperforms the others in explanatory power.
However, none of the models is well-posed since either the coefficients are statistically
different from one or the constants are statistically different from zero.
The models on the right side of the table indicate again that the explanatory power of
the risk-neutral binomial model is significantly greater than that of the others. In
addition, the risk-neutral model is now well-posed whereas the other models are not.
We conclude that the risk-neutral binomial valuation model seems, indeed, to have
explanatory power in one-step valuation forecasts, although the modest regression R-
squared indicates that actual deviations from the correct value may occasionally be
large. Furthermore, the fit of the risk-neutral model is better than the fit of the
traditional models that utilise risk-adjusted rates of return and actual success
probabilities.
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Table 8 Comparative fit of the valuation estimates
The table provides the results of the regressions where the actual k is explained with the estimate of k.
The estimates are calculated using the values of q or p from the regression models presented in Table 6.
Left side regressions: actual k = a + b * estimate of k. Right side regressions: ln(actual k) = a + b *
ln(estimate of k). A model is well-posed if the coefficient is not statistically different from one, and if
the constant is not significantly different from zero. Panel A presents the results for the risk-neutral
model and Panels B and C for the traditional models when the risk-adjusted rates of return are used.
The R-squared values of the risk-neutral model are statistically significantly larger than those of the
other models. N=421 for all columns. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Panel A: Risk-neutral probabilities and risk-free rate of return
Dependent: k Dependent: ln k
Constant -1.88
(0.632)
Constant 0.046
(0.097)
Estimate of k 2.11
(0.186)
Ln (Estimate of k) 1.096
(0.085)
F-statistic 128.3 F-statistic 165.1
R2 0.234 R2 0.283
Well-posed? No (coeff >1, constant < 0) Well-posed? Yes
Panel B: Actual probabilities and risk-adjusted rates of return reported by Wetzel (1981)
Dependent: k Dependent: ln k
Constant 0.728
(0.513)
Constant 0.275
(0.089)
Estimate of k 1.28
(0.143)
Ln (Estimate of k) 0.901
(0.078)
F-statistic 80.2 F-statistic 132.7
R2 0.161 R2 0.241
Well-posed? No (coeff > 1) Well-posed? No (constant > 0)
Panel C: Actual probabilities and risk-adjusted rates of return reported by Ruhnka & Young (1987, 1991)
Dependent: k Dependent: ln k
Constant -0.513
(0.596)
Constant 0.274
(0.091)
Estimate of k 1.70
(0.175)
Ln (Estimate of k) 0.908
(0.081)
F-statistic 93.8 F-statistic 125.3
R2 0.183 R2 0.230
Well-posed? No (coeff > 1) Well-posed? No (constant > 0)
6 CONCLUSION
Over the last two decades, option-based pricing models have been applied to many areas
outside the traditional field of finance. However, venture capital has remained almost
untouched, although it has been identified that these investments include several
option-like characteristics. Few serious attempts have been made to model venture
capital investments based on option-pricing theory, excluding Willner’s (1995) model of
start-up venture growth options. Neither has anybody carried out empirical testing of the
applicability of option-based pricing models to venture capital settings. Finally, and most
importantly, the current knowledge on venture capital lacks efficient methodologies for
analysing the risk-return structure of these investments.
We introduce a simple risk-neutral binomial valuation model for the analysis of venture
capital investments. We also provide empirical evidence that this model is consistent
with previous knowledge on the risk-return profile of venture capital investments.
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Furthermore, we find that the model has predictive power regarding actual future
valuations. We also find that the predictive power of the model is better than that of
corresponding traditional models that use risk-adjusted rates of return and actual success
probabilities. The risk-neutral valuation estimates seem to be fairly unbiased, since the
mean and median estimation errors are found to be small. Nevertheless, the variance of
the estimation error is still large, which is consistent with the ‘common sense’
observation that venture capital investments often result in extreme outcomes.
This paper has both theoretical and practical implications. The main theoretical
implication is that option-based pricing models seem to have relevance in venture
capital applications. Even the simple risk-neutral binomial model can provide a feasible
methodology for analysing the risk-return structure of these investments. An important
implication of this paper for researchers is that the risk and implied volatility associated
with privately held companies indeed decrease as the companies reach higher stages of
development. Thus, pricing models that assume constant volatility are not likely to be
applicable in venture capital or R&D project settings. Practical implications arise from
the fact that the model is relatively simple. We argue that it is understandable and also
feasible in practice. Venture capital practitioners and R&D project evaluators may thus
benefit from the model in decision-making and company analysis settings, especially
when quantifying risk and return. On the R&D side, the binomial approach is
particularly useful for evaluating projects that are organised as internal or external
ventures that receive financing in stages.
The main limitations of this paper arise from two sources, the simplicity of the model
and the properties of the empirical sample. As this paper is the first empirical test of
option-based venture capital pricing models, we attempt to keep the theoretical model
as simple as possible. The binomial framework, which allows only two possible
outcomes after each valuation observation, may be too simplistic for sophisticated
pricing analysis. Our empirical results also demonstrate that the valuations of venture
capital backed companies often result in extreme outcomes that are difficult to capture
with any ex ante pricing model.
Secondly, the data set is limited in certain respects. The observations consist of only
successful ventures that were able to proceed to the initial public offering. If we could
have constructed a sample that contained observations also from ventures that did not
succeed, the reliability of the results would increase. However, such a sample is hard to
construct, since it is impossible to observe the value of a private company that is no
longer able to attract financing. Alternative sources, such as large-scale surveys, could
potentially be useful. These methods could alleviate some of the possible bias toward
the best companies, which may be a problem with the publicly disclosed valuations that
Venture Economics and other corresponding databases record.
Further research should examine the validity of more advanced option-pricing models
in venture capital applications. We have shown that a very simple risk-neutral pricing
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model is consistent with empirical observations. However, option-based pricing models
based on an underlying stochastic process that attempts to capture the venture’s value
have not been empirically validated. Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine
the exercise policy of the venture capitalist’s series of options to abandon. When do the
venture capitalists decide to invest, and when do they decide not to? Finally, analysing
further the risk-return structure of staged venture capital investments using a
theoretically sound model, such as a model based on the simple binomial tree idea,
would significantly contribute to the current knowledge about venture capital.
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ESSAY 2:
CERTIFICATION AND BARGAINING POWER IN VENTURE CAPITAL:
THE IMPACT OF INVESTOR PROMINENCE ON COMPANY VALUATIONS
Abstract: This paper demonstrates how investor prominence affects the valuations of
venture capital backed companies. Employing an extensive data set of U.S. venture
capital investments between 1990 and 2000, we show that certification ability gives
prominent venture capitalists bargaining power that they utilise when investing in
ventures for the first time. In line with asymmetric information and signalling theories,
we find that the reputation of existing venture capital investors adds value in future
financing rounds. Our results are robust to potential selection biases, alternative
measures of investor prominence, existence of other value adding mechanisms, and
different sampling periods.
A previous version of this essay was presented in the Strategic Management Society
conference in San Francisco, CA, United States, October 21 – 24, 2001. The essay was
selected as runner-up in the Strategic Management Society / Booz Allen & Hamilton
best PhD conference paper competition.
The essay is in process for publication in Financial Management.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the presence of informational asymmetries between company insiders and outside
investors, signals that convey information on the quality of the company are valuable.
Signalling reduces the investors’ risk of selecting a ‘lemon’ (Akerlof, 1970), and lowers
the discount investors require to offset this risk (Spence, 1974). The ability of third-party
specialists to give such signals, i.e. to certify the value of young, unknown firms in
markets that are characterised by information asymmetry between company insiders and
investors, has been a popular topic in the finance literature on initial public offerings. A
large body of literature has accumulated around initial public offerings on developing
and testing models based on the formal certification hypothesis developed by Booth and
Smith (1986). Beatty (1989), Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter et al. (1998),
among others, have examined how investment bankers and auditors can help to reduce
the effect of informational asymmetries inherent in the IPO process. Barry et al. (1990)
and Megginson and Weiss (1991) have reported that venture capitalists have the ability
to certify the price of initial public offerings. Furthermore, Gompers (1996) found that
the portfolio companies of older and thus more reputable venture capitalists are
associated with significantly smaller IPO underpricing than those of young VCs.
Since it is problematic for company insiders to convey their private information reliably,
certifying signals from reliable third parties are valuable for new ventures. However, new
ventures cannot obtain credible certification free of charge. For certification to be
credible, the certifying third party needs to have reputational capital at stake, and needs
to be at risk of being adversely and materially affected if the certification proves false
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991). A rational third party with certification ability will
recognise its valuable role and the risks associated with false certification, and will
demand compensation for this service.
Besides the wide body of literature on the price-certifying role of third-party specialists,
previous research has mainly focused on the initial public offering and the public
markets (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Booth and Smith, 1986; Beatty, 1989; Carter and
Manaster, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Michaely and Shaw, 1995; Beatty and
Welch, 1996; Carter et al., 1998; Livingston and Miller, 2000). It has largely ignored the
venture capital setting and the highly uncertain private financing stages, although
certification is expected to be most valuable when there is little public and symmetric
information available about the investment targets. Another closely related but less
investigated phenomenon is the bargaining power of the third parties over the price of
the certification they provide. There is evidence regarding underwriter compensation in
IPOs, but to our knowledge only theoretical work on the bargaining power of venture
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capital investors (Hellmann, 1998; Kirilenko, 2001).9 In the venture capital setting, the
potential discount on the company valuation that venture capital investors need to pay
for their ownership share represents compensation for their certification. If prominent
venture capitalists are particularly valuable for the ventures because of their better
certification capability, investor prominence will be negatively related to the valuation of
the venture when the VC firm enters the venture as a new investor. Similarly, the
prominence of previous investors will be positively related to the future valuations of the
venture if certification adds value, and if the existing investors attempt to decrease the
dilution of their ownership share in subsequent financings.
This paper contributes to the literature by extending the empirical literature on
asymmetric information and signalling from the context of initial public offerings and
public markets to the context of privately held companies. We also contribute to the
literature on certification by explicitly analysing how prominence affects the
compensation third parties require for their certification. Furthermore, we provide
methodological contributions on investor prominence measures that can be used as
proxies for price-certifying ability.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 builds the testable hypotheses based on
earlier research. Section 3 presents the data and the methods used. Section 4 presents
and discusses the empirical results. Finally, conclusions and implications are discussed
in section 5.
2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
In this paper, prominence refers to the reputational capital that venture capitalists have
at stake when making investments. This reputational capital consists of the appreciation
the venture capital firm has in the marketplace, and is driven by the activity and in
particular the proven success of the firm’s operations. Certification refers to the ability of
third parties to reduce the quality uncertainty over parties associated with them.
Although the word ‘certification’ was used already by Akerlof (1970) in the context of
institutions counteracting informational asymmetries, the formal certification hypothesis
by Booth and Smith (1986) established the concept in the context of financial markets
and intermediaries. Booth and Smith (1986) modelled the ability of underwriters to
certify the price of risky issues in markets characterised by asymmetric information
between insiders and prospective outside investors.
These arguments, derived from asymmetric information theory (Akerlof, 1970), assume
that company outsiders and insiders have different objectives and possess different
information. Because of such informational asymmetries, prospective investors cannot
                                                
9 When this paper was already in the review process for publication, we became aware of a related working
paper by David Hsu (2002). Hsu examines the willingness of entrepreneurs to pay for venture capital
affiliations using a survey sample of U.S. financing offers. Discussion on our methodology in
comparison to Hsu (2002) is included in the Methods section.
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completely rely on the information they gain from the insiders of a new venture
(Gompers, 1995). Investors recognise the asymmetry inherent in the investment
situation and are willing to pay less than they would if information were symmetric.
Informational asymmetries thus result in a loss of value, or even a market failure
(Akerlof, 1970).
However, if a third party can credibly signal that the venture is of good quality, part of
the loss of value can be alleviated (Spence, 1974; Booth and Smith, 1986; Beatty, 1989;
Carter and Manaster, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Carter et al., 1998). An
important determinant of credible signalling, or certification, is the reputation of the
third party. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) argue that investors use an investment
bank’s past performance in the equity market to determine its credibility as an
underwriter. Thus, investment banks improve their reputation by choosing strict, but
costly valuation standards for firms they underwrite (Booth and Smith, 1986; Livingston
and Miller, 2000).
In the context of venture capitalists and their portfolio companies, informational
asymmetries exist between existing shareholders and prospective outside investors
principally in the same manner as those that exist between the insiders and outsiders of
any firm. Insiders are better informed on the future prospects of the venture, and
rational outside investors recognise the possible incentives of the insiders to overstate the
value of the firm when issuing equity.
Following the general theories developed to explain the role of financial intermediaries
in resolving informational asymmetries between company insiders and outside investors,
several authors have analysed the role of venture capitalists as such intermediaries. Barry
et al. (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) focused on the ability of venture
capitalists to resolve informational asymmetries in initial public offerings. Because of
their certification abilities, venture capitalists help firms to access higher-quality
underwriters than firms without venture capitalist backing can typically access.
Furthermore, as the general certification hypothesis predicts, the underpricing of
venture capital backed IPOs is significantly smaller than that of other IPOs. The market
interprets the presence of venture capitalists as an indicator of the quality of the issuing
firm. Furthermore, Gompers (1996) analysed the relationship between the prominence
of venture capitalists and their incentives to make portfolio companies public, and
found that young venture capital firms tend to rush for portfolio company IPOs in order
to create initial reputation, and to demonstrate their ability to evaluate the quality of
their portfolio companies. Gompers’ (1996) results suggest that a venture capitalist’s
ability to provide reliable certificates of quality on its portfolio companies is valued by
the market and a desired goal for venture capital firms.
These studies suggest that by putting their reputational capital at stake, venture capital
investors are able to reduce the amount of informational asymmetries inherent in new
ventures when they go public. In this paper, we examine the relationship between the
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reputational capital of venture capital investors and the valuations of investment rounds
with particular focus on the certification ability and the bargaining power of prominent
venture capitalists. We extend previous research on certification by applying the
certification hypothesis to private financing rounds, i.e. investment situations where
informational asymmetries are highest. We develop two specific hypotheses that can be
robustly tested despite the various problems and biases inherent in the empirical
investigation of venture capital valuations in general.
Our first hypothesis considers the certification ability of existing investors in future
financing rounds. Prominent venture capitalists have their reputation at stake when
making investments, and thus investments by prominent venture capitalists can be seen
as signals of the high quality of the venture (Gompers, 1996). If the signal is recognised
in the market, informational asymmetries associated with the venture decrease, and the
valuation of the venture increases. The prominence of insider venture capitalists should,
thus, have a positive impact on the valuation of the venture in subsequent investment
rounds.
Furthermore, previous research has shown that insider venture capitalists have
incentives to utilise their certification ability in the private financing stages. Higher
valuations of subsequent share issues imply less dilution on existing ownership shares.
Insiders would thus be better off the higher the valuation in subsequent rounds unless
they in turn needed to invest in the venture. However, investments by insiders are
typically smaller than investments by new outside investors. To give consistent and
reliable signals about the quality of the venture, VCs optimally hold their share of equity
constant after their initial investment (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994). If insider VCs
diluted their share of ownership by not investing more, they would convey a negative
signal of the quality of the venture. Similarly, an increase in ownership share would
imply that the insider VCs favoured themselves in the allocation of potentially
underpriced shares. Thus, the adverse selection problem can be alleviated only if
insiders hold their share of equity constant. This means that venture capitalists must
make reinvestments that correspond to the amount of dilution in each round. These
investments are considerably smaller than new investments made by outside investors.
As a result, higher valuations of subsequent financing rounds that involve new investors
typically benefit insider VCs.
Our second hypothesis considers the bargaining power of venture capitalists that stems
from their presumed capability to certify the quality of new ventures. If prominent
investors are valuable to their portfolio companies, these VCs have more bargaining
power over the entrepreneurs and other insiders than less prominent ones. Accordingly,
prominent venture capitalists are likely to utilise their negotiation power to push down
the entry valuation and to increase the prospective return on investment for themselves.
The potential ability of top-end venture capitalists to push entry valuations down is
logical from the viewpoint of the certification criteria in Megginson and Weiss (1991).
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According to the criteria for reliable investor certification, it must be costly and difficult
for the venture to purchase the services of a certifying agent, and the cost must be an
increasing function of the extent and quality of the certification. Since venture
capitalists can be regarded as such certifying agents, at least in the context of initial
public offerings (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Gompers, 1996), prominent VCs may
enter deals with more favourable terms than less prominent investors.
More precisely, this paper tests the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: (Certification ability of prominent investors)
The prominence of insider venture capitalists in a new venture is positively
related to the valuation of the venture in subsequent private financing rounds.
Hypothesis 2: (Negotiation power of prominent investors)
Prominent outsider venture capital firms invest in new ventures at lower
valuations than less prominent outsider firms.
3 METHODS AND DATA
3.1 Methods
As Gompers and Lerner (2000) point out, the analysis of venture capital valuations poses
estimation challenges that are considerably different from traditional studies on the
pricing of publicly traded assets. Firstly, the set of venture capital backed firms is not
constant in our analysis, as ventures frequently enter and exit the sample. Secondly, the
time between refinancings is variable and long, on average 9.6 months in our sample.
There are two main options for analysing a set of valuations such as ours. Firstly,
hedonic pricing models can be applied. The idea of hedonic pricing models was first
introduced by Waugh (1928) in the context of vegetable pricing. These models regress
all price observations on a set of explanatory variables. Hedonic pricing models assume
that it is possible to control for factors that are important in determining the price, and
thus omitted variables may lead to biased results and wrong interpretations. To minimise
the potential problems of unobserved heterogeneity, we utilise a thorough set of control
variables in all hedonic models.
While the hedonic approach is useful in the sense that it can incorporate also firms with
only one valuation observation, it cannot take into account all the firm-specific
determinants of valuations. One possible way to address this concern is to undertake an
analysis of first differences (Gompers and Lerner, 2000), and examine valuation changes
between two financing rounds. This significantly reduces the effects of unobserved firm-
specific characteristics that cannot be taken into account in hedonic models.
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The first differences approach is naturally not without drawbacks. Firms for which at
least two valuation observations exist are likely to be more successful than others, since
venture capital valuations can be observed only when the venture has succeeded in
obtaining a follow-up financing round. Ventures that have gone bankrupt, have been
merged, or have become “living dead” after the first financing round do not produce
valuation data, and may systematically differ from the firms we observe with at least two
valuations. However, the first differences analysis provides a useful and complementary
method to test the hypotheses, especially when combined with an appropriate correction
for selection bias.
To overcome the potential problems of selection bias, we utilise Heckman’s sample
selection methodology in all regression analyses (Heckman, 1979). Our Heckman
approach is a full maximum likelihood method, in which the first equation estimates
the probability that Venture Economics has been able to record the valuation of the
financing round, and the second equation the intended regression using an additional
regressor to correct for sample selection. The practical implementation of the Heckman
method requires us to include all venture capital financing rounds, including those with
no valuation observations, in the initial sample. We use the entire sample of venture
capital investments between 1990 and 2000 to estimate the first Heckman equation, and
the sub-sample of the financing rounds with valuation observations to estimate the
models. To accomplish this estimation, we use the following variables that are available
for all financing rounds: the public market index, fundraising in the previous four
quarters, round total amount of financing, venture age, development stage dummies,
location dummies, industry dummies, and year dummies. In the second equation,
coefficients for the substantive regression equation used to test the hypotheses are
estimated using the maximum likelihood method. The Heckman methodology allows
us to alleviate the potential sample selection biases inherent in the venture capital
valuation data set, including biases we have not been able to fully identify. Our
approach is equivalent to previous published research utilising venture capital
valuations (Gompers and Lerner, 2000). We compute the standard errors for the
coefficients using a heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator (White, 1980).
When this essay was in the review process for publication, we became aware of a closely
related working paper by David Hsu (2002). Hsu examines the market for venture
capital affiliation by empirically examining the price differential between financing
offers that new ventures received from venture capitalists of different reputations.
While this paper applies different methods to analyse the valuations of financing rounds,
and the changes in valuations between rounds, Hsu (2002) takes the financing offer as
the unit of analysis. The advantage of this approach is the possibility to explain the
variation in price offered to the startups by different venture capitalists within a short
period, while holding the characteristics of the startup fixed. The choice of the unit of
analysis reduces the potential problems of unobserved heterogeneity and allows to
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estimate the marginal rate of substitution between the price for affiliation and the
reputation of the certifying agent.
The disadvantages of Hsu’s approach are the relatively small number of observations, the
short time frame of the study and the concentration of observations in the peak years of
venture capital investment, basing the offer comparisons on price only and not taking
into account the other characteristics and conditions of the term sheets, and the
potential selection bias problems related to the firms that end up in the final data set.
For example, having the offer as the unit of analysis requires allows to include in the
sample only startups that received multiple financing offers. Similarly, getting the
necessary data made it necessary to administer a survey to firms participating in the MIT
E-Lab program. Both of these issues lead to a potential problem of selection bias that
should be controlled for. Furthermore, even this approach cannot fully address the
problem of unobserved heterogeneity because the problem persists on the offer level
due to the potential unobserved differences in the term sheets the startups received.
We strongly believe that the two different approaches to estimating the price and value
of certification are complementary to each other, especially because Hsu’s (2002)
empirical results appear to consistently support our findings. Hsu (2002) concludes that
(1) startups are more likely to accept an offer from a VC that has a good reputation even
at a low price, (2) top-end VCs make offers at lower pre-money valuations than average
VCs. Our results support these patterns.
3.2 Data
The empirical sample consists of 32,311 financing rounds of 13,048 U.S. venture capital
backed companies between 1990 and 2000, and it contains valuation data for 5,679
rounds. The venture capital investment data is obtained from the Venture Economics
database. This extensive source has been used widely in previous venture capital
research (e.g. Bygrave, 1989; Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 1995; Gompers and Lerner, 1999;
Kortum and Lerner, 2000). Venture Economics has gathered venture capital investment
data since the 1970s using annual reports of venture capital funds, personal contacts to
funds’ personnel, initial public offering prospectuses, and deals announced in the
media. The database contains information on over 150,000 private equity investments
(one whole financing round consists of several single investments), and is widely
recognised as a leading source of U.S. venture capital investment data10.
The sample is selected from the universe of all the venture capital investments using
three criteria. Firstly, we restrict the data set to contain only U.S. companies in order to
reduce unobserved heterogeneity and to improve the reliability of our analysis. Venture
                                                
10 Some academic studies use data from VentureOne, Inc. (e.g. Gompers and Lerner 2000). This firm,
established in 1987, collects similar data to those of Venture Economics’, but uses a different
methodology. Discussion of the relative quality of these two alternative databases can be found in
Gompers and Lerner (1999, 2000) and Lerner (1994, 1995).
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Economics has extremely comprehensive coverage of U.S. investments, and the U.S.
market represents the majority of the global venture capital market. Secondly, we limit
the sample to standard venture capital investments. We implement this by removing
records that Venture Economics classifies as “leveraged buyout”, “secondary purchase”,
“open market purchase”, “private investment in public company”, or “turnaround”. Our
sample thus includes all U.S. investments covered by the established definition of
“venture capital” (Gompers and Lerner, 1999) that Venture Economics has recorded in
the period of the study. Finally, we check for the consistency of the valuation
information for the companies, and exclude all ambiguous records. We classify
valuation information as ambiguous if the data on the amount of financing and the
valuation of the venture imply that the venture capitalists took more than 100% of the
company’s equity in the financing. There are 23 such financing rounds in the original
sample11.
In building our IPO market share measures, we cross-check the data on the initial
public offerings and IPO dates of those sample ventures that Venture Economics
recorded as having conducted an IPO from Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) New
Issues database. SDC New Issues is a source of IPO data that records several
characteristics of the issuer and the underwriter syndicate.
3.3 Variables
Company market value. Throughout the paper, we use what are known in the venture
capital industry as “pre-money” valuations, equal to the product of the price paid per
share in the financing round and the shares outstanding prior to the financing round
(Gompers and Lerner, 2000). Another possibility would have been to utilise “post-
money” valuations, equal to the product of the price paid per share in the financing
round and the shares outstanding after the financing round. Pre-money valuations are
considered more appropriate for pricing analyses than post-money valuations (Lerner,
1994), and have been used in the previous research on venture capital valuations
(Lerner, 1994; Gompers and Lerner, 2000). Pre-money valuation is not directly
dependent on the amount invested in the firm during the current financing round. As
Gompers (1995) discusses, the amount invested may vary with many considerations,
including the fundraising environment. Thus, we examine pre-money valuations
throughout the analysis. Venture Economics converts all preferred shares into common
shares, and reports the “post-money” valuation of the financing round based on the total
number of common shares outstanding after the financing round and the price per
share paid in the financing round. We calculate the pre-money valuation by subtracting
the amount invested in the financing round from the post-money valuation reported by
Venture Economics.
                                                
11 Typically, venture capital financings, as defined in our sample, transfer 10-40% of the venture’s shares to
the venture capitalists.
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Given the length of time that our analysis covers, it is necessary to control for inflation.
To do that, we collect the quarterly values of the Gross Domestic Product deflator from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis of U.S. Department of Commerce. We then convert
all nominal company valuations, public market index values, and amounts of funds
raised and invested to 2001 dollars, and run the analyses using these deflated data.
Investor prominence. The key independent variable of our analysis is investor
prominence, also known as reputation (Livingston and Miller, 2000:22). In previous
literature focusing on certification by third parties, various kinds of proxies have been
used to measure prominence and reputation (Carter and Manaster, 1990; Megginson
and Weiss, 1991; Michaely and Shaw, 1995; Beatty and Welch, 1996; Gompers, 1996;
Livingston and Miller, 2000). In this paper, we put emphasis on selecting a relevant and
meaningful prominence measure for venture capital investors, and on testing several
alternative measures to ensure the robustness of our results. Testing that the predicted
relationships hold irrespective of the operationalisation of the construct increases our
confidence in the results.
Previous research in related domains has employed at least three types of prominence
measures. Firstly, in research on initial public offerings, underwriter prominence has
been tracked using past performance measures such as the IPO market share of each
underwriter (e.g. Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Beatty and Welch, 1996; Livingston and
Miller, 2000). Past performance is a good proxy for prominence because outside
investors and other economic actors can observe and verify track records independently.
Market share based measures are also available for various types of certifying third
parties, which enables comparisons and makes them practical (Beatty and Welch,
1996).
A second category of prominence measures is based on status orderings among
competitors. One example of status based prominence measures is the underwriter
ranking of Carter and Manaster (1990), updated by Carter et al. (1998). The ranking is
based on the notion that IPO underwriters are careful about the position of their name
on IPO tombstone advertisements. Therefore, the higher the name is in the list of the
syndicate partners, the higher the status of the underwriter. While this approach is
appealing, the previous implementation of these status measures has assumed that
reputation remains constant throughout the research period, which is frequently not the
case for longer periods. While there are no similar tombstones in the context of venture
capital investments, researchers in sociology have recently started measuring the status
of venture capitalists as the position of the focal venture capital firm in the overall
network of venture capitalists. Sociologists have interpreted the position in inter-firm
networks as a measure of firm status, and have also used the syndication relationships of
venture capital firms in such networks. Essentially, the more syndication connections a
VC firm has to other VC firms, and the more central positions these other firms have,
the higher is the status of the focal VC firm (Podolny, 2001). While status measures
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generally reflect the appraisal of the focal economic actor in its social context, they may
not be tightly coupled to past or present performance (Podolny, 1993). While not tightly
linked, status and performance are highly correlated, and status both drives future
quality and acts as an indicator of the quality of the underlying product or service
(Benjamin and Podolny, 1999). Despite the different theoretical reasoning, tombstone-
based status measures and past performance measures of prominence have been found
to be highly correlated for instance in the context of initial public offerings (Megginson
and Weiss, 1991; Carter et al., 1998).
A third alternative prominence measure for venture capitalists has been the age of the
venture capital firm (Gompers, 1996). Young venture capital firms have a tendency to
“grandstand”, or to attempt to create reputations by exiting their portfolio companies
earlier than older firms in order to demonstrate tangible performance (Gompers, 1996).
Track record is important for venture capital firms if they wish to raise follow-on funds
and continue active investment. However, age as such is not a fully consistent estimator
of investor prominence. It is not explicitly related to performance, and using age as a
measure of prominence would assume that the creation of prominence is automatic and
monotonic without a connection to the performance of the investors.
In this study, we employ several prominence measures to demonstrate that the choice of
measure does not affect our findings. As our main measure of prominence, we use past
performance, which we operationalise as the cumulative share of the venture capital
backed IPO market. IPO market share is defined as the cumulative number of the
venture capital firm’s portfolio company IPOs divided by the cumulative number of all
venture-backed IPOs in the sample, where the cumulating starts at the first year of the
sample. This approach takes into account both the dynamic nature of prominence and
the success of the venture capital investors. In cases where several venture capitalists
invest in a venture at the same time (syndication), we use the sum of the investors’ IPO
market shares as a measure of the total prominence of new investors. The same logic
applies when the prominence of existing inside investors is measured.
In addition to the sum of IPO market shares, we test the robustness of our results by
running the analyses using four alternative investor prominence measures for both the
new outside investors and the inside investors. These measures include the average and
the maximum of the cumulative IPO market shares of the investors in the syndicate, the
sum of the investors’ number of prior portfolio companies (measuring investment
experience), and the average firm age of the investors. In unreported analyses, we also
run regressions using the maximum age of the investors and the average and the
maximum number of prior portfolio companies as prominence measures. The results
are similar to those presented in this paper.
To take into account only actual signals conveyed by insiders, we include a venture
capital firm’s prominence score in the combined prominence score of existing inside
investors only when the focal venture capital firm invested in the venture in the
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financing round that preceded the current round. This is necessary because only the
event of investing in the venture conveys the signal of high quality to the market and to
outside investors. If a current round investor no longer invests in future financing
rounds, we expect the prominence of this investor to affect the valuation of the venture
only in the current and the immediately following round of financing. However, we also
ran our regressions by taking into account the prominence of all existing inside investors
despite their decision not to participate in later financing rounds, but did not observe
qualitative differences in results.
Control variables. The decision of top-end investors to invest in a new venture is not the
only possible factor that may affect the valuation of the venture. Therefore, we include
several control variables in order to control for the related phenomena.
Venture capital investing has been identified as an extremely cyclical business (Bygrave
and Timmons, 1992; Gompers and Lerner, 2000). Reflecting these cycles, venture
capital valuations eventually follow changes in public market valuations, which give
indications of the possible exit values of the ventures. It is thus essential to control for
changes in public market valuation levels. We use the Nasdaq Composite index,
measured in 2001 dollars, to control for the varying valuation levels in public markets.
Although the Nasdaq index does not entirely follow the industry distribution of our
sample companies, we expect it to represent a very closely correlated measure of the
expected venture capital exit valuations in the largest public exit market for U.S. venture
capital investments.
Another significant factor that affects venture capital valuations is the extent of
fundraising in the venture capital industry (Gompers and Lerner, 2000). We use the
yearly amount of venture capital fundraising carried out by ordinary U.S. venture capital
firms as reported by Venture Economics and converted to 2001 dollars. This measure
includes the yearly money inflow into all U.S. venture capital partnerships that Venture
Economics tracks. Buyout and turnaround funds are excluded from the figures.
Even though venture capitalists attempt to maximise the expected return on their
investment, and thus attempt to minimise the company valuation when they invest,
larger venture capital financing injections may lead to higher implied pre-money
valuations of the target ventures than smaller injections. One reason for the potential
existence of large venture capital injections at inflated valuations is the inflow of funds
into venture capital (Gompers and Lerner, 2000). Additionally, inflated valuations may
result from the common venture capital rules of thumb regarding certain maximum
ownership percentages that investors and entrepreneurs should possess after each
financing round, or from the potential tendency of venture capitalists to invest relatively
large sums of money at inflated valuations when ventures are expected to grow fast and
when they thus require large amounts of capital. The problem of money inflows
inflating valuations closely resembles the traditional free cash flow problem of corporate
management (Jensen, 1986), which may lead managers to make too many, and thus less
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attractive investment decisions when they have a considerable amount of cash to spend.
Because the amount of money injected into the ventures may affect their pre-money
valuations, we include the round amount of financing as a control variable. To control
for inflation, we deflate the amounts using the GDP deflator.
Fama and French (1992) have shown that the stock market returns of small firms differ
significantly from those of other concerns. In organisational research, small and young
companies have been argued to suffer from liability of smallness and liability of
newness, meaning that small and young companies have problems in obtaining
resources because of their lower legitimacy (Stinchcombe, 1965; Aldrich and Auster,
1986). Thus, we control for the age of the venture.
We also control for potential industry effects. We use the classification of Venture
Economics, and include dummy variables for the following industry sectors:
biotechnology, communications / media, computer hardware, semiconductors /
electronics, Internet specific, consumer related, medical / health, and industrial / energy
ventures.
Furthermore, we control for the stage of development of the ventures. According to
Ruhnka and Young (1991), venture capitalists expect that the risk of loss associated with
venture capital investments decreases steadily as a venture reaches higher stages of
development. Their results indicate that the aggregate risk of loss is as high as 66% for
seed investments, and approximately 20% for bridge financings. Wetzel (1981) reports
results in line with Ruhnka and Young (1991). Both report also that venture capitalists’
required rate of return declines as the venture reaches higher stages of development. In
their empirical study of the implied volatility and risk of venture capital valuations,
Seppä and Laamanen (2001) found support for this observation. All these studies
additionally indicate that it is more probable that a venture will fail in the early rather
than the later stages of development. Therefore, as the venture advances from the first
stage of development to the second stage, the risk of loss decreases more than if the
venture advances from stage four to stage five. As a consequence, relative changes in
value are typically larger in the early stages of the venture’s development. Venture
Economics classifies ventures into early stage, expansion, and later stage companies, for
two of which we code dummy variables.
Finally, we include dummy variables for the sample years to control for other time-
dependent factors that may affect company valuations.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics regarding the pre-money valuations of the financing
rounds of the sample. Clear, logical patterns emerge from the data. Firstly, early-stage
rounds have significantly lower valuations than expansion or later-stage rounds. While
the median valuation for early-stage rounds is approximately 8 million dollars, the
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median later-stage valuation is already close to 44 million. Secondly, valuations clearly
vary across industries. Communications/media, consumer related, Internet specific, and
semiconductors/other electronics industries have clearly higher median and average
valuations than other industries. Thirdly, ventures in California or in one of the East
Coast states have higher valuations than average U.S. ventures. Finally, while the
median and average valuations fluctuate across years, there is a significant upward surge
towards the end of the sample years. The increase in valuations between 1998 and 2000
suggests that the effect of the late years of the sample on the results should be checked
carefully. To ensure robustness, we run all regressions using several different sampling
periods, and found no substantive differences.12
Table 2 compares the sample financing rounds with valuation data to those without
valuation data. Although Venture Economics is regarded as the most comprehensive
source of U.S. venture capital investment data, the valuations of the financing rounds
are available only for approximately 18% of the sample financing rounds. Valuations are
more frequently available towards the end of the sample, and most of the differences
between the rounds with valuation observations and those without appear to result from
the large number of valuation observations in the years 1999 and 2000. These years
involved higher public market valuations, higher levels of fundraising, younger
companies, larger financing rounds, and more Internet specific companies. Such a bias
is expected because Venture Economics made its database of company valuations
available only in the beginning of 2000. While we believe that the differences do not in
fact yield biases in the final results, it seems appropriate to utilise an efficient sample
selection correction methodology in all analyses to ensure the robustness of the results
despite not observing the valuation for all financing rounds.
                                                
12 Robustness tests are described later in more detail.
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Table 1 Inflation-adjusted pre-money valuations of financing rounds
The table describes the pre-money valuations of the financing rounds categorised by round characteristics. The
second column lists the number of rounds for which we have valid valuation data. The third column presents the
percentage of rounds with valid valuation data from all financing rounds in the same category in the Venture
Economics database. The three rightmost columns list the median, the mean, and the standard error of the pre-
money valuations in the corresponding category.
Pre-money valuations ($ thousands as of 2001)
Number of rounds
with valuation
data
% of all financing
rounds in category
with valuation
data Median Mean
Standard
error of
mean
Stage of development
Early stage 2,161 18% 8,236 18,120 908
Expansion 2,418 19% 32,629 68,998 2,576
Later stage 1,100 15% 44,370 89,249 3,937
Industry
Biotechnology 403 19% 20,329 39,961 3,131
Communications and media 721 19% 26,376 78,365 5,117
Computer hardware 193 14% 17,809 37,757 3,802
Computer software and services 1,194 18% 18,170 40,403 1,658
Consumer related 122 6% 15,057 73,017 28,283
Industrial/energy 91 7% 11,301 40,709 9,272
Internet specific 1,888 27% 24,826 64,788 2,680
Medical/health 606 16% 13,090 25,755 1,771
Other products 134 6% 17,793 44,511 6,205
Semiconductors/other elect. 327 19% 23,851 59,727 6,522
Location
California 2,567 21% 22,752 57,640 2,407
MA, NJ, or NY 971 17% 20,607 55,529 3,446
Other U.S. state 2,141 15% 18,273 47,775 1,936
Year
1990 27 2% 11,045 25,676 6,626
1991 46 3% 8,403 28,967 6,069
1992 205 11% 11,006 16,738 1,033
1993 158 10% 10,668 19,669 1,959
1994 260 16% 11,610 20,604 1,659
1995 149 8% 9,962 21,856 2,492
1996 386 15% 11,904 29,901 2,974
1997 575 17% 14,709 30,828 2,055
1998 734 19% 15,665 34,627 2,108
1999 1,245 24% 28,614 68,681 4,094
2000 1,894 26% 31,743 77,507 2,929
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Table 2 Comparison of financing rounds with and without valuation data
The table compares the characteristics of the financing rounds for which Venture Economics was able to
determine the valuation, and the rounds for which Venture Economics was not able to do so. The
rightmost column presents the p-values of the χ2- and t-tests of the hypothesis that these two groups of
financing rounds are identical.
Rounds without
valuation data
Rounds with
valuation data
p-value from
test of equality
Stage of development
Early Stage 38% 38% 0.798
Expansion 39% 43% 0.000
Later Stage 23% 19% 0.000
Industry
Biotechnology 6% 7% 0.018
Communications and Media 12% 13% 0.013
Computer Hardware 5% 3% 0.000
Computer Software and Services 20% 21% 0.076
Consumer Related 7% 2% 0.000
Industrial/Energy 4% 2% 0.000
Internet Specific 20% 33% 0.000
Medical/Health 12% 11% 0.000
Other Products 8% 2% 0.000
Semiconductors/Other Elect. 5% 6% 0.149
Location
California 37% 45% 0.000
MA, NJ, or NY 18% 17% 0.093
Other 45% 38% 0.000
Other round characteristics
Date of financing May-96 Dec-97 0.000
Company age (years) 5.6 4.2 0.000
Inflation-adjusted Nasdaq Composite index level 1,938 2,533 0.000
Inflation-adjusted round total amount of financing (MUSD) 6.3 13.3 0.000
Sum of new investors' IPO market share 1.11% 1.85% 0.000
Sum of new investors' cum. no. of portfolio companies 80 177 0.000
Average age of new investors (years) 7.0 9.2 0.000
Finally, Table 3 presents the cumulative IPO market shares of the top 30 U.S. venture
capital partnerships between 1996 and 2000, ranked in descending order according to
the year 2000 figures. The ranking of the top firms appears to remain relatively
unchanged over time. Firms familiar to the general public occupy the top positions:
Kleiner Perkins, New Enterprise Associates, and Sequoia Capital are consistently the top
three partnerships.
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Table 3 Cumulative IPO market shares of top-end venture capital firms (%)
The table presents the cumulative market share of portfolio company initial public offerings for the top 30
venture capital firms in the sample. The venture capital firms are divided into partnerships classified by Venture
Economics as “independent private partnerships” and other types of investors. The cumulative market share in
a given year is defined as (cumulative number of firm’s portfolio company IPOs) / (cumulative number of all
sample IPOs). The first observation in the sample is from the year 1990. Note that several VC firms may have
participated the same portfolio company IPOs.
Venture capital firm name 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Independent private partnerships investing own capital
1 Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers 6.8 7.3 7.2 7.0 6.7
2 New Enterprise Associates 8.5 7.7 7.3 7.2 6.7
3 Sequoia Capital 6.0 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.0
4 Lightspeed Venture Partners (FKA: Weiss, Peck & Greer) 5.7 5.5 5.3 4.7 4.6
5 Accel Partners 3.9 4.2 4.1 4.1 3.9
6 Alta Partners (FKA: Burr, Egan, Deleage & Co.) 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.7
7 Oak Investment Partners 3.9 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.7
8 TA Associates, Inc. 4.5 4.3 4.1 3.8 3.3
9 U.S. Venture Partners 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.0 3.2
10 Mayfield Fund 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1
11 Warburg Pincus, LLC 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.0
12 Institutional Venture Partners 3.4 3.2 3.0 3.1 3.0
13 Venrock Associates 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.9
14 Summit Partners 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.3 2.8
15 Technology Crossover Ventures (TCV) 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.7
16 Domain Associates, L.L.C. 3.2 3.5 3.3 2.6 2.5
17 Greylock 2.6 2.2 2.3 2.6 2.5
18 Crown Advisors International, Ltd. 4.2 3.7 3.4 2.8 2.5
19 Bessemer Venture Partners 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.4
20 Advent International Corp. 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.4
21 Apax Partners (FKA: Patricof & Co. Ventures, Inc.) 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.4
22 InterWest Partners 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.4 2.3
23 RS Investments (AKA: Robertson Stephens & Company, LLC) 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2
24 Menlo Ventures 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.1
25 Integral Capital Partners 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.9 2.1
26 Canaan Partners 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.8
27 Vulcan, Inc. 0.2 0.3 0.8 1.6 1.7
28 Brentwood Venture Capital 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.7
29 Battery Ventures 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.7
30 Mohr, Davidow Ventures 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.7
Other types of venture capital investors
1 J.P. Morgan Partners + Chase Capital Partners (inv. bank / affiliate) 4.5 5.3 5.4 6.5 7.9
2 Sprout Group (investment bank / affiliate) 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.9
3 Goldman, Sachs & Co. (investment bank / affiliate) 1.0 1.6 1.6 2.1 2.8
4 Norwest Venture Partners (subsidiary of other financial institution) 1.5 1.7 1.7 2.3 2.5
5 Intel Capital (corporation) 0.0 0.1 0.4 1.9 2.5
4 RESULTS
4.1 Hedonic analysis
Table 4 presents the results of the hedonic regression analysis of the pre-money
valuations. We use the Heckman sample selection approach with maximum-likelihood
parameter estimates and White’s (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity in a log-log
framework, where we regress the logarithm of the pre-money valuation on the dummy
variables and the logarithms of the continuous, positive variables.
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We explicitly show the effect of five different investor prominence measures for both the
current round’s new investors and those of the previous round. These measures include
the sum, the average, and the maximum of the cumulative IPO market shares of the
investors, the sum of the investors’ number of prior portfolio companies, and the average
firm age of the investors. We also run the regressions using the maximum age of the
round’s investors, as well as the average and maximum of the number of prior portfolio
companies as prominence measures. These unreported models provide results in
support of our hypotheses.
The results consistently support the certification hypothesis. With any measure of
prominence of existing inside venture capitalists, the effect of prominence on the
current round valuation is positive, as expected. New outside investors recognise the
certification by prominent inside venture capitalists, and are willing to pay more for
their investments than in the absence of such insiders. Prominent insiders increase
outsiders’ confidence regarding the quality of the venture by putting their reputation at
stake. Expectedly, the IPO market share measures have the highest significance levels of
the alternative prominence measures. While age, for example, is a good proxy for
experience and prominence, it does not as such measure the experience, performance,
or status of any single venture capital firm.
Similarly, and with any measure for the prominence of the new outside investors
investing in the venture in the current round, prominence is negatively related to the
valuation of the financing round. The results indicate that prominent venture capitalists
possess and utilise their bargaining power over the valuation of new portfolio companies,
and that existing shareholders are willing to issue shares to these investors at lower prices
than to less prominent ones. Consistent with the certification hypothesis, the expected
benefits from certification by the current round investors in future share issues are taken
into account in the valuation of the current round.
 Several control variables are significant. Firstly, large financing rounds are valued
significantly higher than smaller ones. Although we analyse pre-money valuations that
should not be directly dependent on the amount of financing provided, this finding is
expected. The amount of financing is supposedly a good measure of firm size, and large
firms generally have larger market capitalisations than small ones. The amount of
financing provided in the round may also mediate the effect of fund inflows that have
been observed to inflate venture capital valuations (Gompers and Lerner, 2000). In
periods of high fundraising, venture capital valuations tend to go up because venture
funds have more cash to invest in a limited set of ventures. This results in larger capital
injections and thus inflated venture valuations.
A second observation is that old ventures are valued higher than young ventures. Mature
age is likely to be a proxy for better future prospects and less risk. For similar reasons, the
valuations of early-stage ventures are below average, whereas the valuations of later-stage
firms are above average. Early-stage ventures have significantly more uncertainty
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regarding their ultimate success than later-stage firms. Thirdly, we find that ventures
located in California or in one of the three east-coast states with the highest venture
capital activity (MA, NJ, NY) have higher valuations than other ventures. The difference
is particularly notable in California. Fourthly, certain industries are associated with
significantly higher valuations than others. Communications / media, Internet specific,
medical / health, semiconductor, and computer hardware industries appear to have
higher valuations than others.
Finally, and consistent with Gompers and Lerner (2000), we find that public market
valuations and venture capital fund inflows are positively associated with venture
valuations. We are, however, unable to test their effect simultaneously because of the
high correlation between the two measures. Instead, we enter the variables into the
regression models separately. Both of them are found to be significantly and positively
related to the pre-money valuations of the financing rounds.
We also include indicator variables for the sample years in the analysis but do not show
the coefficients in the tables because of limited space. The boom years 1999 and 2000
appear significantly different from others throughout the models, but the removal or
inclusion of the year dummies do not significantly alter the results.
4.2 Analysis of first differences
While the hedonic approach is useful in the sense that it can incorporate firms with only
one valuation observation, it cannot take into account all the firm-specific determinants
of valuations. To address this concern, we construct a first differences framework for the
analysis of valuation changes between rounds, which reduces the impact of firm-specific
effects on the results. Table 5 presents a similar Heckman sample selection framework
with maximum likelihood parameter estimates and White correction for
heteroskedasticity as the hedonic analysis.
First differences provide a complementary possibility to analyse whether investor
prominence affects venture capital valuations. According to the hypotheses, prominent
investors may get low entry valuations and they may be able to set up high valuations in
follow-up rounds. Thus, the post-investment change in the valuation of the venture
between financing rounds t and t+1 should be positively related to the prominence of
investors that invest in the venture in round t. Investments by top-end investors should
be followed by significant increases in valuation, whereas less aggressive write-ups
should follow investments made by less prominent VCs.
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Table 4 Hedonic approach: Heckman regressions on certification effect and
price of certification
The table presents the coefficients of the second equation of a full maximum likelihood Heckman regression.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the pre-money valuation of the financing round. Year dummies are
included in all regressions but are not shown because of limited space. Unstandardised regression coefficients
and absolute heteroskedasticity-consistent z-statistics are presented. Fundraising and the public market index
are collinear, and thus they are entered into the regression equation separately.
Log of round pre-money valuation: log (Vt)
Sum of new investors’ IPO market share -.385 -.385
(1.94) * (1.92) *
Avg of new investors’ IPO market share -.866
(2.91) **
Max of new investors’ IPO market share -.598
(2.56) **
-.070Sum of new investors’ cumulative
number of portfolio companies (log) (5.28) ***
Avg of new investor’s firm age (log) -.105
(4.75) ***
1.614 1.698 1.999 .067 .058 1.622Existing investors’ prominence (using the
same measure as for new investors) (11.09) *** (5.75) *** (9.22) *** (4.99) *** (2.18) * (11.09) ***
Total amount of financing (log) .485 .504 .493 .655 .747 .491
(17.93) *** (19.52) *** (18.52) *** (15.13) *** (24.58) *** (18.01) ***
Company age (log) .187 .192 .191 .143 .107 .194
(6.64) *** (6.70) *** (6.74) *** (4.44) *** (3.71) *** (6.84) ***
Early stage? -.622 -.644 -.629 -.586 -.521 -.626
(12.13) *** (12.45) *** (12.26) *** (9.57) *** (8.83) *** (12.18) ***
Later stage? .238 .257 .246 .218 .219 .237
(6.08) *** (6.49) *** (6.27) *** (5.12) *** (4.98) *** (6.00) ***
Firm located in California? .095 .120 .101 .152 .129 .094
(2.45) * (3.05) ** (2.60) ** (3.52) *** (2.95) ** (2.40) *
Firm located in MA, NJ, or NY? .048 .071 .059 .055 .035 .050
(1.00) (1.45) (1.22) (1.05) (.66) (1.04)
Internet specific? .243 .241 .244 .162 .076 .245
(5.43) *** (5.29) *** (5.40) *** (3.18) *** (1.52) (5.45) ***
Biotechnology? -.131 -.090 -.103 -.218 -.292 -.126
(1.87) + (1.29) (1.48) (2.73) ** (3.67) *** (1.79) +
Communications/media? .231 .271 .251 .239 .187 .230
(4.33) *** (4.98) *** (4.66) *** (3.99) *** (3.15) ** (4.28) ***
Computer hardware? -.159 -.147 -.159 -.303 -.304 -.155
(1.71) + (1.57) (1.71) + (3.17) ** (3.08) ** (1.67) +
Semiconductors? .236 .243 .241 .131 .093 .228
(3.27) *** (3.28) *** (3.33) *** (1.75) + (1.16) (3.18) ***
Consumer related? .031 .001 .028 .068 .038 .019
(.19) (.00) (.17) (.36) (.20) (.12)
Medical/health? -.324 -.291 -.312 -.260 -.246 -.323
(5.03) *** (4.47) *** (4.82) *** (3.49) *** (3.31) *** (5.00) ***
Industrial/energy? .019 -.011 .015 -.179 -.495 .004
(.10) (.06) (.08) (.41) (2.47) * (.02)
Nasdaq Composite index (log) .406 .391 .409 .273 .129
(8.18) *** (7.92) *** (8.26) *** (4.77) *** (2.57) **
Venture capital fundraising (log) .218
(7.17) ***
(year dummies omitted from the table)
Constant 2.108 2.128 2.010 1.751 2.238 2.850
(5.85) *** (5.91) *** (5.60) *** (4.46) *** (5.24) *** (9.12) ***
Χ2-statistic 2559.2 2474.0 2537.4 2040.2 1747.0 2438.7
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N (all 32,311 financing rounds entered
in the Heckman equation)
5,652 5,652 5,652 5,357 5,120 5,652
*** Significant on the 0.001 level, ** Significant on the 0.01 level, * Significant on the 0.05 level, + Significant on
the 0.1 level; 1-tailed tests for the hypothesised relationships, 2-tailed tests for control variables
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Using the same five different investor prominence measures as in the hedonic analysis,
we again find consistent support for the certification hypothesis. All the prominence
measures are positively and significantly related to the value increase between the
current round and the next round. Ventures with prominent venture capitalists
experience higher write-ups in value than other ventures. The prominence measures
based on IPO market share appear most significant, but investment experience and age
variables indicate similar significant results.
Again, several control variables are included the analysis. Most importantly, we explicitly
control for the absolute pre-money valuation of the current round. As we have
documented that the prominence of the current round investors is negatively related to
the valuation of the current round, a larger-than-average increase in valuation after the
round might result only from the fact that the valuation was at a low level in the
beginning. As expected, higher valuations in the current round result in smaller
increases between the current and the next rounds. The removal or inclusion of this
control variable does not, however, alter the results.
Consistent with expectations and prior research, later-stage firms appear to experience
smaller increases in valuations than other firms. Valuation changes are also smaller for
older firms, but the relationship is insignificant. Companies located in California differ
from others in terms of higher write-ups. There are clear patterns in the industry of the
venture. Firms in communications/media, Internet specific, medical/health, and
semiconductor industries appear to experience higher valuation increases than others.
Several variables measuring developments between the two financing rounds are
significant. Firstly, the longer the interval between the two financing rounds, the larger
the increase in valuation. Progress to a higher stage of development also implies a
significant improvement in valuation. Such progress substantially increases the
likelihood that the investment will ultimately be successful. Finally, changes in the
public market index are strongly and positively correlated with changes in venture
capital valuations, but the coefficient of change in fundraising does not seem to be
significant. Although the public market index and the level of fundraising were
previously found to be highly correlated, the inclusion of the first differences of these
indices in the same regression models does not lead to multicollinearity problems.
Indicator variables for the sample years are also included in this analysis even though
space does not allow us to present the coefficients. Significantly higher valuation
increases are associated with the later sample years, and significantly smaller increases
with the early years. However, the inclusion or removal of the year dummies does not
alter the results.
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Table 5 First differences analysis: Heckman regressions on certification effect
The table presents the coefficients of the second equation of a full maximum likelihood Heckman regression.
Unstandardised regression coefficients and absolute heteroskedasticity-consistent z-statistics are presented.
*** Significant on the 0.001 level, ** Significant on the 0.01 level, * Significant on the 0.05 level, +
Significant on the 0.1 level; 1-tailed tests for the hypothesised relationships, 2-tailed tests for controls
Log change in round pre-money valuation: log(Vt+1) – log(Vt)
Sum of investors’ IPO market share, t 1.540
(8.31) ***
Avg of investors’ IPO market share, t 1.877
(7.16) ***
Max of investors’ IPO market share, t 1.682
(7.81) ***
.068Sum of investors’ cumulative number of
portfolio companies (log) , t (5.81) ***
Avg of investor’s firm age (log), t .046
(1.84) *
Round valuation (log), t -.358 -.356 -.357 -.370 -.365
(13.22) *** (13.15) *** (13.17) *** (11.81) *** (10.66) ***
Company age (log), t -.008 -.013 -.009 .008 -.013
(.31) (.51) (.36) (.28) (.42)
Early stage? .053 .054 .053 .027 .065
(.79) (.81) (.80) (.33) (.75)
Later stage? -.428 -.438 -.432 -.468 -.496
(4.62) *** (4.75) *** (4.68) *** (4.07) *** (4.26) ***
Firm located in California? .166 .175 .169 .182 .260
(3.23) *** (3.39) *** (3.29) *** (3.02) *** (3.99) ***
Firm located in MA, NJ, or NY? .039 .048 .045 .022 .096
(.69) (.83) (.79) (.34) (1.36) +
Internet specific? .357 .373 .361 .329 .356
(4.53) *** (4.76) *** (4.61) *** (3.86) *** (4.18) ***
Biotechnology? .071 .088 .078 .038 .083
(.85) (1.06) (.94) (.40) (.82)
Communications/media? .376 .393 .382 .397 .430
(5.08) *** (5.28) *** (5.14) *** (4.81) *** (4.89) ***
Computer hardware? -.003 .011 -.005 -.037 -.019
(.02) (.08) (.04) (.26) (.13)
Semiconductors? .158 .174 .160 .116 .183
(1.71) * (1.85) * (1.72) * (1.09) (1.63) +
Consumer related? -.243 -.241 -.243 -.100 -.102
(1.17) (1.16) (1.17) (.41) (.41)
Medical/health? -.314 -.312 -.316 -.374 -.387
(4.54) *** (4.47) *** (4.55) *** (4.61) *** (4.37) ***
Industrial/energy? -.442 -.458 -.443 -.703 -.741
(2.95) ** (3.00) ** (2.92) ** (3.26) *** (3.24) ***
Change in total amount of financing (log) .081 .072 .078 .113 .111
(4.02) *** (3.61) *** (3.87) *** (4.42) *** (3.95) ***
Time between rounds (log) .097 .102 .099 .031 .036
(2.66) ** (2.79) ** (2.70) ** (.75) (.79)
Progress from early stage? .389 .395 .391 .393 .475
(4.14) *** (4.24) *** (4.18) *** (3.72) *** (4.44) ***
Progress from expansion stage? .668 .685 .675 .697 .776
(5.19) *** (5.36) *** (5.26) *** (4.59) *** (5.11) ***
Change in Nasdaq Composite index (log) .274 .267 .270 .447 .431
(2.76) ** (2.65) ** (2.71) ** (3.98) *** (3.60) ***
Change in VC fundraising (log) .029 .030 .029 .001 -.003
(.35) (.36) (.35) (.01) (.03)
(Year dummies omitted from the table)
Constant 2.083 2.031 2.068 1.925 1.735
(3.69) *** (3.63) *** (3.67) *** (2.85) ** (2.60) **
Χ2-statistic 653.9 634.9 646.1 525.2 441.5
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N (all 32,311 financing rounds entered in
the Heckman equation)
1,921 1,921 1,921 1,765 1,697
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4.3 Further robustness checks and alternative explanations
Certification versus selection of inherently better ventures. One typical concern in
research that examines the value adding influences of venture capitalists is the challenge
of separating the value-adding effects from the “cherry picking “, i.e., the selection of
ventures that will be successful. According to selection logic, the ventures could gain
above-average market valuations even without investor certification or value-adding
capabilities, and the association between investor prominence and future valuation
increases could merely result from the investors’ selecting ability rather than
certification. However, our research design should alleviate the problem of such reverse
causality. There are two important features in our research design that help us deal with
this problem.
Firstly, our hypotheses posit that prominence first reduces the valuation when a
prominent investor makes the investment (bargaining power) but increases the valuation
in subsequent rounds (certification) when controlling for other factors. If prominent
investors were superior in selecting above-average ventures but did not have certifying
abilities, we would not observe that they pay less for their investments when they enter
the venture as new investors. There should be no reason why entrepreneurs let
prominent investors push down valuations if they could not provide certification or
value-adding resources. Because these bargaining power and certification effects are
tested in the same analytical models, the results could hardly be explained by selection.
Secondly, we employ panel data consisting of several observations per venture. This
makes it possible for us to track the value creation rates of new ventures and to relate the
investor prominence to the changes in value creation rates. To ensure that our sample
supports the certification hypothesis, we examined how investor prominence affected
the rate of change in pre-money market value at the time of the financing round. If
investors added value through certification or other mechanisms, investor prominence
would be positively related to the change in the rate of market value creation, because
these investors could ‘push’ the valuation down when entering the venture and ‘pull’ it
up in subsequent rounds when new investors enter. On the other hand, if investors
merely select inherently better ventures, their prominence would not change the rate of
market value creation at the time they enter the venture as new investors. ‘Cherry
picking’ would be likely to appear as a higher than average valuation even at the time of
the initial investment.
Consider a venture that had three financing rounds at times t1, t2, and t3, the pre-money
valuations of which were V1, V2, and V3. Then the rate of creating market value would
be r12 = (V2–V1)/(t2–t1) between rounds 1 and 2 and r23 = (V3–V2)/(t3–t2) between round 2
and 3. The change in the rate of market value creation would be the ratio r23/r12. We
expect investor prominence to be positively related to this ratio and run a maximum-
likelihood Heckman regression with a similar log-log framework and control variables as
previously to verify the argument.
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This robustness test resulted in further support for our hypotheses. The results, presented
in Table 6, demonstrate that investor prominence is associated with a positive change in
the rate of value increase. New investments by prominent investors significantly boost
the rate of adding value between financing rounds. In the regressions, we employ the
same additional control variables as in Table 5.
Table 6 Ensuring intra-firm consistency of results: Heckman regressions
The table presents the coefficients of the second equation of a full maximum likelihood Heckman
regression. The dependent variable is the logarithmic change in the rate of adding pre-money market
value at the time of the financing round, defined as Log(r23/r12), where r12 = (V2–V1)/(t2–t1) and r23 = (V3–
V2)/(t3–t2), V denoting venture valuation and t the timing of a financing round. The same control
variables as in Table 5 are included but not shown because of limited space. Unstandardised regression
coefficients and absolute heteroskedasticity-consistent z-statistics are presented.
Change in rate of adding pre-money market
value: log (r23/r12)
Sum of investors’ IPO market share 1.854
(3.24) ***
Sum of investors’ cumulative number of portfolio companies (log), t .121
(3.08) ***
Avg of investor’s firm age (log), t .136
(1.95) *
t
2
 – t
1
1.079 .936 .857
(7.28) *** (5.72) *** (5.26) ***
t
3
 – t
2
-.915 -.995 -.962
(10.06) *** (6.42) *** (6.14) ***
(other control variables and year dummies omitted from the table)
Constant 11.223 11.056 10.057
(7.06) *** (5.60) *** (4.57) ***
Χ2-statistic 266.6 265.7 265.6
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
N (all 32,311 financing rounds entered in the Heckman equation) 753 728 695
*** Significant on the 0.001 level, ** Significant on the 0.01 level, * Significant on the 0.05 level, + Significant on
the 0.1 level;1-tailed tests for the hypothesised relationships, 2-tailed tests for control variables
Certification versus other value-adding mechanisms. Another challenge is to distinguish
between prominence-related certification effects that are in the focus of the present
analysis, and other potential value-adding activities of venture capitalists.
Previous research indicates that venture capitalists play a significantly more active role
in managing their investments than traditional financial intermediaries. After the initial
investment, venture capitalists engage in several ‘value-adding’ activities with their
portfolio companies. These activities include monitoring financial and operational
performance, recruitment of management, arranging financing from complementary
sources, serving as a sounding broad to entrepreneur team, arranging incentive plans,
providing access to auditors, lawyers, and investment banks, and setting company
policies (MacMillan et al., 1988; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Rosenstein et al., 1993;
Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1996; Hellmann and Puri, 2000; 2002). Management
literature stresses that prominent firms may be able to attract greater and higher-quality
resources than other firms. If the VC firm provides access to its resources for its portfolio
companies, they may be able to gain a competitive advantage (Stuart et al., 1999). New
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ventures might be willing to pay for such benefits, which might increase the bargaining
power of prominent investors over the valuation of the venture. Thus, the relationship
between venture valuation and investor prominence observed in our analyses might be a
result of resource provision rather than certification. There are two main methods we
used to ensure the consistency of our prominence-related certification and bargaining
power hypotheses in the presence of other potential mechanisms influencing value
creation.
Firstly, previous research suggests that it is possible to obtain firm support for the
certification hypothesis by examining whether the certification effect we claim to have
found is contingent on the degree of uncertainty about the quality of the venture (Stuart
et al., 1999; Stuart, 2000). Outside investors are more eager to put particular emphasis
on the prominence of existing investors and other organisations associated with the focal
venture when they do not have sufficient information about the venture to reach an
independent judgement about its future prospects. As a result, the prominence of
existing investors should have a strong effect on the assessments of the value of a venture
when uncertainty about the venture’s quality is high. On the other hand, when outside
investors are confident of their ability to assess the quality of a venture, there is little
need to infer the quality of the company on the basis of the identity and prominence of
existing investors in the venture, which results in a smaller impact of the existing
investors’ prominence on the value of the focal company. Such contingency of
certification on uncertainty is emphasised in both the signalling literature and later
studies on interorganisational endorsements (Spence, 1974; Stuart et al., 1999).
The same contingency argument applies to the bargaining power of new investors over
the valuation of the venture. When uncertainty about the quality of the venture is high,
the expected value of certification to existing shareholders is similarly high because the
prominence of new investors helps to resolve informational asymmetries in future
financings. As a result, the prominence of new investors should have a stronger effect on
the valuation of the venture when uncertainty is high. On the other hand, when
uncertainty about the venture’s quality is low, the expected value of certification is
similarly low because future investors can independently evaluate the venture
reasonably well. Thus, the prominence of new investors should have less impact on the
valuation of the venture.
The contingency on uncertainty allows us to test the certification hypothesis using
interactions between prominence and uncertainty variables. We measured uncertainty
using two variables, age and an indicator variable of the number of prior financing
rounds. Firstly, venture age is a good proxy for uncertainty because young companies
have limited performance histories on the basis of which quality could be assessed
(Sahlman, 1990). Furthermore, venture capitalists are reluctant to invest large sums of
money in young companies, and typically stage their early-stage investments in smaller
injections contingent on performance (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers, 1995). The
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institutionalisation of staged financing in venture capital is in itself strong support for the
argument that the degree of uncertainty about a venture declines as it ages (Stuart et al.,
1999). Secondly, the number of prior financing rounds is closely related to the
uncertainty of the venture because ventures undergo a thorough evaluation by venture
capitalists when they raise financing. All these evaluations convey information of the
quality of the venture to outside investors at least through the venture capitalists’
decisions to invest or not to invest. Share issues also, in general, result in some sort of
documentation of the firm’s activities prior to the issue, and investors participating in
later financing rounds generally have an opportunity to examine the documents of prior
financing rounds during their own due diligence process. As a result, later-round
investors have a significantly broader range of information about the venture in their use
than first-round investors.
The results of the Heckman regressions with interaction terms included are reported in
Table 7. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the pre-money valuation of the
financing round. We first interact investor prominence with age and then with an
indicator variable that is assigned the value of one if the venture has undergone three or
more prior financing rounds. The models include the same control variables and year
dummies as in Table 4. In order to conserve space, we report only the relevant
coefficients. In both of the models, the coefficient of the interaction variable between
uncertainty and existing investors’ prominence is negative, which implies that the
impact of existing investors’ prominence on company valuation declines with the age of
the venture and the number of financing rounds it has undergone. Older ventures that
have longer operating histories gain less from certification by prominent investors, while
new ventures gain proportionally more. Similarly, new investors have less bargaining
power over the valuation of less uncertain ventures. This is reflected in the negative
coefficient of the interaction variable between uncertainty and the prominence of new
investors. While new, prominent investors can negotiate large discounts to the valuation
of uncertain ventures, their ability to do so in the case of more established ventures is
much weaker. Relative valuations are higher in the case of more established ventures
because the expected value of investor certification is smaller than in the case of new,
uncertain ventures.
We also test the effect of defining the indicator variable as two or more rounds or four or
more rounds prior to the current financing round, and find similar results to those
reported here. Similarly, the results are robust to the different measures of investor
prominence.
107
Table 7 Adding interaction terms to the base Heckman regressions
The table presents the coefficients of the second equation of a full maximum likelihood Heckman
regression. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the pre-money valuation of the financing round.
The same control variables as in 4 are included but not shown because of limited space. Unstandardised
regression coefficients and absolute heteroskedasticity-consistent z-statistics are presented.
Log of round pre-money valuation: log (Vt)
Sum of existing investors’ IPO market share 1.614 2.363 1.572
(11.09) *** (7.45) *** (7.80) ***
Sum of new investors’ IPO market share -.385 -.173 -.117
(1.94) * (.50) (.49)
Log of company age * Sum of existing investors’ IPO market share -.599
(2.67) **
Log of company age * Sum of new investors’ IPO market share -.502
(2.08) *
-.510Company had previously 3 or more financing rounds * Sum of
existing investors’ IPO market share (1.64) *
-.568Company had previously 3 or more financing rounds * Sum of new
investors’ IPO market share (1.67) *
Log of company age .187 .318 .149
(6.64) *** (5.75) *** (5.05) ***
Company had previously 3 or more financing rounds .287
(3.82) ***
(other control variables and year dummies omitted from the table)
Constant 2.108 1.911 1.919
(5.85) *** (5.50) *** (5.25) ***
Χ2-statistic 2559.2 2569.5 2653.9
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
N (all 32,311 financing rounds entered in the Heckman equation) 5,652 5,652 5,652
*** Significant on the 0.001 level, ** Significant on the 0.01 level, * Significant on the 0.05 level, + Significant
on the 0.1 level; 1-tailed tests for the hypothesised relationships, 2-tailed tests for control variables
Our results provide support for the certification hypothesis. While we fully agree that
prominent venture capitalists may also be superior in providing value-adding resources
to their portfolio companies, the results on the contingency of certification on
uncertainty show that venture capitalist prominence is associated with their ability to
certify the quality of new ventures. The greater the uncertainty regarding the quality of
the venture, the more outside investors rely on the prominence of existing investors, and
the more outside investors can utilise their prominence as a source of bargaining power
over the valuation of the venture. Although the findings document the relationship
between investor prominence and certification, we would like to stress that certification
and the provision of superior value-adding resources are not mutually exclusive
explanations of the effect of investor prominence on the value of new ventures. Rather,
we would expect these explanations to be complementary. However, the lack of
applicable data prevents us from directly testing the relationship between prominence
and the provision of value-adding resources.
Period of the study. One obvious concern is whether the period of the sample affects the
results. Although our sample covers an 11-year period of venture capital investments,
and thus covers both upturns and downturns in the industry, the majority of our
valuation observations are concentrated in the boom years of 1999 and 2000. The
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extraordinarily large private company valuations and associated valuation increases in
these years (Table 1) might distort the results in spite of our dummy variables
controlling for the different sample years in the regressions. To address this concern, we
ran the regressions using different sampling periods. We employed data from 1990 –
1994, 1993 – 1997, 1996 – 2000, and 1999 – 2000. All these sub-samples provided
qualitatively similar results, and the prominence variables remained significant in all
cases. Thus, the sampling period does not appear to affect our findings.
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper set out to examine the effect of venture capitalist prominence on the
valuations of privately held companies. Contributing to the literature on asymmetric
information and signalling theories, we have extended previous research on certification
in financial markets. Adding to the previous certification literature, we developed and
tested two hypotheses derived from the certification framework. Firstly, we hypothesised
and demonstrated that prominence gives venture capitalists bargaining power and allows
them to invest at lower valuations when controlling for other factors. Secondly, we
hypothesised and demonstrated that certification by prominent venture capital investors
reduces the discount resulting from informational asymmetries and thus leads to
increased valuations in subsequent investment rounds. The results are controlled for
various selection biases and are robust to alternative explanations.
The implications of this paper have theoretical significance in many ways. Our results
extend previous evidence regarding certification by financial intermediaries from the
context of initial public offerings and public markets to the context of privately held
companies. While previous research has shown that venture capitalists can certify the
price of initial public offerings, this paper shows that certification significantly affects
valuations already in the private financing stages in two ways. Firstly, the cost of credible
signalling to the venture is realised in terms of lower entry valuations for prominent
venture capitalists. Secondly, outside investors recognise the value of certification and
are willing to pay higher valuations in follow-up rounds if prominent investors have
invested in the venture.
The explanation for these observations is the certification effect. The results show that
the impact of prominence on company valuations is contingent on uncertainty. While
tangible value-adding capabilities could otherwise explain our findings and outweigh
the certification effect, contingency on uncertainty affirms that at least the certification
effect exists. Our results thus provide support for certification and signalling theories, but
do not argue in favour of or against theories on the tangible value-adding capabilities of
venture capital investors. Furthermore, the methodology of the paper also provides an
approach for measuring the prominence or reputation of venture capitalists. IPO market
share is a consistent measure of prominence, being strongly correlated with investment
experience and slightly less strongly with the age of the venture capital firm.
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Our paper additionally provides several practical implications. The results imply that
informational asymmetries are a significant factor affecting investment decision-making
in venture capital. New investors always confront quality uncertainty when evaluating
prospective new portfolio companies. While insider entrepreneurs are less likely to be
able to signal the true quality of their venture in a credible way, prominent venture
capitalists that are repeatedly present in the investment and exit markets are able to
provide certificates of quality. By putting their reputation at stake and investing in a new
venture, prominent venture capitalists can reduce informational asymmetries between
the venture and other outside investors in follow-up financing rounds. As a result,
prominent venture capitalists reduce the cost of follow-up financings. Our paper further
suggests that investor prominence can and will be leveraged in valuation negotiations
with entrepreneurs.
The main limitations of this paper arise from the fact that it is a great challenge to fully
control for unobserved effects that might affect the valuations we analyse in this paper.
Even though our use of several control variables and the first differences approach
significantly reduce this potential problem, it is not possible to totally alleviate
unobserved heterogeneity. A possible alternative approach would be to take the
financing offer as the unit of analysis and compare the valuations that different VCs
placed on the same venture at the same time (Hsu, 2002). While this method would
allow to hold the characteristics of the venture fixed, it would require administering a
survey, giving up a vast amount of data points, and limiting the sample to ventures that
received multiple offers for the same financing round. Furthermore, there would still be
potential unobserved heterogeneity between the different offers the startups received.
While we believe that such an analysis could complement the methodology employed
in this paper, we feel that our empirical models demonstrate an adequate level of rigor
to ensure the robustness of the results.
In addition to the need for validation of the results in other geographical markets and in
the case of buyouts, this paper provides an interesting path for future research on
venture capital syndications. Does prominence provide venture capitalists with
negotiation power over their syndicate partners, and do venture capitalists utilise it in
practice? While the nominal valuation of a syndicated investment round is typically the
same for all participants irrespective of status, prominent venture capitalists may seek
additional benefits by structuring the deal in favour of themselves. Further research on
contracting in venture capital syndications could shed light on the impact of
prominence on the co-operation between venture capitalists.
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ESSAY 3:
SYNDICATION AND THE EFFICIENCY OF VENTURE CAPITAL
FIRMS
Abstract. This paper examines the relationship between investment syndication and the
efficiency of venture capital firms. Arguments derived from the theoretical motives for
syndication predict that syndication relationships allow venture capitalists to be more
efficient in completing investments and in making their portfolio companies public.
Utilising an extensive data set comprising the venture capital investments of the 100
largest U.S. venture capital firms between 1986 and 2000, this paper demonstrates that
syndication has an impact on venture capitalists’ efficiency in both of these areas. The
frequency of syndicating investments accelerates the process of investing in new
portfolio companies, whereas the diversity of the syndication relationships improves the
venture capitalists’ ability to create public companies from their portfolio companies.
Furthermore, we find that uncertainty moderates the impact of syndication on firm
efficiency. Firms with more uncertain venture portfolios benefit more from engaging in
syndication relationships.
1 INTRODUCTION
Previous researchers have identified several reasons to explain why venture capitalists
frequently syndicate their investments, or co-invest in the same portfolio companies.
Empirical studies have demonstrated that venture capitalists form tightly coupled
syndication networks (Bygrave, 1987; 1988, Sorenson and Stuart, 2001), and that
syndication relationships are often repetitive and reciprocal (Bygrave, 1987; 1988; Lerner,
1994; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). While the debate on the motives for syndication is still
on-going, the most common suggestions cover improved capabilities to add value to the
portfolio companies (Bygrave, 1987; Brander et al., 1999), spreading financial value at risk
(Sahlman, 1990; Lerner, 1994; Lockett and Wright, 2001), improved investment decision-
making (Wilson, 1968; Lerner, 1994), information sharing on new, potential deals (Bygrave,
1987), social structural reasons such as establishment of status (Podolny, 2001), and window
dressing (Lerner, 1994).
While previous research has extensively examined the reasons for establishing syndication
relationships, significantly fewer insights are offered about the impact of syndication on the
venture capital firm and its ability to generate returns on its investments. Rational venture
capitalists seek to establish syndicates when the expected benefits from forming a syndicate
exceed the cost of splitting up the investment and potential future returns. Syndication
relationships may, indeed, have effects that improve the focal firm’s ability to generate high
returns on investment, but they may also have an adverse impact on the firm. For example,
engaging several venture capitalists in the board of a portfolio company may provide
complementary value-adding capabilities to the portfolio company, but may also give
incentives for any single venture capitalist to ‘free ride’ after the initial investment and
expect other VCs to add value. Similarly, reciprocal sharing of information on new deals
with previous syndication partners may be necessary to keep up the future deal flow of the
focal venture capital firm, but may also dilute the potential competitive advantage the focal
firm may gain from deal information it kept to itself. Furthermore, engaging several parties
in investment decision-making tends to make the process of arriving at the final decision
much slower and more cumbersome than if the firm acted on its own, even though joint
decision-making may lead to better investment decisions (Wilson, 1968) and improve the
probability that the investment will in fact be successful.
To provoke a structured discussion on the benefits and drawbacks of venture capital
syndication, this paper sets out to examine if and how syndication relationships affect the
efficiency of venture investors. Firstly, we establish an empirical relationship between the
frequency of syndication, the diversity of syndication relationships, and the efficiency of
venture capital firms. Secondly, we examine how uncertainty affects the potential impact of
syndication on firm efficiency. We utilise an extensive data set of over 50,000 venture
capital investments made in the U.S. between 1986 and 2000, construct a longitudinal set
115
of syndication measures, and supplement the data set with longitudinal data on the venture
capital firms and the initial public offerings of their portfolio companies.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 builds the testable hypotheses. Section 3
presents the data and the methods used. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally,
conclusions and implications are discussed in section 5.
2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 Rationales for syndication
Previous studies have discussed and elaborated the motivations for syndication among
venture capitalists (Bygrave, 1987; Bygrave, 1988; Lerner, 1994; Brander et al., 1999;
Lockett and Wright, 2001). Six main groups of rationales for syndication have been
identified.
Improved capabilities to add value. The sharing of expertise and ‘value-adding’ resources
and capabilities may motivate venture capital firms to co-invest (Bygrave, 1987; Brander et
al., 1999). The potential value-adding activities of a venture capitalist include, for example,
monitoring financial and operational performance, recruitment of management, arranging
financing from complementary sources, serving as a sounding board to the entrepreneurial
team, arranging incentive plans, providing access to auditors, lawyers, and investment
banks, and setting company policies (MacMillan et al., 1988; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989;
Rosenstein et al., 1993; Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1996; Hellman and Puri, 2000;
2002). Thus, venture capitalists have a much more active role in managing their
investments than public market investors. Through the value-adding activities, venture
capitalists can influence both the expected return and the risk of their investments.
The ‘value-added’ motive for syndication is essentially based on resource-based arguments
and resource complementarities. From the resource-based perspective, syndication
relationships allow the venture capitalist to add value to the investments without the need to
accumulate specialised resources for a long time (Ahuja, 2000). Syndication relationships
allow the focal venture firm to benefit from the valuable, firm-specific, imperfectly imitable,
and non-substitutable resources the syndicate partners use to add value to the shared
portfolio company. Venture capitalists tend to have heterogeneous skills and information,
and can add value to the target firm in complementary ways after the investment. They also
have complementary networks of relationships to corporations, investment banks, lawyers,
and potential senior managers for the portfolio companies. No single venture capital firm
can have superior capabilities in all the areas of value-added when compared to a group of
venture capital firms including the focal firm. As a result, syndication would be sought
when the expected benefits from complementary value-adding resources and capabilities
exceed the expected costs of splitting up the investment. Previous research has identified
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certain empirical evidence suggesting that the value-added reasons dominate others as
motives for syndication (Brander et al., 1999).
Syndication does not, however, ensure superior value added, because there is an incentive
to free ride in the syndicate after the investment has been made. Venture capitalists spend a
considerable amount of time with their portfolio companies (Sahlman, 1990). Thus, a
venture capitalist may be tempted to let his/her syndicate partners be involved in the value-
adding activities and concentrate his/her efforts on other ventures in his/her own portfolio.
The problem of free riding is obviously smaller if the ownership share of the focal venture
capitalist represents a considerable share of its portfolio, and if the syndicate partners have
made an agreement that decreases incentives to free ride.
Sharing information on potential deals. Through their syndication relationships, venture
capital firms exchange information with each other to find and evaluate investment
opportunities, to obtain commitments and support, and to legitimate themselves as
prestigious organisations (Bygrave, 1987). Information on potential deals, or deal flow, is
essential to any venture capitalist to ensure that the investments can be selected from a wide
set of alternatives. Venture capitalists select their investments in a screening process that
consists of several stages of different levels of precision (Sahlman, 1990). As a result, only a
small percentage of the initially observed potential deals end up in the portfolio as
investments. To maximise the quality of the final portfolio, and to speed up the process of
investing the fund commitments within the period agreed upon with the limited partners,
venture capitalists aim at maximising their deal flow. Syndication relationships serve as a
mechanism for spreading deal-related information to trusted partners, and as a mechanism
to reciprocate prior invitations to syndicates and prior sharing of deal information (Bygrave,
1987; Lerner, 1994).
Spreading financial value at risk. A third potential motive for syndication is the sharing of
financial risk. Rational investors diversify their portfolios to reduce idiosyncratic risk and to
make their portfolios more efficient (Markowitz, 1952). However, venture capitalists find it
more difficult to diversify their portfolio than public market investors because of the high
informational asymmetries of the private investment market (Sahlman, 1990), and possibly
also because of the smaller size of their funds and the difficulty of divesting
underperforming investments. In order to achieve an optimal level of portfolio
diversification, and to reduce their financial value at risk, venture capital firms may choose
to syndicate large investments. Although financial risk sharing has been found to be a
motive for syndication at least in the UK venture capital market (Lockett and Wright, 2001),
empirical studies in general have not provided firm support on the motive of financial risk-
sharing. Venture capitalists have been observed to syndicate frequently even if financial
value at risk is low (Bygrave, 1987), and reasons related to value-adding capabilities have
been found to dominate financial risk-sharing reasons (Brander et al., 1999).
Improved decision-making. Fourthly, syndication provides benefits from joint decision-
making. Firms can share risk related to decision-making under uncertainty if they co-
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operate (Wilson, 1968). Syndicating first-round venture capital investments in particular
may lead to better decisions about whether or not to invest in the firms (Lerner, 1994). If
several independent investors first check each other’s willingness to invest in a potentially
promising firm and then jointly invest in it, the selection they make may be superior to a
decision based on only one decision-maker (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986). Such a hierarchical or
at least partly hierarchical decision-making mechanism reduces the risk of selecting inferior
companies in the portfolio. Furthermore, such mechanisms contribute to resolving the
information asymmetry inherent in private investments. Empirical evidence suggests that
venture capitalists indeed appear to syndicate when investment-related information is highly
asymmetric (Bygrave, 1987). Thus, one potential motive for syndication is improved
decision-making or reduced risk of adverse selection in the investment situations. Venture
capitalists may also syndicate because existing investors in a venture have an incentive to
overstate the value of the venture’s shares when new investors are providing additional
financing. The only way to avoid this opportunistic behaviour is for the existing lead
investor to hold a constant share of equity (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994), and therefore
later-round investments must be syndicated.
Social reasons. The formation of syndication relationships may also reflect the venture
capitalists’ need to establish social status (Podolny, 2001). Firms with many relationships
with other well-connected firms have high status and gain reputational benefits. As a result,
venture capitalists may attempt to establish syndication relationships to generate and
maintain status-enhancing organisational connections. Furthermore, reciprocity can be a
particularly appropriate motive for repeat syndication with the same partners. Venture
capitalists may invite others to join a deal in the hope of receiving reciprocal invitations to
the future deals of the syndication partners (Lerner, 1994). Syndication can also act as a
vehicle to expand the spatial radius of exchange of venture capital firms (Sorenson and
Stuart, 2001). While venture capitalists generally prefer to invest in geographically close
companies, syndication relationships appear to allow VCs to invest in more distant firms
with trusted syndication partners.
Window dressing. Finally, ‘window dressing’ may motivate venture capital firms to
syndicate with each other (Lerner, 1994). In order to be able to raise a new fund after
closing the previous one, venture capitalists have to be able to demonstrate a good track
record of past performance. Hence, venture capital firms may be tempted to enter deals that
have proved to have a good chance of providing a successful exit in the future. As a result,
venture capitalists may want to join investment syndicates in later-stage deals even at
relatively high prices. Such investments allow the venture capital firms to associate
themselves with the potential success stories of these investments. However, the window
dressing hypothesis fails to explain syndication activities in the case of early-stage
investments. This paper attempts to apply appropriate methods to control for window
dressing in order to eliminate potential misinterpretations of the results.
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2.2 Efficiency
 Organisational ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ are both related to the optimal functioning of
organisations, but differ as theoretical concepts. Pfeffer and Salancick (1978) define
efficiency as an organisation’s internal evaluation of the number of resources consumed per
a certain amount of output produced. Efficiency focuses on the process of achieving as
many effective outputs as possible with a given number of inputs; or vice versa, achieving
the given number of effective outputs with as few inputs as possible. Effectiveness, on the
other hand, is the assessment of the organisation’s output and activities performed by each
of its external interest groups. Effectiveness can thus be defined only with respect to the
assessment of a particular group. For example, the owners of a company might disagree
with the employees on what is effective for the organisation. Owners might prefer the
maximisation of their wealth, whereas employees might prefer the maximisation of their
well-being. Effectiveness and efficiency are, thus, independent standards for evaluating
organisations.
To understand the meaning of efficiency in the case of venture capital firms, a brief
overview of the structure of the formal venture industry is necessary. Traditionally, venture
capitalists raise money from their limited partners, invest the money in promising new
ventures, harvest the investments by liquidating their holdings in an acquisition, a public
offering, or some other type of an exit, and finally distribute the original funds and a
majority of the returns back to the limited partners. The success of the initial fund or funds
is critical to the venture capital firm’s ability to raise further funds and continue operations.
An additional important characteristic of venture capital investing is active involvement in
the development of the portfolio companies during the period between investment and exit,
the ‘value added’ of the investor (MacMillan et al., 1988; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989;
Rosenstein et al., 1993; Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1996; Hellman and Puri, 2000;
2002).
The main interest groups of a typical venture capital firm tend to have a common
perspective on the effectiveness of these firms. Firstly, from the limited partners’ point of
view, the objective of venture capital organisations is to maximise the value of the originally
raised funds by selecting, managing, and developing the ventures in which these funds are
invested. Thus, a venture capital firm is effective when it maximises the realised return on
the limited partners’ investment. Secondly, the main part of the general partners’
compensation is generally a percentage of the return on the investments supplemented with
a fixed percentage fee of capital under management. The management company, i.e. the
general partners, is rewarded with a 20-25% stake of the returns to the limited partners in
addition to a 1-2% annual managing fee on capital invested in the venture capital fund
(Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 1999a). Thus, the venture capital firm is most
effective from its general partners’ point of view when the return on the invested funds is
maximised. Thirdly, from a portfolio company’s perspective, the venture capital firm is most
effective when it helps the company to maximise the wealth of its shareholders. Finally,
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from the macroeconomic perspective of society, venture capitalists are most effective when
their actions create market value, foster entrepreneurship, and lead to the creation of new
jobs and economic growth. This argumentation leads to a natural first definition of venture
capitalist efficiency: venture capitalists are most efficient when they produce as high a
return on their capital employed as possible by using a given number of other resources.
Measuring the efficiency of venture capital firms is difficult for an outside observer because
of the lack of publicised information. The internal rate of return (IRR) of the firm’s funds
would be the most interesting operationalisation of efficiency, as the IRR illustrates the
return on capital invested. However, these numbers are regarded as trade secrets, and
reliable, industry-wide IRR figures on individual funds are not currently available. In spite
of the lack of fund IRR data, comparing the frequency of successful exits across venture
capital firms may provide a practically feasible proxy for efficiency. The track record of
IPOs, for example, is a quantifiable and relevant performance measure for venture
capitalists. Initial public offerings are often referred to as ‘the golden exit’ for VCs (Bygrave
and Timmons, 1992). The largest valuations and returns to venture capitalists are most
often realised in IPOs (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). Although only a fraction of venture
capital investments reach the IPO, most of the total value to the investors is created in these
exits (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Gompers and Lerner, 1999b). Additionally, the
valuations of the portfolio companies are ultimately formed in a competitive market in the
IPO, and hence the IPO provides a reliable view of the market value of these companies.
The frequency and value of portfolio company initial public offerings should thus be highly
correlated to fund returns. As a result, a venture capital firm is efficient if it manages to
create a large number of public companies from its portfolio companies. In this paper, we
focus on examining the efficiency of venture capital firms in creating public companies.
2.3 Hypotheses
Instead of focusing on the reasons for syndication, this paper takes a macro-level approach
to examine how syndication affects the efficiency of venture capital firms. To answer this
question, we analyse two aspects of the potential impact of syndication on the efficiency of
the firm. Firstly, we assess the effect of the frequency of syndication on firm efficiency.
‘Frequency’ refers to the regularity of engaging in a co-investment relationship when a
prospective investment target is available to the venture capitalist. The frequency of
syndication is high when the focal venture capital firm has syndicate partners in most of its
deals, and low when the focal firm makes most of its deals alone. Secondly, we examine the
impact of the diversity of the firm’s syndication relationships. Diversity is high when the
focal venture capital firm has a comparatively large number of different syndicate partners,
and low when the firm has comparatively few syndicate partners relative to other venture
capital firms.
Our first hypotheses consider the relationship between syndication and efficiency in
creating public companies from portfolio companies. Creating public companies is
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important for a venture capitalist for the various reasons discussed earlier, particularly the
often very attractive exit valuations, and potential to build a reputation. The venture capital
firm can affect its ability to make portfolio companies public in two ways. Firstly, it can
attempt to select extremely promising and high-quality ventures in its portfolio. If the
venture capital firm succeeds in picking the best companies, a high proportion of its
portfolio is ultimately likely to go public. Secondly, and, many researchers argue, more
importantly, the venture capital firm can engage itself in various value-adding activities
(MacMillan et al., 1988; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Rosenstein et al., 1993; Sapienza,
1992; Sapienza et al., 1996; Hellman and Puri, 2000; 2002) with an attempt to influence
the development of the portfolio companies as positively as possible.
According to the theoretical motives for syndication, both the frequency of syndication and
the diversity of syndication relationships affect these two potential mechanisms. Firstly,
syndication relationships may lead to better investments decisions. Syndication relationships
provide an enhanced flow of information on potential deals (deal flow). Venture capital
firms that have a diverse set of syndication relationships may have a wide variety of ventures
to choose from. If the venture capital firm’s evaluation criteria are relative to the universe of
ventures it observes, enhanced deal flow leads to the selection of inherently better
companies because the venture capitalist chooses a certain ratio of the deal flow in its
portfolio. If the evaluation criteria are absolute rather than relative, enhanced deal flow
accelerates the venture capitalist’s process of finding and selecting portfolio companies that
fulfil the necessary criteria. Thus, venture capitalists with a rich deal flow may be able to
create public companies more frequently than venture capitalists with a less extensive deal
flow. Moreover, the higher the frequency of engaging in syndicated investments, the more
the venture capitalist is able to benefit from the potential efficiency gains due to improved
deal flow. In addition to deal flow issues, syndication typically leads to a hierarchical
decision-making process in which the investment target must pass the evaluations of several
independent investors (Wilson, 1968). As a result, syndication may lead to better decisions
about whether or not to invest. Previous research on managerial decision-making (Amason,
1996) also suggests that employing a diverse team of decision-makers generally leads to
better decisions.
Secondly, syndication relationships may provide the venture capitalist complementary
value-adding capabilities. Instead of having to acquire their own specialised resources for
the steering of all the portfolio companies, venture capitalists can utilise the expertise of
their syndicate partners. Furthermore, the external relationships of the syndicate partners
can be highly valuable to the focal venture capitalist. The partners may have, for example,
good contacts with relevant investment banks, auditors, corporations, and potential portfolio
company executives to be hired. Alone, the focal venture capitalist would have to establish
relationships with all the external parties in order to add the same value as the syndicate
partners can add together. By engaging in diverse syndication relationships, the focal firm
can use its co-investors as sources of complementary value-adding resources and
capabilities. Furthermore, the higher the frequency of engaging in syndicated investments,
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the more the venture capitalist is able to benefit from the potential efficiency gains due to
improved value-adding capabilities.
We formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The diversity of syndication relationships is positively related to the
venture capital organisation’s efficiency in creating public companies.
Hypothesis 2: The frequency of syndication is positively related to the venture
capital organisation’s efficiency in creating public companies.
The research setting allows us additionally to test how efficiency gains deriving from the
frequency and diversity of syndication depend on uncertainty. Firstly, the potential benefits
related to decision-making are highest under high uncertainty. Individual decisions on
highly uncertain investments involve high risk and often highly asymmetric information.
Making justified investment decisions under high uncertainty is considerably more
probable if the focal firm can supplement its own analyses with the evaluations of its
syndicate partners. The typical hierarchical decision-making process of syndicates is likely
to be most influential when the investment target is highly uncertain. As a result,
syndicating first-round and most uncertain venture capital investments in particular may
lead to better decisions about whether or not to invest (Lerner, 1994). Efficiency gains from
improved decision-making through syndication may thus be most evident when uncertainty
about the quality of the focal venture is high.
Secondly, the ability of venture capitalists to add value is particularly evident in the most
uncertain (early-stage) ventures (Sapienza, 1992). Early-stage investments typically require
significantly more involvement in the day-to-day operations of the business from the venture
capitalists, whereas later-stage companies already have management structures in place and
require less assistance in running the business. Syndication relationships can act as a
vehicle to gather specialised value-adding resources to steer and monitor portfolio
companies. Thus, the more uncertain (early-stage) the investments of the focal venture
capital firm, the more syndication may provide efficiency gains in terms of access to value-
adding resources and capabilities.
An additional possible implication from testing the moderating effect of uncertainty on the
efficiency gains from syndication is the elimination of the potential role of window dressing
as the dominant motive for syndication. In the case of window dressing, efficiency gains
would be highest for firms with a high share of later-stage investments because window-
dressing venture capitalists would aim at syndicating primarily later-stage deals to quickly
associate themselves with initial public offerings. If the efficiency gains from syndication are
higher for venture capitalists focusing on early-stage investments, window dressing is
unlikely to explain the hypothesised relationship between syndication and firm efficiency.
In contrast, such contingency on uncertainty would support arguments that syndication
provides tangible benefits to the venture capital firm.
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In sum, we expect uncertainty to moderate the relationship between syndication and the
efficiency of venture capital firms in creating public companies:
Hypothesis 3: The more uncertain the venture capital organisation’s portfolio, the
more the diversity of syndication relationships affects the venture capital
organisation’s efficiency in creating public companies.
Hypothesis 4: The more uncertain the venture capital organisation’s portfolio, the
more the frequency of syndication affects the venture capital organisation’s
efficiency in creating public companies.
The efficiency in creating public companies from portfolio companies does not yet provide
a comprehensive view of the efficiency of the venture capital firm. If the process of
screening and completing deals is very slow, the final output of public companies per year
will be low despite a high “hit rate” of producing IPOs. To address this issue, our final
hypotheses consider investment completion efficiency. By this term, we mean the efficiency
of identifying investment targets, evaluating them, and making the investment in those
companies that fulfil the necessary criteria. This process is efficient when the venture
capital firm can identify and process a large number of prospective deals in a given period.
Venture capital firms that consume comparatively large quantities of time and general
partner resources on screening, making the investment decision, and structuring the deal
are comparatively inefficient in completing investments.
We argue that both the frequency and the diversity of syndication have an impact on the
efficiency of venture capital firms in completing investments. Firstly, the frequency of
syndication should have a positive effect on deal-making efficiency because syndication
relationships allow venture capitalists to obtain more and richer information on potential
deals. Syndication relationships provide investors with an efficient channel to exchange
information with trusted partners (Bygrave, 1987). To reciprocate prior invitations to
syndicated deals, venture capitalists also frequently invite their previous partners to deals
that have passed their initial screening (Lerner, 1994). Because of the increase in the flow
of potential deals, venture capitalists that syndicate may be able to alleviate part of the time-
consuming information gathering and venture identification process. An improved access to
the necessary information should also accelerate the decision-making process, ceteris
paribus. In addition, the asymmetry of information between the venture and the focal
venture capitalist decreases as richer information about the venture becomes available. As a
result, venture capitalists that syndicate may be able to make investments consuming less
time and internal effort than VCs who do not syndicate.
While the diversity of syndication relationships contributes to the richness of information
available to the venture capital firm and may improve the ultimate decisions (Amason,
1996), the hierarchical decision-making process of investment syndicates (Wilson, 1968;
Lerner, 1994) may also have a negative impact on the efficiency of completing investments.
Syndicates involve several independent decision-makers, and the withdrawal of one or more
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parties may result in others giving up the deal. As a result, the percentage of investments not
passing the combined screen of the syndicate partners is high when the syndicate is large.
Thus, the more syndicate partners there are on average participating the firm’s prospective
deals, the fewer investments the firm is likely to accept in a given period. On the other
hand, research in managerial decision-making argues that strategic decision-makers may be
able to take advantage of diversity without the adverse impacts of conflict (Amason, 1996).
Venture capitalists with diverse syndication relationships might be able to benefit from the
richness of information the relationships provide without suffering from a cumbersome
decision-making process. As a result, diversity can be argued to have both negative and
positive effects on the efficiency of the venture capital firm in completing investments.
We hypothesise:
Hypothesis 5: The frequency of syndication is positively related to the venture
capital organisation’s efficiency in completing investments.
Hypothesis 6a: The diversity of syndication relationships is positively related to the
venture capital organisation’s efficiency in completing investments.
Hypothesis 6b: The diversity of syndication relationships is negatively related to the
venture capital organisation’s efficiency in completing investments
3 DATA AND METHODS
3.1 Data
While most of the previous research on venture capital syndication networks has focused on
the creation of dyads between firms (Bygrave, 1987; Bygrave, 1988; Anand and Piskorski
2001), or the syndication of individual investments (Lerner, 1994; Brander et al., 1999), the
focus of this paper is the venture capital firm. More precisely, we analyse a time series of
yearly observations from each venture capital firm in our sample. The focus of the analysis
is the interrelation between syndication and the efficiency of the venture capital firm.
Our sample consists of the 100 leading private U.S. venture capital organisations that we
identified based on the number of portfolio companies the firms had invested in by the end
of the year 2000. Sampling from the leading firms in the industry was necessary to ensure
the availability and reliability of data. Previous studies on interorganisational networks and
alliances have used a similar strategy (Gulati, 1995; Ahuja, 2000). In spite of the focus on
the top 100 firms, our sample still provides considerable variation in terms of the variables
examined in the analyses.
To construct the sample, we collected data on all venture capital investments made by the
top 100 firms between 1986 and 2000 from Securities Data Corporation’s Venture
Economics and New Issues databases. Venture Economics has been used in previous
124
venture capital research (e.g. Bygrave, 1987; Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 1995; Gompers and
Lerner, 1998). Venture Economics has gathered venture capital investment data since the
1970s using the annual reports of venture capital funds, personal contacts to funds’
personnel, initial public offering prospectuses, and acquisitions announced in the media.
The database contains information on over 150,000 private equity investments (one
financing round consists of several single investments) and it is widely recognised as a
leading source of U.S. venture capital investment data. The SDC New Issues database was
used to gather the offer prices and shares outstanding after the offer for each initial public
offering the portfolio companies of our sample VC firms made between 1986 and 2001.
Supplementary data were gathered from the back issues of the publications called Pratt’s
Guide to Venture Capital Sources. This publication lists the general partners, the key
personnel, and a variety of other parameters for most of the U.S. venture capital firms each
year. The most relevant records for our study are the lists of general partners. These data are
reported consistently each year with names and positions. Using the Pratt’s Guide data, we
tracked the total number of partners and their names in each venture capital firm each year.
We classified personnel as partners if their position title included one of the terms ‘partner’,
‘vice president’ or ‘managing director’. To ensure further the validity of the Pratt’s Guide
general partner data, we collected the current résumés of 28% of the partners of our sample
firms, and reviewed their career years in each venture partnership. We then compared
Pratt’s Guide listings of partners to the sub-sample of résumés without observing significant
inconsistencies between these two sources.
The sample of investments was selected from the universe of all venture capital investments
using multiple criteria. Firstly, we restricted the data set to contain only U.S. venture
capitalists and investments. In addition, we restricted our sample to those U.S. venture
capital partnerships that Venture Economics classifies as “independent private
partnerships”. Thus, we did not take into account investment bank affiliates, corporate
investors, endowments, individuals, or other private equity investors. Secondly, we
examined only investments into U.S. portfolio companies. Finally, we limited the sample to
investments that are standard venture capital investments by removing records that Venture
Economics classifies as “leveraged buyout”, “secondary purchase”, “open market purchase”,
“private investment in public company” or “turnaround”. The data set includes 54,700
investments into 10,057 portfolio companies in the years 1986 – 2000.
As our analysis sample contains only the 100 U.S. largest venture capital partnerships, we
cannot always observe all the syndication partners of a given firm because some of the
partners may not figure among the 100 largest firms. This bias could lead to a situation in
which the syndication partners of some firms were systematically left out. Therefore, we
extended the original sample of 100 companies to include the 160 largest venture capital
investors in order to check the robustness of our frequency and diversity measures. In fact,
we can observe on average 44% of the firms that invested in each company, while the
investments by the 160 largest firms capture over 90% of all the portfolio companies in the
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Venture Economics database between 1986 and 2000. However, measuring the syndication
variables for the 100 sample firms from the syndication network of the 100 largest venture
capital firms produced qualitatively equal results to those we obtained by measuring the
variables from the syndication network of the 160 largest firms. The results indicate that
restricting the sample to the 100 largest firms only does not generate systematic errors in our
syndication measures.
Previous research has examined smaller samples mainly because of the large amount of
computing power required to handle the matrix of syndication relationships. For example,
Bygrave (1987; 1988) used a sample of 1501 randomly chosen portfolio companies that had
received the first round of funding, and were included in the Venture Economics database.
Lerner (1994) studied the rationales for syndication using a sample of 651 investment
rounds in 271 biotech companies. Brander et al. (1999) used Canadian data on 576 exists
from 1991 to 1997. Hence, the sample in this paper represents so far the largest set of
investments in venture capital syndication studies.
3.2 Variables
3.2.1 Venture capitalist efficiency
Because of the lack of public data on the internal rates of return of venture capital funds or
their individual investments, our proxy for the efficiency of a venture capital firm is its
ability to create highly valuable public companies from its portfolio companies. While this
approach cannot fully address the financial impact of splitting up the investment and the
potential future returns, it captures the impact of syndication on the rate of creating
successful outcomes from the portfolio companies, and aims to serve as a solid starting point
for further research and argumentation on the potential benefits and drawbacks of
investment syndication. To test the hypotheses of this paper, we decompose the ability to
create public companies into two parts: investment completion efficiency and efficiency in
creating public companies from the companies chosen in the portfolio. The sooner a
venture capital firm is able to identify prospective targets, make investments in them, and
turn them into valuable public companies, the more efficient it is.
3.2.2 Efficiency in creating public companies
The return from a venture capital investment is realised when the venture capital firm
makes an exit from a portfolio company. In the exit, the venture capital firm either sells its
stake or distributes the shares to its limited partners. At this stage, the venture has typically
reached a point in which venture capital financing no longer has a meaningful role. The
exit thus serves as a clear ending point for venture capital financing. Although only a
fraction of venture capital investments reach the IPO, most of the total value to the investors
is created in IPO exits (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Gompers and Lerner, 1999b). As the
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largest valuations and returns to venture capitalists are most often realised in IPOs, we
choose to focus on measuring the venture capitalist’s efficiency in creating public
companies from portfolio companies. We conduct three analyses on the relative efficiency
of the investors. Firstly, we calculate the ratio of companies that ultimately went public
from the new companies selected in the portfolio in a given year. For example, we track the
status of all new company investments made in 1986, and check how many of them
ultimately went public. Secondly, we calculate the number of initial public offerings per
firm general partner in a given year. Thirdly, we examine the market value the venture
capital firm captured from these IPOs per general partner each year. The larger these ratios,
the more efficient the venture capitalist.
3.2.3 Investment completion efficiency
If a venture capital firm is efficient in completing investments, it is able to identify,
evaluate, and accept more investments in a given period with given quality criteria than an
inefficient counterpart. Thus, efficiency in completing investments should lead to an
increase in the number of completed investments relative to the quantity of resources
available for the evaluation and selection activity. The investments venture capitalists make
are either follow-up investments to existing portfolio companies, or investments to
companies to which the focal venture capitalist has not invested before. In the first case, the
investor is already familiar with the venture through the previous evaluations and potential
board representation, whereas in the latter case the venture is to some extent unknown and
thus requires extensive evaluation. Hence, it is of more interest to focus the analysis on
investment completion efficiency only on investments in new companies rather than on re-
investments in existing portfolio companies, as the evaluation and selection processes differ
significantly.
To measure the efficiency of the venture capital firm in completing deals, we examine the
number of new company investments made by the firm each year relative to the number of
general partners in the firm. General partners usually participate in identifying promising
investment targets, manage the investment process, and make the ultimate evaluation and
selection decisions. We calculate the ratio of new company investments per general partner
in a given year of the sample to measure the investment completion efficiency of the
venture capital firm. The larger this ratio, the more efficient the investment completion
process.
3.2.4 Diversity and frequency of syndication
In the strictest definition of syndication, two venture capitalist invest in the same venture in
the same financing round. However, the Venture Economics data impose certain
restrictions for measuring syndication according to the strictest definition. The records in
the Venture Economics database occasionally overstate the number of financing rounds
because of staged distributions of funds and variations in the reported dates of the source
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data (Lerner, 1994; Gompers and Lerner, 1999b). However, towards the end of our sample
period, Venture Economics argues that the data collection methods have been significantly
improved, and that old records have partly been revised. To alleviate the problem of single
venture rounds being recorded as several observations, we broaden the concept of
syndication by defining it as two venture capital firms investing in the same venture within a
year. This does not require the investments to occur in the same round, but rather within a
relatively short period. We believe that this approach captures the syndication relationships
between any two venture capitalists and alleviates the potential problems with the early
records of our data. Because our unit of analysis is the firm-year observation, our definition
of a syndication relationship should have no unexpected impacts on the final results.
We define the diversity of syndication in a given year as the average number of other
venture capital firms that the focal firm co-invested with in each new company investment
during that year. Further, we define the frequency of syndication as the number of the focal
firm’s syndicated investments divided by the total number of its investments in a given year.
3.2.5 Uncertainty
Uncertainty refers to the degree to which the future states of the world cannot be
anticipated and accurately predicted. In venture capital investment situations, there is
considerable uncertainty concerning the quality of the portfolio companies. A typical proxy
for uncertainty in venture capital portfolio companies is the ‘stage of development’ of the
company (e.g. Gompers and Lerner, 2000). Early-stage companies have short operating
histories and have typically released a very limited amount of public data about themselves.
Thus, uncertainty regarding the quality of potential deals is highest in the early stages of the
venture’s development. Later-stage companies are much less uncertain because of their
longer operating histories and more deterministic paths of future development. Several
empirical studies confirm these propositions (e.g., Ruhnka and Young, 1991).
We measure the uncertainty of the venture capitalist’s investment portfolio by calculating
the percentage of investments in early-stage, expansion stage and later-stage companies each
year. Venture Economics classifies each investment into one of these categories according
to the stage of development of the company at the time of the investment.13 We assume that
portfolios consisting mainly of early-stage companies are more uncertain than portfolios
consisting mainly of later-stage investments.
                                                
13 Venture Economics reports that the following definitions are used for the stages of development. Early
stage: The company is developing its product and engages in initial marketing, manufacturing and sales
activities. Expansion stage: The company needs working capital for the initial expansion in producing and
shipping. It has growing accounts receivable and inventories. Although the company has clearly made
progress, it may not yet be showing a profit. Later stage: The company needs financing for the major growth
expansion. Its sales volume is increasing and it is breaking even or profitable. Funds are utilised for further
expansion, marketing, and working capital or development of an improved product.
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3.3 Control variables
Firm size and resources. The main resources of a venture capital firm are the capital to be
invested, the human resources running the firm and its investments, and information on
potential investment targets (Bygrave, 1987). Firm size and the scarcity or availability of
resources are likely to have a significant effect on the efficiency of the firm, and thus need
to be controlled for in the models.
To capture the overall size of the firm, we control for the market share of investments,
calculated as the number of new companies in which  the firm invested each year divided
by the number of all new companies receiving venture capital financing in the sample that
year.
We measure the firms’ financial resources by tracking the amount of capital under
management each year. When raising funds, venture capitalists negotiate capital
commitments from limited partners and invest them gradually over a few years into
promising target companies. The sum of these commitments in a firm is referred to as
‘capital under management’. We calculate a control variable for financial resources as the
sum of the non-expired venture capital funds, and exclude funds that are raised for
investments in asset classes other than traditional venture capital, e.g. buyouts. More
precisely, we include only funds that Venture Economics classifies as ‘venture capital’ in
our sample. We further assume the expiration of a fund to take place within ten years of the
vintage year, which Sahlman (1990) found to be the case in 72% of the funds in his sample.
Thus, we calculate the total size of a fund as part of capital under management for the ten
years after its raising was completed.
The number of general partners each year is taken from our combination of the records
from Pratt’s Guide to Venture Capital Sources and the résumés of the hand-collected
general partner sub-sample. We recognise that the records from Pratt’s Guide reflect the
year up to the date of publication, and use each year’s Pratt’s Guide data for the previous
year’s entries. We further assume that the number of general partners during a single
calendar year remains constant. In the rare cases whereby general partner data is
unavailable from both sources for a certain year, we use the data of the previous year.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to observe directly the supply of investment targets (‘deal
flow’) dealt with by the venture capital firms of the sample. The number and quality of
business proposals are guarded trade secrets, and there are no records of the deal flow.
However, as venture capital has been found to be highly local business (Sorenson and
Stuart, 2001), firm location can be used as a proxy for the overall amount of potential deal
flow available to the firm. Following the convention of earlier research (Gompers and
Lerner, 2000), we supplement our size-related controls, such as the market share of
investments, using dummy variables for location. In our sample, 48% of investments were
in companies in California, 13.5% in Massachusetts, and 4.8% in Texas. VCs located in
California made 40% of all investments, VCs in Massachusetts 21%, and those in New York
8%. Respectively, 53 VCs are located in California, 33 in Massachusetts and 15 in New
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York. We use two dummy variables to indicate whether the VC firm is located in
California, Massachusetts or another state.
Venture capital firm age. The age of venture capital firms has become a standard control
variable in the analysis of venture capital firms (e.g., Gompers, 1996; Gompers and Lerner,
1999a). The older the firm, the more contacts, experience, and prominence it has. In
addition, the younger the firm, the more it tries to establish a reputation by opportunistically
striving towards successful exits. This is a phenomenon known as ‘grandstanding’ (Gompers,
1996). We thus control for age effects, and calculate the age of each firm in our sample
based on the founding dates in the Venture Economics database. We cross-check the
validity of these records using the back issues of Pratt’s Guides. In some rare ambiguous
cases, we found that Venture Economics had allocated venture capital investments to a firm
before the reported founding date. In these cases, we set the company founding year as the
year of its first investment recorded in the database.
Investment stage mix of investments. The stage of development of a venture affects both the
risk and the expected time-to-exit of the venture capital investment in it. In addition, a firm
investing exclusively in later-stage companies is likely to be involved in proportionally more
IPOs than one investing in early-stage companies. We calculate the percentage of
investments in early-stage, expansion stage, and later-stage companies for each firm each
year according to Venture Economics classifications.
Industry mix of investments. We also control for potential industry effects. We use the
classification that Venture Economics provides for each portfolio company to construct
percentage-of-portfolio variables for each VC firm. The following industry sectors are
covered in the data: communications, computer hardware, computer software,
semiconductors/electronics, Internet communications, Internet/computer related, and non-
high-technology ventures.
Time-dependency. As our sample is a time series of cross-sections, it is necessary to control
for differences between sample years. In all regressions, we include dummy variables for the
sample years.
3.4 Statistical methods
To adequately test the hypotheses of this paper, we attempt to construct a set of robust
statistical models. Because our analysis needs to tackle an unbalanced time series – cross-
sectional panel data set of firm-year observations, straightforward statistical methods that
assume there to be no heteroskedasticity, unobserved heterogeneity, or first-order
autocorrelation, are inapplicable. While we run also conventional OLS regressions for
comparison, we present only the results of the theoretically more robust time-series cross-
sectional generalised least squares (GLS) regressions with fixed-effects specifications. This
approach simultaneously controls for potential first-order autocorrelation across the
subsequent observations of the same firm and heteroskedasticity across the observations of
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the different firms, and utilises robust maximum-likelihood estimates for the model
coefficients.
To control for unobserved heterogeneity in our sample, we choose to utilise the fixed firm
effects approach. A fixed-effects model is appropriate when inferences are made conditional
to the sample, whereas a random-effects model should be chosen when inferences are made
for the entire population (Hsiao, 1986). Since our syndication measures are conditional to
the sample, the first approach was selected as more appropriate. However, we found the
differences in the results to be marginal if random-effects models are used. While pooled
ordinary least squares models provide qualitatively similar results, the statistical approach
adopted in this study gives a more realistic view of the magnitude, standard errors, and
significance of the individual regression coefficients.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations for the sample of 1333 yearly
observations on the 100 venture capital firms in the sample. The average age of the firms is
17.7 years. On average, the firms have 5.8 general partners. The industry mix of investments
is relatively even, and most of the industry share averages are approximately 8%-14% of the
total portfolio. Exceptions are the Internet sectors, which represent the most recently
established and thus the smallest industries of our longitudinal sample. The average
portfolio includes 33% early-stage firms, 39% expansion-stage firms, and 24% late-stage
firms.
Over two thirds of all venture capital investments in the sample are syndicated. The average
frequency of syndication is 68%, suggesting that venture capitalists frequently engage in
syndication relationships. On average, venture capitalists have 1.25 syndicate partners per
portfolio company, and invest in 8.4 new companies in a year, amounting to 1.46 new
companies per general partner per year. The IPO ratio across all investments is 0.26, which
is roughly comparable to the old venture capital rule of thumb of one breakthrough per five
investments (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). This corresponds to 2.2 IPOs per year per
venture capital partnership, or 0.39 IPOs per year per general partner.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the firm-year observations
Min Max Mean Std. dev.
Investments in new companies / partner / year 0 8.5 1.46 1.20
Ratio of ultimate initial public offerings out of new investments in a given year 0 1.0 0.26 0.25
Number of IPOs / partner / year 0 5.0 0.39 0.45
Value of IPOs / partner / year (BUSD) 0 1.0 0.04 0.13
Frequency of syndication (% of portfolio companies) 0 1.0 0.68 0.24
Diversity of syndication (Avg. no. of syndication partners / company) 0 8.0 1.49 0.98
Venture capital firm age (years) 0.5 65 17.7 10.5
Market share of investments (%) 0.0 8.3 1.0 0.8
Number of general partners 1 22 5.8 3.0
Capital under management (BUSD) 0.1 4.0 0.25 0.36
Share of investments to medical (%) 0 100 13 16
Share of investments to biotech (%) 0 100 8 13
Share of investments to software (%) 0 100 20 18
Share of investments to hardware (%) 0 100 9 12
Share of investments to Internet, computer-related (%) 0 100 6 12
Share of investments to semiconductors (%) 0 100 8 12
Share of investments to communications (%) 0 100 15 16
Share of investments to Internet communications (%) 0 56 3 6
Share of investments to non-high-technology (%) 0 100 14 17
Share of investments to early stage ventures (%) 0 100 33 21
Share of investments to expansion stage ventures (%) 0 100 39 21
Share of investments to later-stage ventures (%) 0 100 24 19
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Investments / partner / year 1.00
2 Ratio of IPOs / investments -0.05 1.00
3 No. of IPOs / partner / year 0.50 0.61 1.00
4 Value of IPOs / partner / yr 0.37 0.22 0.54 1.00
5 Frequency of syndication 0.13 0.19 0.24 0.12 1.00
6 Diversity of syndication -0.07 0.31 0.24 0.01 0.57 1.00
7 Uncertainty * diversity 0.11 0.26 0.32 0.09 0.47 0.64 1.00
8 Uncertainty * frequency 0.22 0.15 0.29 0.16 0.59 0.31 0.79 1.00
9 Market share of deals 0.36 0.06 0.25 0.30 0.14 -0.05 0.03 0.13 1.00
10 Capital under mgmt 0.27 -0.16 -0.08 0.11 -0.05 -0.21 -0.17 -0.07 0.38 1.00
11 No. of general partners -0.13 -0.04 -0.18 0.08 -0.07 -0.16 -0.13 -0.09 0.45 0.55 1.00
12 Firm age -0.09 -0.11 -0.23 -0.03 -0.02 -0.10 -0.12 -0.07 0.09 0.23 0.32 1.00
13 California 0.20 0.07 0.20 0.18 0.31 0.22 0.30 0.31 0.14 0.09 -0.03 -0.11 1.00
14 Massachusetts -0.06 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.11 0.06 -0.39 1.00
15 Medical % -0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.08
16 Biotech % -0.07 0.17 0.08 -0.02 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.03 -0.09 -0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.02
17 Software % 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 0.13 0.07
18 Hardware % -0.04 0.18 0.18 -0.03 0.19 0.39 0.29 0.15 -0.01 -0.17 -0.11 -0.15 0.14 0.02
19 Internet/computer % 0.32 -0.25 -0.12 0.09 -0.09 -0.26 -0.22 -0.13 0.03 0.45 0.20 0.18 0.11 -0.02
20 Semiconductors % -0.08 0.12 0.05 -0.01 0.13 0.25 0.19 0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.05
21 Communications % 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.05
22 Internet/communic. % 0.29 -0.23 -0.12 0.10 -0.10 -0.22 -0.17 -0.08 0.06 0.39 0.22 0.18 0.09 -0.04
23 Early stage % 0.21 0.07 0.21 0.12 0.16 0.06 0.66 0.81 0.10 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 0.19 -0.05
24 Later stage % -0.18 -0.05 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.31 -0.38 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.10 -0.09 0.05
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
15 Medical % 1.00
16 Biotech % 0.12 1.00
17 Software % -0.30 -0.24 1.00
18 Hardware % -0.16 -0.13 -0.06 1.00
19 Internet/computer % -0.15 -0.19 0.01 -0.25 1.00
20 Semiconductors % -0.17 -0.06 -0.16 0.15 -0.16 1.00
21 Communications % -0.24 -0.18 -0.14 -0.11 -0.10 -0.07 1.00
22 Internet/communic. % -0.15 -0.18 0.03 -0.22 0.47 -0.14 0.02 1.00
23 Early stage % 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.08 -0.09 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 1.00
24 Later stage % 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 0.06 0.03 -0.06 -0.48 1.00
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The pairwise correlations listed in Table 1 indicate that the hypothesised relationships exist.
The correlations between the syndication variables and the dependent variables are positive
except that the impact of the diversity of syndication relationships on deal-making efficiency
is negative. Furthermore, all cross-correlations among the independent variables are below
0.8, the usual threshold for a multicollinearity problem. Standard tests for multicollinearity
did neither suggest problems with the specifications of the models.
4.2 Efficiency in creating public companies
To test whether the propensity and strategy to syndicate investments affect the efficiency of
venture capital firms to create public companies from their portfolio companies, we attempt
to construct a set of robust and relevant statistical models. Table 2 presents the results of a
fixed-effects GLS analysis of the efficiency of venture capital firms in creating public
companies from portfolio companies. We test the impact of the frequency of syndication
and the diversity of syndication relationships using the yearly share of ultimate portfolio
company initial public offerings from investments in new companies as the dependent
variable. The regression coefficients are presented with the corresponding z-statistics.
Additionally, the analyses include year dummies that are not presented in the table.
The basis model in Table 2 shows that firms focusing on certain industries and firms that
have many general partners produce a significantly higher ratio of portfolio company IPOs
than other firms. The remaining models focus on testing the hypotheses. Firstly,
Hypotheses 1 and 2 proposed that the diversity of syndication relationships and the
frequency of syndication are positively related to the venture capital organisation’s
efficiency in creating public companies, respectively. Although the second model in Table
2 indicates that the frequency of syndication is positively related to the IPO efficiency of the
sample firms, the third model with the diversity variable included shows that the diversity of
syndication has a positive and much more significant effect on the ability to create initial
public offerings from portfolio companies. Venture capitalists that have a diverse set of
syndication relationships seem to be more efficient in generating IPOs from their portfolio
companies than competitors with a more restricted set of syndication partners.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 proposed that the more uncertainty there is, the more the diversity of
syndication relationships, and the frequency of syndication affect the venture capital
organisation’s efficiency in creating public companies, respectively. In the fourth model of
Table 2, we add an interaction variable of the diversity of syndication relationships and the
percentage of early stage investments. The coefficient appears positive and significant, as
expected. The fifth model repeats the test using an interaction between syndication
frequency and the percentage of early-stage investments. However, the interaction variable
does not appear significant. Uncertainty in the venture capitalist’s portfolio seems, thus, to
intensify the efficiency gains from the diversity of syndication relationships, but does not
interact with the frequency of syndication.
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We argue that there are at least two reasons why the diversity of syndication relationships
outweighs the frequency of syndication in the efficiency of creating public companies from
portfolio companies. Firstly, diversity defines the scope of the resource-capability base
available for value-adding activities. If the venture capitalist has a diverse set of syndication
partners, it is comparatively more likely that the partners can provide complementary
resources and capabilities that can add value to the portfolio company. Secondly, diversity
enhances the focal venture capital firm’s ability to include the most promising ventures in
the portfolio. A diverse set of relationships ensures a rich flow of deals from multiple
sources. To get deal flow, it is potentially not necessary to engage frequently in syndication
relationships. Rather, the number of active relationships counts. While the frequent
utilisation of syndication relationships seems to have a positive effect on efficiency when
diversity is not taken into account, these two reasons support the result that the diversity of
the relationships is the dominant factor in efficiency gains from syndication in creating
public companies.
Table 2 includes an alternative column of coefficients for the full regression model. Both of
the full models use the same methodology but different time spans of data. The model in
the fifth column of the table use the entire sample data from 1986 to 2000, whereas the
model in the sixth column uses data ranging only from 1986 to 1991. The results discussed
above are confirmed by the right-hand side regression on the restricted data set. The
inclusion of the restricted time span is necessary to demonstrate the robustness of the
results, and to eliminate the potential impact of different investment stage strategies of the
venture firms. While the number of observed portfolio company IPOs may be sensitive to
the time the investments have been in the portfolio, running the analyses on the latter time
span of data should alleviate the problem. For example, the probability of year 2000
investments reaching an IPO by the end of our observation period in 2001 is relatively low,
whereas the probability of year 1990 investments of reaching an IPO by the same time is
much higher. In contrast, practically all potential IPOs should have been realised by 2001
for the historical period of 1986-1991, irrespective of the focal firm’s choice of investment
stage focus. We further check the robustness of the results using different time spans, and
find that the regressions provide qualitatively equivalent results to the ones reported in the
table.
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Table 2 Efficiency in creating public companies from portfolio companies: the ratio
of ultimate IPOs out of new investments
The dependent variable is the ratio of companies that ultimately reached the initial public offering of
investments in new companies each year. Cross-sectional time-series GLS regression with fixed firm effects
is applied. Regression coefficients and z-statistics are presented; year dummies are included but not shown.
Ratio of ultimate IPOs out of new investments / year, 1986 – 2000 1986 – 1991
Frequency of syndication .064 .010 .011 .040 .015
(2.64) ** (.36) (.38) (.82) (.18)
Diversity of syndication .057 .043 .038 .074
(5.82) *** (3.06) *** (2.42) ** (3.13) ***
(Diversity) x (early stage %) .059 .060 .050
(1.79) * (1.80) * (1.49) +
(Frequency) x (early stage %) -.084 -.052
(.73) (.25)
Market share of investments .654 .416 1.052 1.075 1.036 .816
(1.12) (.71) (1.75) + (1.79) + (1.72) + (.71)
Capital under management (log) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
(.48) (.50) (.21) (.19) (.18) (1.68) +
Number of general partners .007 .007 .006 .005 .005 .000
(3.40) *** (3.22) *** (2.69) ** (2.64) ** (2.64) ** (.01)
Firm age (log) -.010 -.004 -.006 -.006 -.006 -.015
(1.16) (.46) (.69) (.63) (.63) (1.06)
Firm located in California? .018 .015 .009 .008 .007 .045
(1.52) (1.25) (.76) (.65) (.61) (2.05) *
Firm located in Massachusetts? .008 .009 .011 .011 .011 .061
(.57) (.67) (.76) (.77) (.75) (2.53) *
Medical % .145 .122 .016 .013 .014 -.105
(3.40) *** (2.73) ** (.33) (.26) (.28) (1.46)
Biotech % .494 .502 .342 .349 .347 .388
(9.53) *** (9.17) *** (5.97) *** (6.06) *** (6.05) *** (3.47) ***
Software % .196 .166 .054 .057 .058 .052
(5.24) *** (4.19) *** (1.24) (1.29) (1.31) (.74)
Hardware % .252 .294 .142 .147 .148 .114
(4.55) *** (4.90) *** (2.22) * (2.31) * (2.32) * (1.29)
Internet, computer-related % .336 .356 .277 .280 .277 .480
(4.93) *** (5.13) *** (3.85) *** (3.88) *** (3.84) *** (1.72) +
Semiconductors % .345 .216 .090 .091 .090 .114
(6.31) *** (3.60) *** (1.42) (1.43) (1.41) (1.21)
Communications % .147 .121 .013 .017 .017 -.075
(3.72) *** (2.86) ** (.27) (.37) (.37) (1.08)
Internet, communications % .293 .331 .262 .266 .265 .096
(2.55) * (2.91) ** (2.28) * (2.31) * (2.31) * (.17)
Early stage % -.021 -.040 -.051 -.101 -.064 .011
(.64) (1.19) (1.51) (1.96) * (.89) (.09)
Later stage % -.006 -.018 -.066 -.061 -.060 -.153
(.17) (.48) (1.71) + (1.58) (1.56) (2.55) *
Constant -.274 -.310 -.211 -.200 -.213 .249
(5.99) *** (6.42) *** (3.98) *** (3.71) *** (3.76) *** (4.09) ***
Wald χ2-statistic 695.1 713.9 755.2 756.8 756.9 201.4
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 1333 1333 1333 1333 1333 477
*** Significant on the 0.001 level, ** Significant on the 0.01 level, * Significant on the 0.05 level, + Significant on the 0.1
level; 1-tailed tests for hypothesised relationships, 2-tailed tests for controls
4.3 Investment completion efficiency
The second type of analysis considers the impact of syndication on the efficiency of venture
capital firms in completing new investments. Table 3 presents five GLS models that regress
the independent variables on the number of completed investments relative to the number
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of firm general partners each year. The regression coefficients are presented with the
corresponding z-statistics. Although not presented in the table, all regression analyses
include year dummies to control for potential differences between years.
The first model tests the effects of all control variables. As expected, controls related to size
and firm resources – market share of investments and capital under management – are
highly significant. The coefficient of firm age is negative, which indicates that younger
firms tend to make more investments per general partner than more established firms.
Location in California or Massachusetts is positively related to the dependent variable,
presumably because of the higher supply of potential investment targets in those regions
(Gompers and Lerner, 2000). Firms that are active in early-stage investments appear to
make more investments per general partner than firms focusing on later-stage ventures.
In Hypothesis 5 we suggested that the frequency of syndication is positively related to the
venture capital organisation’s investment completion efficiency, whereas Hypothesis 6b
predicted that the diversity of syndication relationships is negatively related to investment
completion efficiency. Models 2 and 3 include the frequency of syndication and the
diversity of syndication relationships as independent variables. The coefficient for
syndication frequency turns out to be highly significant and positive, whereas the diversity
of syndication relationships seems to be an insignificant explanatory variable. However,
when both variables are added at the same time, and the cross-correlation between
frequency and diversity is taken into account, frequency appears positive and significant,
and diversity negative but still insignificant. The final model thus provides results in line
with the negative pairwise but insigificant correlation between diversity and investment
completion efficiency (Table 1). The results suggest that the frequency of syndication
increases the deal-making efficiency of venture capital firms by increasing the manageable
number of new company investments per general partner, whereas high diversity of
syndication relationships has no clear impact on the efficiency in completing investments.
The results are in line with our predictions. As outlined in the hypotheses, venture
capitalists that syndicate frequently benefit from their syndicate partners. Syndication
accelerates the process of finding investment targets and completing investments. Similarly,
frequent engagement in syndicated investments may enhance the evaluation of the
investment targets by allowing the general partners of the focal firm to concentrate better on
their core competence areas of the evaluation process.
However, although the frequency of syndication is a significant factor contributing to the
efficiency of completing investments, the diversity of syndication relationships tends to have
both negative and positive effects. While frequent syndication with a limited number of
syndication partners may allow venture capitalists to institutionalise and rationalise the
investment evaluation process, collaboration with a diverse group of syndication partners is
more time-consuming. It takes more time to make decisions, set up meetings, and manage
the relationships, if syndication partners are numerous. Hierarchical or at least partly
hierarchical decision-making in the syndicate also decreases investment acceptance rates.
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On the other hand, diversity also brings access to richer information, and makes decision-
making easier. The results suggest that neither of these mechanisms significantly dominates
the other one.
Table 3 Investment completion efficiency: the number of new investments per
general partner and year
The dependent variable is the number of the firm’s investments in new companies each year divided by the
number of the firm’s general partners that year. Cross-sectional time-series GLS regression with fixed firm
effects is applied. Regression coefficients and z-statistics are presented; year dummies are included.
Investments into new portfolio companies / partner / year
Frequency of syndication .191 .358
(2.56) ** (4.06) ***
Diversity of syndication .031 -.029
(1.24) (1.00)
Market share of investments 75.3 72.5 75.4 71.6
(26.52) *** (25.70) *** (26.61) *** (25.11) ***
Capital under management (log) .000 .000 .000 .000
(6.27) *** (6.56) *** (6.76) *** (6.88) ***
Number of general partners -.165 -.165 -.177 -.174
(21.56) *** (21.39) *** (23.06) *** (22.52) ***
Firm age (log) -.082 -.146 -.096 -.132
(2.77) ** (4.56) *** (3.14) ** (4.11) ***
Firm located in California? .131 .107 .171 .123
(3.13) ** (2.45) * (3.96) *** (2.80) **
Firm located in Massachusetts? .121 .107 .162 .134
(2.86) ** (2.47) * (3.68) *** (3.03) **
Medical % .253 .060 -.215 -.258
(2.02) * (.45) (1.54) (1.80) +
Biotech % .014 -.157 -.484 -.496
(.10) (.98) (2.91) ** (2.86) **
Software % .360 .133 -.130 -.187
(3.30) *** (1.11) (1.03) (1.42)
Hardware % .338 .245 -.101 .003
(2.02) * (1.36) (.54) (.02)
Internet, computer-related % 1.453 1.137 .704 .687
(6.70) *** (5.08) *** (3.09) ** (2.96) **
Semiconductors % -.090 -.321 -.552 -.631
(.57) (1.87) + (3.27) *** (3.51) ***
Communications % .397 .155 -.098 -.193
(3.34) *** (1.23) (.72) (1.40)
Internet, communications % 1.837 1.357 1.140 1.063
(4.71) *** (3.49) *** (2.96) ** (2.76) **
Early stage % .931 1.002 .714 .778
(9.35) *** (9.48) *** (6.79) *** (7.11) ***
Later stage % -.136 -.178 -.410 -.374
(1.30) (1.64) (3.67) *** (3.29) ***
Constant 1.692 2.065 2.443 2.452
(11.14) *** (12.62) *** (14.14) *** (13.90) ***
Wald χ2-statistic 2306.8 2210.6 2165.6 2178.1
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 1333 1333 1333 1333
*** Significant on the 0.001 level, ** Significant on the 0.01 level, * Significant on the 0.05 level, + Significant on the 0.1
level; 1-tailed tests for hypothesised relationships, 2-tailed tests for controls
4.4 Overall efficiency of the venture capital firm
As a concluding analysis, we demonstrate how syndication affects the overall efficiency of
the venture capital firm by combining the efficiency in creating public companies from
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portfolio companies and the efficiency in completing investments in two overall efficiency
measures. Firstly, we calculate the product of the ratio of initial public offerings out of
investments made and the ratio of investments made per general partner in a given period,
and arrive at an overall measure of the efficiency of the venture capital firm: Initial public
offerings per general partner each year. Secondly, we calculate the market value generated
in these initial public offerings per firm general partner each year. These aspects of
efficiency are important especially for the general partners since the compensation of the
general partners is mostly dependent on the magnitude of returns generated per partner
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999a).
The analysis in Table 4 considers the overall efficiency of the venture capital firm. In
models 1–3, we regress the number of initial public offerings per year per general partner
on the same independent and control variables as in Table 2. As model 2 indicates, the
diversity of syndication has a positive effect on the number of IPOs relative to the number of
general partners. Venture capitalists who have a diverse set of syndication partners seem to
be able to participate in significantly more IPOs relative to their general partner resources
than other venture capitalists. The regression coefficient of the syndication frequency
variable indicates that the frequency of syndication is positively but not significantly related
to firm efficiency.
Model 3 supplements the regression model with interaction terms between the share of
early-stage investments of the firm’s investments, and the syndication variables. The share of
early-stage investments reflects the uncertainty of the venture capitalist’s portfolio. The
coefficient of the interaction between the frequency of syndication and portfolio
uncertainty is positive, as expected. Even though model 2 shows that the positive
contribution of frequency on firm efficiency is not significant for all the VC firms of the
sample, venture capitalists focusing on early-stage investments gain benefits from frequent
syndication relationships. Similarly, the interaction variable between uncertainty and the
diversity of syndication relationships is positive and significant. Portfolio uncertainty thus
moderates the relationship between the diversity of syndication and firm efficiency.
Models 4 and 5 repeat the same tests using the market value generated in the initial public
offerings per general partner each year as the dependent variable. Model 4 shows that both
the frequency and the diversity of syndication have a positive impact on the efficiency of the
VC firm, but that only diversity is significant. Furthermore, model 5 indicates that the
interactions between portfolio uncertainty and the syndication are positive but not
significant. The moderating effect of portfolio uncertainty is much less significant than in
the case of the number of IPOs per general partner possibly because early-stage portfolios
potentially generate, on average, smaller portfolio company IPOs than later-stage portfolios.
To demonstrate the robustness of the results, we run the same regressions on a restricted
data set with observations from 1986-1991 only. All models show qualitatively similar results
to the ones obtained from the full data set. As an example of the robustness tests, model 6
reports the results of a regression similar to model 3 but utilises the restricted data set.
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Table 4 Efficiency of venture capital firms: the number and value of initial public
offerings per general partner and year
The dependent variable is the number of portfolio company initial public offerings produced per general
partner each year in models 1,2,3, and 6, and the value of portfolio company IPOs produced per general
partner each year in models 4 and 5. Cross-sectional time-series GLS regression with fixed firm effects is
applied. Regression coefficients and z-statistics are presented; year dummies are included but not shown.
Number of IPOs / general partner / year ,
1986 – 2000
Value of IPOs / gen. part. /
year , 1986 – 2000
Model 3,
1986 – 1991
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Frequency of syndication .033 -.040 .065 .001 -.022
(.84) (.67) (1.27) (.01) (.22)
Diversity of syndication .052 -.004 .047 .028 -.003
(3.72) *** (.21) (2.74) ** (1.19) (.12)
(Diversity) x (early stage %) .196 .072 .123
(4.33) *** (1.15) (1.83) *
(Frequency) x (early stage %) .187 .187 .285
(1.41) + (.97) (1.08)
Market share of investments 18.7 18.4 18.8 21.0 21.2 18.9
(15.21) *** (14.48) *** (15.13) *** (8.70) *** (8.75) *** (8.28) ***
Capital under management (log) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
(.38) (.74) (.85) (1.39) (1.35) (3.23) ***
Number of general partners -.026 -.028 -.030 -.005 -.006 -.062
(8.07) *** (8.25) *** (8.86) *** (1.10) (1.28) (9.86) ***
Firm age (log) -.025 -.051 -.050 -.039 -.036 -.064
(2.03) * (3.40) *** (3.31) *** (2.15) * (1.91) + (2.92) **
Firm located in California? .100 .085 .071 .104 .096 .197
(5.35) *** (4.08) *** (3.40) *** (3.01) ** (2.73) ** (5.91) ***
Firm located in Massachusetts? .024 .026 .022 .027 .027 .118
(1.31) (1.22) (1.04) (1.08) (1.05) (3.39) ***
Medical % .109 -.034 -.027 -.163 -.166 -.310
(2.06) * (.51) (.42) (2.16) * (2.17) * (3.12) **
Biotech % .288 .218 .223 .035 .028 .273
(4.88) *** (2.53) * (2.64) ** (.36) (.29) (1.77) +
Software % .205 .035 .056 -.004 .002 -.144
(4.37) *** (.56) (.91) (.06) (.03) (1.76) +
Hardware % .248 .132 .122 -.172 -.161 .022
(3.40) *** (1.38) (1.32) (1.63) (1.47) (.17)
Internet, computer-related % .400 .336 .352 .301 .302 .853
(4.62) *** (3.32) *** (3.64) *** (2.03) * (2.03) * (2.26) *
Semiconductors % .104 -.087 -.081 -.098 -.100 -.186
(1.62) (1.06) (1.02) (.91) (.93) (1.92) +
Communications % .110 -.041 -.015 .020 .034 -.094
(2.35) * (.69) (.26) (.30) (.48) (1.01)
Internet, communications % .317 .311 .319 .602 .591 3.001
(1.88) + (1.75) + (1.87) + (2.45) * (2.39) * (1.48)
Early stage % .099 .054 -.269 .102 -.085 -.335
(2.52) * (1.09) (3.06) ** (1.62) (.73) (2.16) *
Later stage % -.072 -.146 -.102 -.051 -.029 -.128
(1.64) (2.77) ** (1.97) * (.86) (.46) (1.63)
Constant -.112 .037 .127 -.281 -.227 .622
(1.76) + (.46) (1.57) (2.74) ** (2.12) * (7.07) ***
Wald χ2-statistic 823.1 733.8 818.7 283.1 281.0 418.4
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 1333 1333 1333 1330 1330 477
*** Significant on the 0.001 level, ** Significant on the 0.01 level, * Significant on the 0.05 level, + Significant on the 0.1
level; 1-tailed tests for hypothesised relationships, 2-tailed tests for controls
The results provide additional support for our hypotheses. The diversity of syndication has a
positive effect on venture capital organisations’ overall efficiency, and the impact is greater
the more uncertainty there is in the portfolio of the focal venture capital firm. The
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frequency of syndication, on the other hand, is consistently insignificant in the regressions.
In contrast, frequency has a significant positive impact on the number of portfolio company
IPOs when portfolio uncertainty is high. Overall, the results indicate that it is beneficial for
the general partners of venture capital firms to engage in diverse syndication relationships
especially when typical investment situations are uncertain. Furthermore, a diverse network
of syndication partners contributes especially to the venture capital firm’s ability to create
public companies from an uncertain portfolio of investments, and improves value
generation from portfolio company IPOs in both uncertain and less uncertain portfolios.
The final results are summarised in Figure 1, which presents the relationships found
significant in the regressions and the connection between investment completion
efficiency, efficiency in creating public companies from portfolio companies, and the
overall efficiency of the venture capital firm. The results clearly demonstrate the positive
impact of diversity on the ability to generate public companies, the positive impact of
frequency and the insignificant impact of diversity on the efficiency in completing deals,
and the moderating effects of uncertainty. Similarly, Figure 1 demonstrates the observed
positive impact of frequency on overall firm efficiency. On the other hand, the diversity of
syndication relationships appears to improve the “hit rate”, but not have an effect on the
“throughput” of the venture capital firm.
Figure 1 Impact of syndication on the efficiency of venture capital firms
Frequency of syndicating
investments
# of syndicated investments
 # of investments made
Diversity of syndication
relationships
Average # of syndication partners in
each investment made
Efficiency in completing
investments
rate of new investments
# of managing partners
Efficiency in creating public
companies from the portfolio
rate of initial public offerings
 # of investments made
Overall efficiency of the venture
capital firm
rate of initial public offerings
# of managing partners
Uncertainty
early-stage investments in portfolio
all investments in portfolio
+
+
+
Significant empirical relationship
Relationship defined as the product
of efficiency in completing
investments and efficiency in
creating public companies
+
+
+
+
4.5 Robustness of the results
To ensure the robustness of the above results, we conduct several confirmatory analyses.
Firstly, we attempt to eliminate window dressing as a potential explanation for the
results by testing whether the impact of syndication is contingent on the stage
distribution of the portfolio of the focal venture capital firm. If window dressing
explained the relationship between syndication and the ability to create public
companies from portfolio companies, the impact of syndication would seem to be
highest for firms with a high proportion of later-stage investments because venture
capitalists engaging in window-dressing would aim at syndicating primarily later-stage
deals to associate themselves quickly with upcoming initial public offerings. However,
our results in Tables 2 and 4 show that efficiency gains from syndication are consistently
higher for venture capitalists focusing on early-stage investments. The higher the share
of early-stage investments in the venture capital firm’s portfolio, the more the diversity
and frequency of syndication affect the ability to create public companies from the
portfolio. Thus, window dressing is unlikely to explain the observed relationships
between syndication and firm efficiency.
Secondly, our methodology also significantly reduces the probability that reverse
causality were a problem in our analyses. Reverse causality would imply that investments
that are syndicated were more likely to go public along some unobservable dimensions,
which would “hard wire” the results. We take this potential problem into account in two
ways. Firstly, we utilise a large number of control variables that might affect the
propensity of firms to syndicate and generate initial public offerings. Secondly, we argue
that the positive contingency on uncertainty indicates that investment syndication
provides tangible benefits to venture capital firms. If reverse causality explained our
results, especially later-stage investments that are highly probable IPO candidates should
attract syndication partners, but uncertain early-stage investments should not be nearly
as attractive targets for syndication. However, our results consistently show that the
impact of syndication is highest for venture capital firms that have a large share of early-
stage investments. Thus, reverse causality is not likely to explain the results.
Thirdly, we recognise that the ratio of IPOs out of new company investments may be
biased downwards from the actual value towards the end of the time range of our
sample. This results from the fact that new company investments require a certain
amount of time before the exit can be realised. The median time between the first
investment by the focal venture capitalist into a company and the IPO of the company is
2.9 years14 in the sample, which indicates that a significant share of the investments
                                                
14 The figure may seem small taking into account the traditional venture capital holding period of about
five years from first investment to exit (Bygrave and Timmons 1992). However, this figure is the median
of the investment holding periods for venture capital firms including firms that invested for the first time
in the venture only in the very late financing rounds. These short holding periods make the median
equal-weighted time-to-IPO seem relatively short.
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made in 1998 had not reached the potential IPO by 2001, our last point of observation
for initial public offerings. Thus, we observe too few IPOs in the last years of our sample
for all venture capitalists, and especially for firms concentrating on early-stage
investments. As the bias favours firms focusing on later-stage investments, we expected
that the analysis would tend to reject the key hypotheses, making the results more
significant if the IPO data could be made complete. In spite of that, we test the
robustness of our results by restricting the sample to several different periods, and
compare the results to ones obtained from the entire sample. The restricted models
reported in Tables 2 and 4 that use IPO variables as dependent variables demonstrate
that the choice of time range should not pose problems in the analysis.
As mentioned in the section describing the method, we also test the impact of the
choice of the sample of firms on the syndication measures. While the approach shown
in the analyses utilises syndication measures derived from the syndication network of the
100 largest U.S. VC firms, we also run the regressions on syndication measures derived
from an extended database of the 160 largest U.S. venture capital firms. This approach
captures more syndication relationships for almost all of the firms, but does not alter the
results of the regressions. Measuring the syndication variables for the 100 sample firms
from the syndication network of the 100 largest venture capital firms produced
qualitatively equal results to those we obtained by measuring the variables from the
syndication network of the 160 largest firms. Table 5 summarises the key results using
the alternative syndication measures in the regression equations.
Table 5 Robustness of key results to alternative syndication measures
The syndication measures are calculated from an extended sample of the 160 largest U.S. venture
capital organisations. Cross-sectional time-series GLS regression with fixed firm effects is applied.
Regression coefficients and z-statistics are presented; control variables are included but not shown.
Ratio of IPOs /
new investments
Investments /
partner / year
Number of IPOs /
partner / year
IPO value /
partner / year
Frequency of syndication .012 .039 .390 .030 -.035 .070
(.40) (.80) (4.29) *** (.76) (.63) (1.30)
Diversity of syndication .050 .039 -.028 .058 -.003 .048
(4.58) *** (2.51) ** (0.98) (3.99) *** (.15) (2.78) **
(Diversity) x (early stage %) .059 .358 .193
(1.79) * (4.21) ***
(Frequency) x (early stage %) -.082 .188
(.69) (1.40) +
Control variables The same control variables are included in all models as in Tables 2 – 4
Wald χ2-statistic 732.9 737.1 2125.2 780.2 828.2 279.1
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 1333 1333 1333 1333 1333 1330
*** Significant on the 0.001 level, ** Significant on the 0.01 level, * Significant on the 0.05 level, + Significant on
the 0.1 level; 1-tailed tests for hypothesised relationships, 2-tailed tests for controls
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper set out to examine the relationship between syndication and the efficiency of
venture capital firms. In spite of the stream of previous theoretical and empirical
research on the reasons to syndicate venture capital investments, knowledge of the
benefits and drawbacks of syndication for the venture capital firm is still thin. In this
paper, we took a macro-level approach to examine how syndication affects the efficiency
of venture capital firms, and presented and elaborated the key benefits and disadvantages
that arise from the syndication of investments with other venture capitalists.
Furthermore, we formulated six hypotheses on the impact of the frequency of
syndication and the diversity of syndication relationships on the efficiency of venture
capital firms. The hypotheses were tested using a comprehensive data set consisting of
the investments of the 100 largest U.S. venture capital organisations between 1986 and
2000.
 The results provide support for the hypotheses regarding the impact of syndication on
the efficiency of venture capital firms. The key lever of enhancing the ‘hit rate’, or the
efficiency in creating public companies from portfolio companies, appears to be the
diversity of the syndication relationships. The broader a set of syndication relationships a
venture capital firm has, the better is its ability to make its portfolio companies public.
Furthermore, our results demonstrate that uncertainty moderates the relationship
between the diversity of syndication and the efficiency in creating public companies.
The more uncertain the venture capital firm’s investment portfolio, the more efficiency
gains the diversity of syndication relationships provides. The positive contingency on
portfolio uncertainty also allows us to reject the window dressing hypothesis and reverse
causality as potential alternative sources of our findings. Finally, we found that investors
who frequently engage in syndication relationships can leverage their syndication
partners to increase their overall efficiency and, in particular, efficiency in completing
deals. The gains from the frequency of syndication were also found to be positively
contingent on portfolio uncertainty.
Our paper has several important implications. Firstly, it provides understanding of
appropriate syndication strategies for venture capitalists. Both the diversity and
frequency of syndication relationships appear important in terms of efficiency especially
when uncertainty is high. Diversity, however, seems to be more powerful in explaining
efficiency in the creation of public companies from portfolio companies. Diversity
improves the “hit rate” of venture capitalists. Diversity also improves the market value
that the venture capital firm can capture from its portfolio company IPOs. Thus, having
a diverse set of syndication partners is a potential success factor in venture capital
investing especially in the case of early-stage investments.
Secondly, venture capitalists can use syndication as a vehicle to adjust their deal
completion efficiency. The frequency of syndication improves the overall efficiency of
venture capital firms especially by improving the efficiency in completing investments.
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Frequent syndication with a limited number of syndication partners results in a larger
number of deals being completed within a given period. The “throughput” of the firm
thus increases with the frequency of syndication. However, as the diversity of syndication
relationships increases, deal completion rates and the “throughput” may start to
decrease, although our results suggest that the impact is not significant. Nevertheless,
venture capitalists should attempt to balance their frequency of engaging in investment
syndicates and the diversity of their syndication relationships to find an optimal
combination of impact on the “hit rate” and the “throughput” of their firm.
Finally, researchers can benefit from this paper in terms of a better understanding of
how investment syndication affects the venture capital firm and its portfolio of
investments. This paper has attempted to start a structured academic discussion on the
benefits and drawbacks of investment syndication for venture capital firms.
There are naturally limitations in this paper. Firstly, measuring the frequency of
portfolio company initial public offerings does not quite correctly reward venture
capitalists that are specialised in acquisition exits or generate large returns on their
investments through exit vehicles other than the IPO. Although IPOs probably provide
by far the highest average returns and yield several other benefits to the venture capital
firm, acquisitions can also be successful and significantly contribute to the efficiency of
a venture capital firm. The lack of comprehensive data on acquisitions and company
valuations in these exits effectively hinders rigorous empirical investigations of the
impact of syndication on the success of acquisition exits. An analysis of the internal rates
of return of the funds of the venture capital firm instead of only the success of portfolio
company IPOs could also supplement the results obtained in this paper. However, the
lack of publicised IRR figures for a large enough set of venture capital funds prevented
us from conducting this analysis.
Secondly, we have not been able to fully analyse the price of syndication. While it seems
clear that venture capitalists can enhance their efficiency through syndication, it is not
clear how much they must pay for splitting up the investment. It is possible that firm
prominence is a significant factor in determining how the investment and the benefits
from syndication are split up. An analysis of this question would require more detailed
information on how the financing round is apportioned among the venture capital firms
participating in the syndicate than is currently available, but would also be a significant
supplement to our empirical understanding of venture capital syndication.
A third limitation arises from the fact that our data set is geographically limited to the
United States. Expanding the analysis to European countries and other parts of the
world would reveal potential country-specific effects of syndication. Despite the
limitations, we believe that our approach provides a valid and valuable starting point for
more detailed analyses on syndication, the efficiency, and the performance of venture
capital firms.
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This paper has left also other interesting questions open. Syndication clearly provides
benefits in terms of efficiency, but this paper has not analysed the determinants of the
existence of the syndication relationships. Why do certain syndication relationships
exist? The past performance and the prominence of the focal investor are likely to be
potential explanatory factors of the exchange partners’ willingness to syndicate. On the
other hand, a preferred position in the co-investment network should presumably be
related to better performance and prominence. Further research could examine how the
relative position of venture capitalists in the syndication network affects their
prominence and relative performance. Network theory provides appropriate measures,
such as power and centrality, to assess whether certain venture capitalists act as key
nodes of the network in addition to their potentially frequent relationships with a
selected set of other firms.
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ESSAY 4:
HOW THE RICH BECOME RICHER IN VENTURE CAPITAL: FIRM
PERFORMANCE AND POSITION IN SYNDICATION NETWORKS
Abstract. This paper compares resource-based and social structural explanations for the
network positions and performance of organisations. Our distributed lag analysis of an
extensive data set of U.S. venture capital investments and their syndicate structures
between 1986 and 2000 suggests that venture capital firms in central network positions
increase their market share of portfolio company initial public offerings in subsequent
years. Consistent with the social structural argument, our results further demonstrate
that prior network position tends to determine future position. Analyses of causality show
that past network position tends to dominate the observable quality of firm resources as a
determinant of the subsequent performance and position of the firm. Our results further
imply that the structure of venture capital syndication networks is rigid and involves
high barriers to entry, and that the acquisition of general partners contributes to changes
in existing network positions.
This essay is forthcoming in Bygrave WD (ed.). 2003. Frontiers of Entrepreneurship
Research 2002. Babson College: Wellesley, MA.
The essay was presented at the Strategic Management Society conference in Paris,
France, 22 – 25 September, 2002, where it was awarded the Strategic Management
Society / Booz Allen & Hamilton best PhD conference paper prize.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, research on strategic alliances and related collaborative
relationships has identified that up to a limit, connectedness to other firms in
collaborative interorganisational networks improves firm performance.
Interorganisational relationships have been found to improve innovation output (Ahuja,
2000b; Baum et al., 2000), revenue growth (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Baum
et al., 2000), growth of research and development (Baum et al., 2000), profit rates
(Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994), organisational survival rates (Mitchell and Singh,
1996; Baum and Oliver, 1991), and market valuations in initial public offerings (Stuart et
al., 1999).
Two main theory streams have provided complementary explanations for why
interorganisational relationships are beneficial, and why firms establish linkages. Firstly,
arguments based on the resource-based view of the firm posit that firms obtain access to
needed assets or complementary resources through the linkages. While resources are
typically firm-specific, not available for purchase in factor markets, and need to
accumulate and develop in the firm over a long period in order to provide competitive
advantage (Dierickx and Cool, 1989), interorganisational relationships provide a vehicle
through which firms can obtain much quicker access to resources that create competitive
advantage (Ahuja, 2000a). Thus, the resource-based view of inter-organisational network
formation argues, firms establish linkages to gain access to complementary and attractive
resources possessed by others.
Secondly, collaborative relationships provide organisations with social benefits. Well-
connected firms gain informational and reputation benefits from their linkages to other
firms (Gulati, 1995; 1999). Prior exchange relationships serve as indicators of the
reliability of potential partners, and the exchange network spreads information efficiently
between connected firms (Gulati 1995; 1999). Furthermore, economic sociology argues
that an economic actor’s rewards are largely a function of position in the actor’s social
structure (White, 1981; Baker, 1984; Podolny, 1993). Actors with central positions tend to
gain higher rewards than peripheral actors. A key argument for why central actors tend to
outperform others is that network positions are reflections of the status of the firm
(Podolny, 1993; 1994). Status acts as a signal of the quality of the firm’s products and
reduces the costs actors would need to incur in order to gain confidence that the
products are of acceptable quality. Because of these position-based benefits, the social
structural view of network formation argues that a firm’s ability to form new relationships
is determined by the set of opportunities provided by its network position. Central and
high-status actors or firms attract more and higher-status exchange partners than
peripheral actors. Thus, the social structural view argues that network formation is
endogenous, and prior position tends to determine future position.
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While previous research on interorganisational exchanges has made significant
contributions, especially to the formation of exchange relationships both from the
resource-based perspective and the social structural perspective, the connection between
firm performance and its position in collaborative networks has not received as much
attention. In particular, the current body of knowledge lacks explicit analyses of causality
in the relationship between firm performance and position in collaborative networks. It is
unclear whether past performance or past positions lead to central positions in
collaborative networks, and whether central positions lead to improved performance.
Assuming that other actors evaluate firms’ resources on the basis of the observable quality
of the firms’ outputs, examining this causal relationship is equivalent to examining
whether the resource-based reasons or the social structural reasons are the dominant
determinants of interorganisational exchange.
This paper sets out to examine the relationship between firm performance and position
in the syndication network of the U.S. venture capital industry. We propose that venture
capitalists that have gained a central position in the syndication network will
consequently outperform their peers as a result of resource-based and social structural
benefits. To understand causality in the hypothesised relationship between firm
performance and network position, we formulate two additional competing hypotheses.
On one hand, the social structural hypothesis implies that past position is the major
determinant of subsequent position. According to this view, the willingness of other firms
to co-operate with the focal firm depends on the number and position of its existing
partners. On the other hand, resource-based reasoning suggests that the observable
quality of the firm’s resources attracts exchange partners and improves the network
position of the focal firm.
Our empirical analysis is based on a longitudinal set of firm-year observations constructed
from an extensive database of over 50,000 U.S. venture capital investments in the period
1986 – 2000. The venture capital industry provides a good environment for testing our
hypotheses for various reasons. Firstly, the formation of interorganisational linkages is
significantly more frequent in venture capital syndication than in the case of alliances
that typically have been used as the empirical data for studies on interorganisational
exchanges. Frequent observations on linkage formation should reduce unobserved
heterogeneity that can be caused by changes in the characteristics of the exchange
partners over time. Secondly, syndication is clearly defined, and syndication events are
easily observable, whereas the proper identification of alliances typically requires rigorous
judgement by the researchers. Thirdly, examining venture capital syndications also
allows us to treat network position as a dynamic variable rather than a static, cross-
sectional variable. This enables rigorous empirical testing of causality in the hypothesised
relationships.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical setting, and builds
the testable hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and the methods used. Section 4
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presents the empirical results. Finally, conclusions and implications are discussed in
section 5.
2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 Resource-based view of interorganisational relationships
The resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959) suggests that firms seek competitive
advantage by obtaining control over those factors that increase their competitiveness
above that of their closest rivals (Wernerfelt, 1984). ‘Resources’ are factors that can
provide competitive advantage and have four distinctive characteristics (Barney, 1991).
Firstly, resources must be valuable to the firm, either in terms of lower input costs or
higher prices of outputs. Secondly, resources must be rare or firm-specific. If resources
were commonly held, they would not differentiate firms from one another, and thus
would not provide competitive advantage. Thirdly, resources must be imperfectly
imitable to sustain the competitive advantage in the long term. Finally, resources must
not be substitutable. If resources could be replaced using strategically equivalent
substitutes, they would not provide competitive advantage. These factors imply that
resources cannot be instantaneously developed. Rather, they require time to accumulate.
Thus, resources are typically asset stocks that have less value when separated from the
creating organisation (Dierickx and Cool, 1989).
Interorganisational exchange relationships provide firms with an opportunity to resolve
the problem of having to accumulate resources for a long time before gaining any
competitive advantage (Ahuja, 2000a). Through interorganisational relationships, firms
can obtain access to assets that fulfil the four conditions for resources that create
competitive advantage. In addition to the accumulation problem, collaboration resolves
the problem of tradability in the case of non-tradable resources. Thus, organisations can
benefit from exchange relationships because they can access attractive resources that can
complement their existing resource pool. Firms form linkages to obtain access to needed
assets (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991), or to learn
new skills (Kogut, 1988). Additionally, the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and
Salancick, 1978) suggests that organisations engage in exchange relationships because
their resources are interdependent. Actors attempt to reduce uncertainty and acquire
resources that are not easily available on the market. Thus, linkage formation reflects
firms’ incentives to collaborate (Ahuja, 2000a). The greater the firm’s competitive
resource deficiency and the need to obtain the relevant resources, the more willing the
firm is to form linkages.
According to the resource-based view of network formation, firms select their exchange
partners on the basis of the observable quality of their resources, and organisations with a
complementary or superior resource base are the most attractive partners. Organisations
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can identify the quality of the potential partners’ resources by acquiring information on
their current observable resource endowments, or by examining the past performance of
the partner’s actions (Baum et al., 2000). The resource-based view assumes that the
availability of exchange opportunities is not a constraint, and that the supply of linkage
partners is infinitely elastic (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994). Initial position in the
network is not relevant; the attractiveness of the partner’s resources determines whether a
dyad is formed or not. This assumption is naturally debatable.
Inter-firm linkages provide the focal organisation with several benefits (Ahuja, 2000a).
Network connections help it to improve financial performance and survival prospects
(Baum and Oliver, 1991; Baum et al., 2000; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994;
Mitchell and Singh, 1996), develop and absorb technology (Powell et al., 1996), and
withstand economic shocks (Miner et al., 1990). Additionally, interorganisational
relationships have been found to improve innovation output (Ahuja, 2000b; Baum et al.,
2000) and market valuations in initial public offerings (Stuart et al., 1999). However, to
be able to form the linkages that may yield these benefits, the firm should be attractive to
collaboration partners. The resource-based argument is that the focal firm should have an
attractive stock of resources that it can exchange with the partners.
2.2 Social structural view of interorganisational relationships
An alternative view of the formation of exchange relationships stems from social
structural theory and theories of social networks. According to this view, prior exchanges
are major determinants of the emergence of future exchanges (Granovetter, 1985;
Gulati, 1995). Exogenous factors such as the resources of the network actors may be
important for initiating co-operative exchanges but are insufficient in determining with
whom the organisation decides to exchange. Because organisations face substantial
uncertainty in obtaining reliable information on the attributes, quality, and
trustworthiness of potential new exchange partners, they tend to prefer their existing
partners in future exchanges (Gulati, 1995). Extended experience with linkages reduces
the focal firm’s uncertainty about partners because prior relationships provide
information on the partners’ capabilities and likely behaviour of the partners. Prior
relationships also enable the institutionalisation of the collaboration relationships and the
creation of organisational routines around them (Ahuja, 2000a). Thus, network dyads are
most likely formed between actors that have previously co-operated with each other.
Status effects are another important social factor in the formation of exchange
relationships. In his classic article on the reward systems of science, Merton (1968)
recognised the self-reinforcing positive effects of status. Eminent scientists tend to receive
a disproportionate amount of credit for their contributions, and collaborative papers tend
to earn a disproportionate amount of credit for the author with the highest prior
reputation. People remember primarily the author they are already familiar with from the
past – the author with the higher status. This phenomenon, the ‘Matthew Effect’
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(Merton, 1968), has been later documented in several contexts (e.g., Podolny, 1993). In
addition to actors in science, economic actors with high status should be able to achieve
above-average returns. The status of an economic actor refers to the perceived quality of
the economic actor’s offering relative to the perceived quality of those of the actor’s
competitors (Podolny, 1993). Status serves as a signal of the quality of the actor and the
actor’s offerings (Podolny, 1993; 1994). Thus, it is easier for a high-status actor to attract
the exchange partners it desires than it is for a low-status actor.
A common argument among sociologists is that status is reflected as position in a social
network (Bonacich, 1987; Podolny, 1993). High-status actors can be seen as central
nodes in the network of firms and their resources. Central position makes economic
actors desirable exchange partners, and allows them to gather resources from a large set
of relationships. Associations with a large number of high-status partners increases the
attractiveness of the central actors as partners, which leads to the formation of new
exchange relationships and even higher centrality and status.
In conclusion, central positions in collaborative networks will positively impact a firm’s
performance and opportunities to form further linkages because of at least three
mechanisms (Gulati, 1995; 1999; Ahuja, 2000a). Firstly, central firms can obtain
information about linkage formation opportunities from their partners and their partners’
partners. Because of an enhanced flow of information, central actors have more
opportunities to form linkages, and they possess more accurate information on the quality
of the potential exchange partners. Secondly, a central position is in itself a signal of the
status and reliability of the focal firm. An extensive number of existing partnerships with
other high-status actors create trust among potential new partners through accumulated
reputation and references from the existing partners. It is thus less risky for other firms to
collaborate with highly central firms than with firms whose collaborative behaviour is
unknown. Similarly, product market participants reward high-status firms because status
reduces the costs the market participants would need to incur to gain confidence that the
products of the firm are of acceptable quality. Thirdly, centrality in the network acts as a
signal that the focal firm has access to other highly central actors. Potential exchange
partners thus have the opportunity to connect to other high-status actors in addition to
the focal firm. As a result, central firms attract proportionally more exchange partners
than peripheral firms.
2.3 Exchange theories in the venture capital context
Venture capital firms frequently engage in collaborative relationships with other venture
investors because investment syndication is common in the industry. Just as commercial
banks syndicate loans, venture capitalists often share their risk capital investments.
Syndicates are typically formed by a lead investor who contacts other potential investors
and records their commitments to invest. Several motives encourage venture capitalists to
co-operate and establish syndicates. Firstly, syndication partners can improve the lead
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investor’s capabilities to add value to the portfolio company (Brander et al., 1999).
Venture capitalists have heterogeneous skills and information and can contribute to the
success of portfolio companies through several mechanisms (MacMillan et al., 1988;
Sapienza, 1992; Hellman and Puri, 2002). Secondly, syndication relationships allow
venture capitalists to share information on future deals (Bygrave, 1987; Sorenson and
Stuart, 2001). Thirdly, syndication allows the spread of financial risk, although empirical
evidence has provided contradictory results on the sharing of financial resources as a
motive for syndication (Bygrave, 1987; Lockett and Wright, 2001). Fourthly, syndicates
allow making better investment decisions because several investors can evaluate the
venture largely independently (Wilson, 1968; Lerner, 1994). Fifthly, venture capitalists
may syndicate to enhance their social status (Podolny, 2001). Sixthly, the ‘window
dressing’ phenomenon of venture capital funds has been argued to be one possible
explanation for syndication (Lerner, 1994).
Previous research on the exchange relationships of venture capital firms has examined
both the resource-based and social structural explanations for tie formation in investment
syndication, although most studies of syndication have adopted a relatively informal
approach.
The resource-based stream of arguments has argued that venture capitalists need, in
principle, at least three kinds of resources (Bygrave, 1987). Firstly, VCs need the capital
to be invested in the portfolio companies. The second necessary set of resources is the
supply of potential investment targets, i.e. promising new ventures that are short of
capital. Finally, the VC firm must find competent human resources to make investment
decisions and steer the portfolio companies. In principle, syndication could serve as a
resource exchange vehicle in these three areas. Firstly, syndicate partners can provide
additional capital, and can thus decrease the financial commitment needed from the
lead investor. This shares risk inherent in large or speculative investments, and enables
investments that are out of the lead investor’s operating scope in terms of monetary size.
Secondly, syndication provides venture capitalists with a flow of information on
prospective investment targets (Bygrave, 1987; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Thirdly and
finally, VCs share their decision-making resources in the syndication network by utilising
the evaluation capabilities of their syndicate partners when screening and selecting
investment targets. Syndication also allows VCs to use their syndicate partners’ expertise
and relationships with outside parties, such as corporations, investment banks and law
firms, to add value to their investments. Thus, the resources of the potential exchange
partners may represent the primary determinant for the formation of syndication
relationships.
Previous research also includes theoretically less formal empirical investigations on the
formation of venture capitalist networks. Bygrave (1988) examined the structure of
venture capital syndication networks in the U.S., and found that venture capital firms
tend to form tightly coupled cliques that exchange information swiftly. For example,
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firms focusing on highly innovative ventures formed a tightly coupled group, and
concentrated on maintaining the existing exchange relationships instead of actively
creating new ones. However, these tightly coupled groups sometimes establish contacts
with weakly tied firms that are potential sources of information fresh to the tightly
coupled network. Nevertheless, Bygrave’s (1988) empirical results indicate that the
structure of the syndication network is among the key determinants of tie formation.
Bygrave (1988), however, attributes exchanges to resource needs instead of a social
structural argument.
The social structural view on venture capital has started to emerge as an alternative
approach to venture capital syndication. Adopting a status-based perspective, Podolny
(2001) examined how the position of venture capital firms in the network or syndication
relationships affects their choice of market segments. Whereas high status tends to drive
venture capitalists towards less risky market segments, structural holes in the network
imply a shift from low-risk to high-risk segments. Strategy choice and market behaviour
are, thus, embedded in the network of syndication relationships. Further supporting the
social structural view, Anand and Piskorski (2001) found that venture capital firms that
have central positions in the syndication network can establish co-operation relationships
with other firms regardless of their financial resources, whereas peripheral firms can
establish ties only if they have substantial financial resources. As a result, central venture
capitalists tend to sustain their positions.
2.4 Hypotheses
The resource-based and social structural views on interorganisational collaboration allow
us to test and elaborate the relationship between firms’ economic performance and
position in a collaboration network. Several arguments derive from these theories for
formulating appropriate hypotheses on the effect of network position on firm
performance.
Firstly, a central position may provide the focal firm with the benefits of resource
exchange. Interorganisational exchange relationships provide firms with an opportunity
to resolve the problem of having to accumulate resources for a long time prior to gaining
any competitive advantage (Ahuja, 2000a). Through interorganisational relationships,
firms can obtain access to resources that create competitive advantage. Efficient resource
exchange using appropriate vehicles, e.g. alliances, has been shown to yield several
benefits to organisations (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Baum et al., 2000; Hagedoorn and
Schakenraad, 1994; Mitchell and Singh, 1996; Powell et al., 1996; Miner et al., 1990).
If a venture capital firm is in a central position in the syndication network, it has frequent
connections to several other venture capitalists that can potentially exchange resources
with it. The large number of connections increases the probability that the firm can find
syndicate partners that possess complementary resources. Thus, centrality should
improve the efficiency of resource exchange through the collaborative linkages. Typical
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resources that can be exchanged in venture capital syndication relationships are money,
investment evaluation resources, and ‘value-adding’ resources that venture capitalists use
to steer the portfolio companies in the right direction. In practice, exchange partners
provide the focal venture capital firm with limited access to their human resources,
including general partners and junior employees, and with access to external resources in
their own co-operative network, such as investment banks, law firms, auditors,
consultants, and potential portfolio company clients. If the focal venture capital firm can
utilise this additional resource base, it may be able to improve its performance in the
marketplace.
The second potential benefit from a central network position is the access to the flow of
deal information in the network. It is known that venture capitalists frequently share
information on prospective investment targets in their syndication network (Bygrave,
1987; Sorenson and Stuart 2001). The more central the position held by a venture capital
firm in the co-operative network, the more information flows through the firm. Key firms
act as central nodes in the network, and observe most of the so-called deal flow. If a
venture capitalist has a large variety of prospective portfolio companies to choose from, it
is more likely that the companies ultimately chosen in the portfolio will be of good
quality than if the venture capitalist had only a small variety of potential targets. Venture
capital firms that are able to observe and screen a wide variety of targets within the fund’s
investment period are better off than firms with less deal flow.
Thirdly, central position gives the focal firm a high status. Status acts as a indicator of
the quality of the companies associated with the focal firm (Benjamin and Podolny,
1999). Status has been found to be an important factor in certifying the quality of
portfolio companies under uncertainty and asymmetric information (Carter and
Manaster, 1990). As a result, central and high-status venture capital firms should be able
to overperform peripheral firms in the exit markets for their investments.
Venture capital firms cannot, however, immediately capitalise on the potential benefits
stemming from their position. Rather, we expect the potential performance
improvements to be realised with a time lag. A time lag is probable because the gains
from a central position can be observed in the form of tangible performance only after
the actions enabled by the central position have taken place and yielded an outcome.
Improvements in selection and value-adding capabilities will affect the venture
capitalist’s observable performance only after the investments have been realised. This
typically takes several years after the investment; the average period from a venture
capital investment to exit is approximately five years (Sahlman, 1990). Similarly, the
social structural gains from position, such as informational advantages and status benefits,
are likely to yield tangible results only after a number of years. Consequently, we expect
that the benefits of position allow central venture capital firms to achieve above-average
performance, but with a time lag:
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Hypothesis 1: The centrality of a venture capital firm’s position in the syndication
network is positively related to the subsequent performance of the firm.
While the hypothesised relationship between past position and current performance
seems clear-cut, both past performance and past position can be argued to be the
determinants of current network position. On one hand, the resource-based
argumentation suggests that successful firms attract other firms to engage in exchange
relationships with them. An excellent prior track record of generating high returns or
successfully realising investments make a certain venture capitalist an attractive co-
investment partner to other investors because of signalling benefits. The resource-based
view of network formation argues that firms assess the quality of the potential partners’
resources by acquiring information on their current observable resource endowments, or
by examining the past performance of the partners’ actions (Baum et al., 2000). An
observable track record is a major factor in reducing the asymmetry of information
between the focal firm and its potential exchange partners. Information asymmetry exists
because the focal firm has superior knowledge of the quality of its own resource base
compared to the potential exchange partners. Additionally, the focal firm has an
incentive to overstate its quality in order to establish beneficial exchange relationships.
Rational partners recognise this incentive, and become more cautious about forming a
relationship unless the focal firm can signal its quality in a reliable way. Signalling
reduces the partners’ risk of adverse selection, i.e. the risk of establishing a relationship of
inferior quality (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1974). Thus, signalling reduces the barriers to
establishing a relationship, and accumulated reputation represents a key factor for
signalling quality. As a result, other firms would increase their willingness to collaborate
with the focal firm if it has performed well. This, in turn, would lead to an increase in
position centrality.
As in the case of the relationship between current performance and prior position in the
network, we expect there to be a time lag from the realisation of good performance to the
improvement of position in the venture capital syndication network. However, this time
lag should be shorter than that between position centrality and subsequent performance
because of social recognition. Other firms should recognise the above-average
performance of their potential exchange partners without major delays, since the track
record of a venture capital firm is typically formed of successful investment exits. Good
exits are most often publicised, and the reputation of well-performing firms is distributed
rapidly in the venture capital community. It is therefore likely that if the good
performance of a venture capital firm increases the willingness of other firms to exchange
with the focal firm, the exchanges will be realised without major lags after the
exceptional performance has been observed.
The resource-based argumentation of network formation leads to the following
hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 2a: The performance of a venture capital firm is positively related to the
subsequent centrality of its position in the syndication network.
On the other hand, the social structural view stresses that prior exchanges are the major
determinant of future exchanges (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995). Network dyads are
most likely formed between actors that have previously co-operated with each other,
because prior exchanges can significantly reduce the quality uncertainty that the
exchange partners have over each other’s resources, and because institutionalised
relationships increase the efficiency of new exchanges (Ahuja, 2000a). Venture capital
firms have also been observed to reciprocate their past syndicate partners by inviting
them to participate new deals (Bygrave, 1988).
Status effects constitute another social mechanism that contributes to the stability of prior
positions. Economic actors are willing to form exchange relationships with high-status
firms because an association with high-status exchange partners may enhance the level of
attention paid on the focal actor’s endeavours. A firm’s reputation and its ability to
establish new linkages are likely to improve when it co-operates with high-status
exchange partners (Stuart, 1998). Network and institutional theorists also agree that an
economic actor’s performance in its marketplace is affected by the status levels of its close
associates (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Podolny 1994). Firms associated with high-status
partners are likely to be considered of higher status than firms without such association.
Status legitimises their resources, decreases the problems from information asymmetry,
and attracts further partners. Thus, the more central a position a venture capital firm has,
the more willing should other VCs be to form relationships with it, and the better should
these partners be positioned in the syndication network. Such status effects may reinforce
the position centrality of the most central firms in the syndication network.
The social structural view suggests a competing hypothesis on the determinant of
position centrality in venture capital syndication networks:
Hypothesis 2b: The centrality of a venture capital firm’s position in the syndication
network is positively related to the subsequent centrality of its position.
3 DATA AND METHODS
3.1 Data
While most of the previous research on venture capital syndication networks has focused
on the creation of dyads between firms (Bygrave, 1987; Bygrave, 1988; Anand and
Piskorski, 2001), the focus of this paper is the venture capital firm. More precisely, we
analyse a time series of yearly observations from each venture capital firm in our sample.
The focus of the analysis is the interrelation between a firm’s performance and its
position in the syndication network.
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Our sample consists of the 100 leading private U.S. venture capital organisations which
we identify on the basis of the number of portfolio companies in which the firms had
invested by the end of the year 2000, and the venture capital investments made by these
firms between 1986 and 2000. Sampling from the leading firms in the industry was
necessary to ensure the availability and reliability of data. Previous studies on networks
and alliances have used a similar strategy (Gulati, 1995; Ahuja, 2000a). In spite of the
focus on the top 100 firms, our sample still provides considerable variation regarding the
variables examined in the analyses.
The venture capital investment data of this paper was obtained from the Securities Data
Corporation’s Venture Economics database. This source has also been used in previous
venture capital research (e.g. Bygrave, 1987; Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 1995; Gompers and
Lerner, 1998). Venture Economics has gathered venture capital investment data since
the 1970s using the annual reports of venture capital funds, personal contacts to funds’
personnel, initial public offering prospectuses, and acquisitions announced in the media.
The database contains information on over 150,000 private equity investments (one
financing round consists of several single investments), and it is widely recognised as a
leading source of U.S. venture capital investment data.
Supplementary data were gathered from the back issues of Pratt’s Guide to Venture
Capital Sources, which lists the general partners, key personnel, and a variety of other
parameters for most of the U.S. venture capital firms each year. The most relevant
records for our study are the lists of general partners. For each year that a certain firm has
been included in the publication, these data are reported consistently with names and
positions. Using data from Pratt’s Guide, we tracked the total number of partners and
their names in each venture capital firm each year. We classified personnel as partners if
their position title included one of the terms ‘partner’, ‘vice president’ or ‘managing
director’. To further ensure the validity of the general partner data in Pratt’s Guide, we
collected the current résumés of 28% of the partners of our sample firms and reviewed
their career years in each venture partnership. We then compared the Pratt’s Guide
listings of partners to the sub-sample of résumés without observing significant
inconsistencies between these two sources.
The sample of investments was selected from the universe of all venture capital
investments using multiple criteria. Firstly, we restricted the data set to contain only U.S.
venture capitalists and investments. We restricted our sample to those U.S. venture
capital partnerships that Venture Economics classifies as “Independent private
partnerships”. Thus, we did not take into account investment bank affiliates, corporate
investors, endowments, individuals, or other private equity investors. Secondly, we
examined only investments in U.S. portfolio companies. Finally, we limited the sample
to investments that are standard venture capital investments. We implemented this by
removing records that Venture Economics classifies as “leveraged buyout”, “secondary
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purchase”, “open market purchase”, “private investment in public company” or
“turnaround”.
As our analysis sample contains only the 100 U.S. largest venture capital partnerships, we
cannot always observe all the syndication partners of a given firm because some of the
partners may not figure among the 100 largest firms. This bias could lead to a situation in
which the syndication partners of some firms were systematically left out. Therefore, we
extended the original sample of 100 companies to include the 160 largest venture capital
investors in order to check the robustness of our position centrality measures, yet keeping
the practical problem of the exponentially growing effort required to construct the
syndication matrix under control. In fact, we can observe on average 44% of the firms
that invested in each company, while the investments by the 160 largest firms capture
over 90% of all the portfolio companies in the Venture Economics database between
1986 and 2000. However, measuring centralities for the 100 sample firms from the
syndication network of the 100 largest venture capital firms produced qualitatively equal
results to those we obtained by measuring the variables from the syndication network of
the 160 largest firms. The results indicate that the choice of the sample does not generate
systematic errors in our centrality measures. Altogether, the data set includes 54,700
investments in 10,057 portfolio companies in the years 1986 – 2000.
3.2 Variables
3.2.1 Performance
In principle, venture capital firms are most successful when they maximise the value of
their shareholdings. This results directly from the definition of a venture capital firm.
Venture capital firms are investment management companies that raise funds from
limited partners, including institutional investors, corporations, and wealthy individuals.
VCs invest these funds in equity stakes in unquoted companies, actively participate in
the development of these companies, and harvest their investments typically within 3-7
years in a public offering or a trade sale. In these ‘exits’, venture capital firms either
distribute the shares of the portfolio companies or pay back cash to the limited partners.
The management company, i.e. the general partners, is rewarded with a 20-25% stake of
the returns to the limited partners in addition to a 1.5-3% annual managing fee on the
capital invested in the venture capital fund (Gompers and Lerner, 1999a). The general
partners receive the highest compensation when they maximise the return on capital
invested. Thus, the wealth of all parties is maximised when the value of the venture
capital firm’s shareholdings is maximised.
Measuring the performance of venture capital firms is difficult for an outside observer
because the lack of public information. Considering the maximisation of the venture
capital firm’s shareholdings, the internal rate of return (IRR) of the firm’s funds would be
the most interesting performance measure, as it illustrates the return on capital invested,
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and hence represents the creation of value to the limited and general partners. However,
these numbers are regarded as trade secrets, and reliable, industry-wide IRR figures on
individual funds are not available.
However, comparing successful exits across venture capital firms provides a reasonable
measure of performance. Megginson and Weiss (1991) used the market share of portfolio
company initial public offerings as a measure of venture capitalist track record. Similarly,
we choose to use the yearly market share of initial public offerings to measure the relative
performance of venture capitalists. IPO track record is a quantifiable performance
measure for venture capitalists and offers three clear advantages. Firstly, the valuations of
the portfolio companies are ultimately formed in a competitive market in the IPO, and
hence the IPO provides a reliable view of the market value of these companies.
Secondly, the largest valuations and returns to venture capitalists are most often realised
in IPOs (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). Although only a fraction of venture capital
investments reach the IPO, most of the total value to the investors is created in these exits
(Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Gompers and Lerner, 1999b). Thus, we can consider the
IPO as the preferred exit vehicle for most venture capital firms. Thirdly, an IPO is a
publicised event in the market, conveying information that has a direct reputational
effect for the focal venture capital firm, as an IPO indicates that the firm has been able to
make a very successful investment. Thus, we argue that the value-weighted market share
of initial public offerings is a valid measure for the success of a venture capital firm
relative to its peers. A value-weighted share of IPOs captures the ability to generate initial
public offerings relative to peer investors, and also rewards for value creation in addition
to the mere frequency of portfolio company IPOs.
We obtained the initial public offering (IPO) valuation data from the Securities Data
Corporation’s (SDC) New Issues database. SDC New Issues is a source of IPO data that
records up to 250 characteristics of the issuer, the underwriter syndicate, and market
characteristics at the time of the issue. We recorded the final offer price and the number
of shares outstanding after the offer to determine the IPO market value of the firm. Since
some inconsistencies in the number of shares outstanding after the offer were
encountered in the SDC data, the initial public offering related data were also cross-
checked by comparing them to the data from IPO prospectuses obtained from the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Edgar database. To ensure validity, two
researchers independently recorded the necessary prospectus data, and compared the sets
to each other and the SDC data. Ambiguous cases were then re-checked and corrected
using the prospectus information.
3.2.2 Network centrality
Venture capital firms are connected to each other both through informal and personal
ties on the general partner level and through formal or contractual ties on the firm level.
These dyadic connections of venture capitalists can be combined to form a network.
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Using a network to describe the relationships, not only includes the original information
about the dyadic relationships but it also captures the overall structure of relations within
a set of venture capital firms.
The centrality of a firm is a network measure that illustrates the focal firm’s position in
the network relative to its exchange partners. Essentially, the more a firm has connections
to others, the more central it is. Additionally, the centralities of the firms the focal firm is
connected to affect the focal firm’s centrality. The more central firms the focal firm is
connected to, the higher its centrality. Thus, centrality is positively related both to the
number of connections and the centralities of the firm’s exchange partners.
We interpret the syndication relationship as a network tie between two venture capital
firms. In order to invest in the same venture, the venture capital firms need to co-operate
closely in selecting the venture, in structuring the deal, and in adding value to the
company in the long run. Hence, a syndication relationship is a strong indicator of the
degree of co-operation between the two venture capital firms. Although there certainly
exists a range of other types of relationships between VCs, syndication offers a
comprehensive indicator of intra-industry co-operation in investment activities.
The strictest definition of syndication requires that two or more venture capitalists invest
in the same venture in the same round of financing. However, the Venture Economics
data impose certain restrictions for measuring syndication according to the strictest
definition. The records in the Venture Economics database occasionally overstate the
number of financing rounds because of staged distributions of funds and variations in the
reported dates of the source data (Lerner, 1994; Gompers and Lerner, 1999b). As our
focus is the network of venture capital firms, we can alleviate the problem of unmatched
records by broadening the concept of syndication from co-investment in the same
financing round to co-investment in the same company within a limited period. We
choose to define a syndication relationship as the event of two venture capital firms
investing in the same venture within a year. Because our unit of analysis is the firm-year
observation, our definition of a syndication relationship should have no unexpected
impacts on the final results.
To establish the centrality scores for each venture capital firm, we use Bonacich’s (1987)
centrality measure ci(α,β) defined as
( ) ( )∑ β+α=βα
j
ijji Rc,c
where Rij is an element of the relational matrix R, and each element of R is the number
of companies in which the firms i and j have invested together. β is the degree to which
the centrality of i is function of the centralities of other firms. β can be interpreted as the
radius of the influence of i. If we do not expect the syndication relationships of j to
directly benefit i, β should be small. We follow the practice of earlier studies and set β
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equal to three quarters of the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue of R (Podolny, 1993;
Sorenson and Stuart, 2001).
In our sample, venture capital firms enter the sample each year as they are founded, apart
from firms that were founded before 1986. Thus, the structure of our syndication network
changes yearly. As a result, a firm’s centrality may change from year to year even if its
syndication relationships remain unchanged. To standardise the centrality measure
across years, we choose α so that the sum of squared centralities equals the number of
firms in the network (Bonacich, 1987). Thus,
( ) n,c
i
2
i =βα∑ .
3.2.3 Firm general partners
Our third dependent variable is the number of general partners in the venture capital
firm. While our primary operationalisation of firm performance is the market share of
portfolio company IPOs, we also measure firm performance with the number of general
partners in each firm over time to ensure the robustness of the results and to better
understand how network positions are acquired and retained. We assume that successful
firms are able to increase the number of general partners, while unsuccessful firms would
tend to do the opposite. Another reason to examine the number of general partners over
time in each firm is that changes in the number of general partners also act as indicators
of changes in the network of relationships the firm has. An incoming additional partner
usually brings in a number of new interorganisational relationships through his personal
contacts, and a leaving partner often makes several relationships disappear. If this is the
case, we will observe changes in the number of general partners to affect the position of
the firm.
 The number of partners each year is taken from our combination of the records from
Pratt’s Guide to Venture Capital Sources and the résumés of the general partner sub-
sample. We recognise that the records from Pratt’s Guides represent the situation of the
year previous to the year of publication, and use each year’s Pratt’s Guide data for the
previous year entries. We further assume that the number of general partners during a
single calendar year remains constant. In the rare cases in which general partner data are
unavailable from both sources for a certain year, we use the data of the previous year.
3.3 Control variables
Resources and firm size. The main resources a venture capital company needs are the
capital to be invested, supply of potential investment targets, and the human resources
managing the firm and its investments (Bygrave, 1987). The scarcity or availability of
resources is likely to have a significant effect on the propensity of the firm to syndicate,
and thus internal resources need to be controlled for in the models, apart from the
number of general partners that we treat as an independent variable.
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To capture the overall size of the firm, we control for the market share of investments,
calculated as the number of new companies in which  the firm invested each year
divided by the number of all new companies receiving venture capital financing in the
sample that year.
When raising funds, venture capitalists negotiate capital commitments from limited
partners, and invest them gradually over a few years into promising target companies.
The sum of these commitments in a firm is referred to as ‘capital under management’.
We calculate the sum of the non-expired venture capital funds, and exclude funds that
are raised for investments in e.g. buyouts. We include only funds that Venture
Economics classifies as ‘venture capital’ in our sample. We further assume the expiration
of a fund to take place within ten years of the vintage year, which Sahlman (1990) found
to be the case in 72% of the funds in his sample. Thus, the total size of a fund is
calculated as part of capital under management for the ten years after its raising was
completed.
Location. A wide and continuous supply of investment targets (deal flow) is generally
regarded as an important success factor venture capital investing (Bygrave, 1987;
Sahlman, 1990). However, we are unable to observe the deal flow that a given venture
capital firm faces. The number and quality of business proposals are guarded trade
secrets, and there are no records of the deal flow. Following the convention of earlier
research (e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 2000), we control for differences in the supply of
investment targets using location variables. In our sample, 48% of investments were made
in companies in California, 13.5% in Massachusetts, and 4.8% in Texas. VCs located in
California made 40% of all investments, VCs in Massachusetts 21%, and those in New
York 8%. Respectively, 53 VCs are located in California, 33 in Massachusetts and 15 in
New York. We use dummy variables to indicate whether the VC firm is located in
California, Massachusetts or another state.
Venture capital firm age. The age of a venture capital firm may have significant impacts
on its operations. The older the firm, the more contacts, experience, and prominence it
has. In addition, the younger the firm, the more it tries to establish a reputation by
opportunistically striving towards successful exits. This is a phenomenon called
‘grandstanding’ (Gompers, 1996). We thus control for age effects. We calculate the age of
each firm in our sample on the basis of the founding dates in the Venture Economics
database. We cross-checked the validity of these records using the back issues of Pratt’s
Guides, and overrode Venture Economics data in case of conflict. In some rare cases, we
found that Venture Economics had allocated venture capital investments to the firm
prior to the reported founding date. In these cases, we set the company founding year as
the year of the first investment recorded for the firm in the Venture Economics database.
Investment stage mix of investments. The stage of development of a venture affects both
the risk and the expected time-to-exit of the venture capital investments in the venture. In
addition, a firm investing exclusively in later-stage companies is likely to be involved in
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proportionally more IPOs than one investing in early-stage companies. We calculate the
percentage of investments in early-stage, expansion stage and later-stage ventures for each
firm each year according to Venture Economics classifications.
Industry mix of investments. We also control for potential industry effects. We use
Venture Economics’ classification of investments into the following industry sectors:
medical/health, biotechnology, communications, computer hardware, computer
software, semiconductors/electronics, Internet communications, Internet/computer
related, and non-high-technology ventures as recorded by Venture Economics. We
calculate the percentage of investments in each of these industry segments for each firm
and each year.
Time-dependency. As our sample is a time series of cross-sections, it is necessary to
control for differences between sample years. In all regressions, we include dummy
variables for the sample years.
3.4 Methods
The time series – cross-sectional nature of our data set not only allows us to test the
existence of the hypothesised relationships, but also enables testing of causality. More
specifically, the data enables us to examine Granger causality. Variable X is said to
Granger-cause Y if the lagged values of X are significant predictors of Y when Y is
regressed on its own lagged values (Granger, 1969). By first regressing current
performance on prior performance and prior position centrality, and then symmetrically
regressing current position centrality on prior performance and prior position centrality,
we can test whether centrality is the major determinant of performance or whether
performance determines centrality. In addition to running regressions on the measures of
performance and position, we supplement the analysis by conducting the Granger
causality tests using first differences of the variables. This approach has the advantage of
alleviating the impact of potentially high zero-order correlations between the lagged
values of relatively static variables, such as position centrality or the number of general
partners.
Because our analysis needs to tackle an unbalanced time series – cross-sectional panel
data set of firm-year observations, straightforward statistical methods that assume there to
be no heteroskedasticity, unobserved heterogeneity, or first-order autocorrelation, are
inapplicable. While we run also conventional OLS regressions for comparison, we
present only the results of the theoretically more robust time-series cross-sectional
generalised least squares (GLS) regressions with fixed-effects specifications. This
approach simultaneously controls for potential first-order autocorrelation across the
subsequent observations of the same firm and heteroskedasticity across the observations
of the different firms, and utilises robust maximum-likelihood estimates for the model
coefficients. While pooled ordinary least squares models provide qualitatively similar
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results, the statistical approach adopted in this study gives a more realistic view of the
magnitude, standard errors, and significance of the individual regression coefficients.
To control for unobserved heterogeneity in our sample, we choose to utilise the fixed
firm effects approach. A fixed-effects model is appropriate when inferences are made
conditional to the sample, whereas a random-effects model should be chosen when
inferences are made for the entire population (Hsiao, 1986). Since our position measures
are conditional to the sample, the first approach was selected as more appropriate.
However, we found the differences in the results to be marginal if random-effects models
are used.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations for the sample of 1333 yearly
observations on the 100 venture capital firms in the sample. The average age of the firms
is 17.7 years. On average, the firms have 5.8 general partners, and the average amount of
capital under management is 255 million dollars. The amount of capital under
management varies more than the number of partners indicating differences in
investment focus across venture capital firms and differences between sample years due
to the enormous growth of the venture capital industry in the 1990s. The industry mix of
investments is relatively even, and most of the industry share averages are approximately
8%-14%. Exceptions are the Internet communications and the software sector, which
represent the ‘boom’ investment sector of the 1990s, and the youngest and thus the
smallest groups of the sample, respectively. The average portfolio includes 33% early-
stage firms, 39% expansion-stage firms, and 24% late-stage firms.
The value-weighted market shares of initial public offerings vary significantly among the
firms. At maximum, a single firm has been able to participate in 11% of the sample firms’
portfolio company IPOs in a specific year. Bonacich’s centrality score statistics reveal that
the average centrality score is only 0.81. An interpretation of centrality score states that
score of one means that firm does not have unusually large or small centrality (Bonacich,
1987). Hence there is a group of firms that have relatively high centrality scores, but the
majority of the sample firms form the syndication network around these central firms.
The skewness of the distribution is similar to prior studies (Podolny, 2001).
The pairwise correlations listed in Table 1 deserve a methodological comment. On the
basis of the fact that especially the yearly centrality scores and the numbers of general
partners are positively correlated with their own lagged values, we paid specific attention
to controlling for multicollinearity in further analyses. High correlations among the
independent variables may cause the regression coefficients of the correlated
independent variables to appear insignificant because the variables mask each others’
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explanatory power. The usual statistical thresholds for a multicollinearity problem are a
correlation coefficient of 0.8 between any two independent variables, a variance inflation
factor over 10, or a tolerance score below 0.1. The first threshold is not exceeded in our
data set, as the maximum correlation among independent variables is 0.79 (between
centrality at t and centrality at t – 1). However, generalised least squares regression
models that we utilise in further analyses do not allow the calculation of variance
inflation factors or tolerances. To ensure that multicollinearity does not distort our
results, we ran identical ordinary least squares regressions for all the models presented in
this paper, and calculated VIF and tolerance scores for them. The results indicated that
multicollinearity is not a problem. Furthermore, the first differences analysis helps to
alleviate the problem of high zero-order correlations between some relatively static
variables and their own lagged values.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations (1333 firm-year observations).
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. dev.
Bonacich’s centrality 0.00 4.49 0.81 0.85
Value-weighted market share of initial public offerings (%) 0.0 11 1.0 1.1
Venture capital firm age 0.5 65 17.7 10.5
Market share of investments (%) 0.0 8.3 1.0 0.8
Number of general partners 1 22 5.8 3.0
Capital under management (BUSD) 0.1 4.0 0.25 0.36
Share of investments to medical (%) 0 100 13 16
Share of investments to biotech (%) 0 100 8 13
Share of investments to software (%) 0 100 20 18
Share of investments to hardware (%) 0 100 9 12
Share of investments to Internet, computer-related (%) 0 100 6 12
Share of investments to semiconductors (%) 0 100 8 12
Share of investments to communications (%) 0 100 15 16
Share of investments to Internet communications (%) 0 56 3 6
Share of investments to non-high-technology (%) 0 100 14 17
Share of investments to early stage ventures (%) 0 100 33 21
Share of investments to expansion stage ventures (%) 0 100 39 21
Share of investments to later stage ventures (%) 0 100 24 19
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Centrality, t 1.00
2 Centrality, t-1 0.79 1.00
3 Centrality, t-5 0.62 0.68 1.00
4 IPO market share, t 0.44 0.47 0.49 1.00
5 IPO market share, t-1 0.37 0.40 0.47 0.57 1.00
6 IPO market share, t-5 0.27 0.29 0.41 0.45 0.44 1.00
7 No. of partners, t 0.35 0.33 0.28 0.39 0.39 0.30 1.00
8 No. of partners, t-1 0.33 0.34 0.30 0.42 0.39 0.33 0.79 1.00
9 No. of partners, t-5 0.22 0.24 0.34 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.64 0.70 1.00
10 ∆Centrality, t-1…t 0.27 -0.26 -0.11 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 1.00
11 ∆Centrality, t-2…t-1 0.11 0.29 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.35 1.00
12 ∆Centrality, t-6…t-5 0.14 0.12 -0.29 0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.04 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 1.00
13 ∆IPO share, t-1…t 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.28 -0.31 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 1.00
14 ∆IPO share, t-2…t-1 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.31 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.43 1.00
15 ∆IPO share, t-6…t-5 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.37 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.04
16 ∆Partners, t-1…t 0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.30 -0.16 -0.09 0.12 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.03
17 ∆Partners, t-2…t-1 0.04 0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.18 0.20 -0.11 -0.01 0.11 0.07 -0.08 0.06
18 ∆Partners, t-6…t-5 0.07 0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.11 -0.23 -0.03 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.03
19 Market share of invs. 0.59 0.62 0.51 0.60 0.53 0.38 0.43 0.44 0.36 -0.05 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05
20 Capital under mgmt 0.36 0.35 0.30 0.37 0.38 0.36 0.51 0.46 0.38 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02
21 Firm age -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.32 -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 -0.01 -0.05
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Table 1 (continued)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
22 California 0.44 0.45 0.36 0.18 0.16 0.10 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03
23 Massachusetts -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02
24 Medical % 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.08 -0.05 0.06 0.04 -0.06 -0.01
25 Biotech % 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.04
26 Software % 0.25 0.26 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.10 0.04 -0.01
27 Hardware % 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.02 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01
28 Internet/Computer % 0.19 0.19 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.06
29 Semiconductors % 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.07 -0.12 0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.03
30 Communications % 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.03
31 Internet/Communic. % 0.17 0.18 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.19 0.14 0.09 -0.01 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.01
32 Early stage % 0.36 0.31 0.19 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.02 -0.04
33 Later stage % -0.02 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.13 -0.22 0.04 -0.01 -0.05 0.04
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
15 ∆IPO share, t-6…t-5 1.00
16 ∆Partners, t-1…t 0.02 1.00
17 ∆Partners, t-2…t-1 0.01 -0.03 1.00
18 ∆Partners, t-6…t-5 0.00 0.02 -0.08 1.00
19 Market share of invs. 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06 1.00
20 Capital under mgmt 0.01 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.49 1.00
21 Firm age -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.09 0.03 0.17 1.00
22 California 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.21 0.11 -0.12 1.00
23 Massachusetts -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.08 -0.39 1.00
24 Medical % 0.00 -0.09 -0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.11 1.00
25 Biotech % 0.02 -0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.07 0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.10 1.00
26 Software % 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.09 -0.11 0.16 0.11 -0.26 -0.22 1.00
27 Hardware % 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.09 0.11 0.09 -0.15 -0.09 0.03 1.00
28 Internet/Computer % -0.01 0.19 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.37 0.09 0.15 -0.03 -0.12 -0.19 0.03 -0.14 1.00
29 Semiconductors % 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.14 -0.06 -0.11 0.04 -0.10
30 Communications % 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.19 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07
31 Internet/Communic. % 0.02 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.24 0.12 0.12 -0.06 -0.10 -0.16 0.03 -0.11 0.37
32 Early stage % 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.00 0.23 -0.05 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.02
33 Later stage % -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.15 -0.10
29 30 31 32 33
29 Semiconductors % 1.00
30 Communications % -0.02 1.00
31 Internet/Communic. % -0.10 0.07 1.00
32 Early stage % 0.00 0.02 0.05 1.00
33 Later stage % 0.15 0.04 -0.04 -0.33 1.00
Table 2 illustrates the close relationship between performance in the IPO market and
position centrality in the syndication network. Panels A and B contain the 25 top firms in
the sample in terms of the value-weighted IPO market share and position centrality,
respectively. The IPO market share for a given year is defined as the sum of the offer
values of the firm’s portfolio company IPOs divided by the total offer value of all sample
IPOs in the same year. Using value-weighted market shares instead of equal-weighted
ones also allows us to take into account the amount of value created in the exits instead
of only the relative number of successful exits.
Panel A shows that the top 25 companies have a combined value-weighted IPO market
share of 45.9 %. Many of the VC firms on the list appear to be partnerships that are
regarded as prestigious in the practitioner community and publications. The list also
demonstrates that portfolio company IPOs are substantially concentrated to a sub-section
of the sample firms. However, it is worth noting that several VC firms may have
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participated the same portfolio company IPOs because of the syndication of investments.
Hence the companies with the largest market shares of investments are presumably
involved in relatively many IPOs as well. We will return to controlling for this effect in
the regression models.
To illustrate the hypothesised relationship between network centrality and the IPO
market share of the firms, Panel B presents the average of Bonacich’s centrality measure
for the top 25 companies in the sample using the same two time spans. Companies that
appear in both panels are highlighted. The fact that 18 firms out of 25 appear in both
Panel A and Panel B suggests that there is a positive relationship between the venture
capital firm’s performance and its centrality in the syndication network. However, the
table does not yet reveal which of the phenomena – network centrality or performance –
is the dominant factor reinforcing the other.
4.2 Basic Granger causality tests
To address this question and the hypotheses, we construct six different distributed lag
fixed effects regression models. Table 3 provides the results for the GLS models on the
effect of position centrality in the syndication network on subsequent performance in the
IPO market and the number of general partners, and the effect of the performance and
partner variables on centrality. In the first two models, the dependent variable is the
value-weighted IPO market share of the venture capital firm each year. In the third and
fourth models, the dependent variable is the number of general partners in the VC firm
each year. In the two rightmost models, the dependent variable is position centrality. The
regression coefficients are presented together with the respective z-statistics. We also
include year dummies and controls on the industry composition of the investment
portfolio in the analysis although the coefficients are not shown in the table.
Hypothesis 1 suggested that past position centrality in the syndication network is
positively related to the subsequent performance of the firm, but with a time lag. The first
two models in Table 3 demonstrate that the lags of IPO market share significantly
contribute to subsequent share, and that the two-year lagged centrality score is positively
and significantly related to the value-weighted IPO market share of the firm in year t.
The notion “success breeds success” appears to apply to the venture capital setting.
However, the relationship between centrality and the number of managing partners is
slightly more ambiguous. The two-year lagged centrality score and the five-year lagged
score are positively and significantly related to the number of managing partners in year t,
but the four-year lagged centrality score has a very significant negative impact on the
same variable. Instead, the lagged values of the number of general partners tend to
determine the subsequent values of the variable. The number of partners appears to be
relatively stable.
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Table 2 IPO market share and position centrality
Panel A presents the value-weighted market share of portfolio company initial public offerings for the
top 25 companies in the sample. The venture capital firms include only independent U.S. partnerships
that invest in the traditional venture capital stages of development. The IPO market share in a given
year is defined as (offer value of firm’s portfolio company IPOs in the given year) / (offer value of all
sample IPOs in the given year). Note that several VC firms may have participated in the same IPOs.
Panel B presents Bonacich’s centrality in the syndication network for the top 25 companies.
Panel A: Value-weighted market share of sample venture-backed initial public offerings
Venture capital firm name
Average
1986-2000
Average
1995-2000
 Firm appears
in Panel B
1 Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers 4.51 % 5.90 % Yes
2 New Enterprise Associates 2.72 % 2.93 % Yes
3 Sequoia Capital 2.34 % 2.69 % Yes
4 Accel Partners 1.58 % 2.49 % Yes
5 Norwest Venture Partners 1.14 % 2.32 % Yes
6 Bessemer Venture Partners 1.44 % 2.10 % Yes
7 U.S. Venture Partners 1.54 % 1.87 % Yes
8 Benchmark Capital 0.72 % 1.80 %
9 Mayfield 1.80 % 1.77 % Yes
10 HarbourVest Partners, LLC. 1.75 % 1.69 %
11 Jafco American Ventures, Inc. 0.65 % 1.64 % Yes
12 Oak Investment Partners 1.73 % 1.56 % Yes
13 Institutional Venture Partners 1.82 % 1.54 % Yes
14 Robertson Stephens & Company, LLC 1.89 % 1.49 %
15 Matrix Partners 1.12 % 1.47 % Yes
16 Mohr, Davidow Ventures 0.97 % 1.43 % Yes
17 Centennial Ventures 2.08 % 1.42 %
18 Greylock Management Corp. 1.36 % 1.39 % Yes
19 Summit Partners 1.15 % 1.34 %
20 Venrock Associates 1.58 % 1.33 % Yes
21 InterWest Partners 1.51 % 1.30 % Yes
22 Charles River Ventures 1.16 % 1.18 % Yes
23 TA Associates, Inc. 2.35 % 1.10 %
24 Crosspoint Venture Partners 0.65 % 1.08 % Yes
25 Vanguard Venture Partners 0.75 % 1.07 %
Panel B: Bonacich’s centrality in the syndication network
Venture capital firm name
Average
1986-2000
Average
1995-2000
 Firm appears
in Panel A
1 New Enterprise Associates 3.52 3.57 Yes
2 Accel Partners 2.60 3.14 Yes
3 Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers 3.14 2.78 Yes
4 Institutional Venture Partners 2.79 2.69 Yes
5 Oak Investment Partners 2.70 2.66 Yes
6 Mayfield 2.71 2.34 Yes
7 Sequoia Capital 2.55 2.02 Yes
8 Bessemer Venture Partners 1.30 1.85 Yes
9 U.S. Venture Partners 2.04 1.85 Yes
10 Norwest Venture Partners 1.19 1.80 Yes
11 Crosspoint Venture Partners 1.05 1.70 Yes
12 Charles River Ventures 1.03 1.68 Yes
13 Venrock Associates 1.48 1.49 Yes
14 Matrix Partners 1.43 1.47 Yes
15 Mohr, Davidow Ventures 1.56 1.37 Yes
16 Greylock Management Corp. 1.09 1.35 Yes
17 Sevin Rosen Management Co. 0.94 1.35
18 Menlo Ventures 1.29 1.34
19 Jafco American Ventures, Inc. 0.63 1.33 Yes
20 Delphi Ventures 0.98 1.32
21 InterWest Partners 1.45 1.27 Yes
22 Burr, Egan, Deleage & Co. 1.33 1.26
23 Highland Capital Partners 0.70 1.19
24 Morgenthaler Ventures 1.12 1.16
25 OneLiberty Ventures 0.80 1.15
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Based on resource-based arguments, Hypothesis 2a proposed that the past performance of
a venture capital firm is positively related to its subsequent position centrality in the
syndication network. In contrast, Hypothesis 2b suggested that past positions determine
subsequent positions. The results of the last two GLS models using centrality as the
dependent variable show that the lagged values of centrality represent major
determinants of subsequent position centrality in the syndication network. In contrast,
the lagged value-weighted IPO market shares are consistently insignificant determinants
of current centrality. Similarly, the lagged general partner variables are insignificant or
even negative. Prior position, on the other hand, has a notable impact on subsequent
position. The centrality scores of the two previous years make the strongest positive
contributions to subsequent centrality, while the other lagged centrality scores are
insignificant or have a smaller impact.
The results indicate that position centrality consistently Granger-causes performance in
the IPO market, and that the impact of centrality is strongly positive. Technically,
position centrality also Granger-causes the number of general partners, but the impact is
ambiguous with both negative and positive lagged terms. On the contrary, neither the
performance in the IPO market nor the number of general partners can be interpreted to
Granger-cause position. The results thus suggest unidirectional causality that runs from
position to performance in the portfolio company IPO market.
A number of the control variables in Table 3 appear significant in the analysis, but the
combined magnitude of the coefficients of the actual independent variables outweighs
the magnitude of all the control variables. Of the control variables, the market share of
investments is, as expected, positively related to the value-weighted market share of IPOs.
Furthermore, a wide resource base in terms of capital under management is positively
related to the number of general partners. Investment stage focus also explains some
differences in the firms’ centralities and IPO market shares.
While the results seem to provide support for the social structural view of
interorganisational networks, additional analysis is required to ensure the robustness of
the conclusions, and to shed light on the ambiguous relationship between position
centrality and the number of general partners. Particular problems may arise from the
high zero-order correlations of the general partner and centrality variables with their own
lagged values, even though our regressions pass the standard Variance Inflation Factor
tests for multicollinearity problems.
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Table 3 Granger causality tests of position and performance
Time-series cross-sectional GLS regression with distributed lags and a fixed-effects specification is applied.
Regression coefficients and z-statistics are presented. Control variables are measured at t-1 years. Industry controls
are not shown.
IPO market share, t No. of general partners, t Centrality, t
IPO market share, t – 1 .160 .143 -.003
(5.73) *** (5.07) *** (.46)
IPO market share, t – 2 .077 .069 -.005
(2.94) ** (2.62) ** (.80)
IPO market share, t – 3 .073 .072 -.001
(2.91) ** (2.80) ** (.15)
IPO market share, t – 4 .063 .065 -.006
(2.52) ** (2.57) ** (1.00)
IPO market share, t – 5 .069 .075 .001
(3.09) *** (3.35) *** (.10)
No. of general partners, t – 1 .860 .862 .101
(22.60) *** (22.63) *** (1.07)
No. of general partners, t – 2 .024 .019 .135
(.54) (.43) (1.20)
No. of general partners, t – 3 -.006 -.006 -.058
(.18) (.18) (.56)
No. of general partners, t – 4 .054 .055 -.225
(1.45) + (1.47) + (2.08) *
No. of general partners, t – 5 -.021 -.022 .051
(.78) (.78) (.61)
Centrality, t – 1 .056 .002 .652 .593
(1.16) (.27) (21.91) *** (16.50) ***
Centrality, t – 2 .170 .014 .218 .234
(3.50) *** (1.73) * (6.85) *** (6.10) ***
Centrality, t – 3 .006 -.002 -.012 .061
(.11) (.27) (.37) (1.65) *
Centrality, t – 4 .024 -.025 .011 .047
(.48) (3.08) *** (.38) (1.36) +
Centrality, t – 5 -.067 .013 -.001 -.044
(1.61) + (1.92) * (.07) (1.66) *
Mkt share of investments .739 .496 .017 .015 .048 .053
(8.61) *** (5.07) *** (2.07) * (1.51) (2.16) * (2.17) *
Capital under mgmt (log) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
(1.29) (1.13) (4.47) *** (4.58) *** (2.55) * (1.02)
Firm age (log) .037 .007 -.010 -.011 -.190 -.038
(.60) (.11) (.85) (1.00) (6.32) *** (.93)
Firm located in CA? .298 .146 -.005 -.004 .132 -.020
(3.00) ** (1.43) (.36) (.32) (3.28) *** (.41)
Firm located in MA? .125 .067 .002 .004 .109 .037
(1.25) (.68) (.16) (.33) (2.36) * (.68)
Early stage % -.362 -.381 .032 .042 .368 .429
(1.92) + (2.11) * (1.10) (1.38) (3.53) *** (3.60) ***
Later stage % -.019 -.093 -.036 -.035 -.640 -.434
(.09) (.44) (1.18) (1.08) (5.42) *** (3.33) ***
(Industry controls not shown)
Constant .028 .889 .150 .162 .039 -.483
(.15) (3.20) *** (3.98) *** (3.49) *** (.28) (2.65) **
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald χ2-statistic 839.1 917.8 8130.3 7828.0 7534.0 7153.1
N 1269 1269 842 842 1269 865
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4.3 Granger causality tests using first differences
To address the issues associated with stable variables in the basic Granger causality tests,
we undertake an analysis of first differences. The specifications of the models are
identical to Table 3 except that the dependent and independent variables are calculated
as the first difference between two consecutive values of the variable. This approach
significantly reduces the problems of high zero-order correlation between independent
variables, and complements the previous analysis.
The first two models in Table 4 regress the change in IPO market share on its own lags
and the lags of the change in position centrality. While the previous changes in IPO
market share have a negative contribution on subsequent changes, as expected taken into
account typically diminishing marginal returns, the lagged changes in centrality are
consistently positively related to performance in the IPO market. Improvements in
position tend to breed subsequent performance.
The impact of lagged position changes on the growth in the number of general partners
is also positive. The two- and three-year lagged changes in centrality have a significant
positive contribution on partner acquisition. Although the four-year lagged change in
centrality has a slight negative impact on partner acquisition, the combined magnitude of
the regression coefficients is positive and significant.
Changes in centrality are consistently independent of changes in IPO market share. On
the contrary, growth in the number of general partners has some positive effects on
changes in position centrality. The two- and four-year lagged variables are positive and
significant. The relationship between position and the growth in the number of general
partners clearer than in the previous analysis.
The results of the first differences analysis confirm and clarify the results of the basic
Granger causality tests. Firstly, there is a clear unidirectional causal relationship between
position and performance in the IPO market. Position breeds performance. Secondly,
there is a feedback relationship between position and the number of general partners. A
change in centrality has a positive impact on partner growth, but partner growth also has
a positive impact on centrality. The acquisition of general partners seems to play a
significant role in establishing the firm’s position.
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Table 4 Granger causality tests of position and performance using first differences
Time-series cross-sectional GLS regression with distributed lags and a fixed-effects specification is applied.
Regression coefficients and z-statistics are presented. Control variables are measured at t. Industry controls are not
shown.
∆ IPO market share, t…t+1 ∆ No. of partners, t…t+1 ∆ Centrality, t…t+1
∆ IPO mkt share, t-1…t -.623 -.673 .003
(22.38) *** (24.26) *** (.35)
∆ IPO mkt share, t-2…t-1 -.459 -.524 .003
(14.87) *** (16.79) *** (.34)
∆ IPO mkt share, t-3…t-2 -.279 -.338 .003
(9.24) *** (11.08) *** (.36)
∆ IPO mkt share, t-4…t-3 -.133 -.168 -.001
(5.45) *** (6.91) *** (.11)
∆ No. of partners, t-1…t -.102 -.102 .009
(2.70) ** (2.71) ** (.10)
∆ No. of partners, t-2…t-1 -.049 -.058 .171
(1.89) * (2.25) * (1.82) *
∆ No. of partners, t-3…t-2 -.051 -.061 .085
(1.97) * (2.38) ** (1.01)
∆ No. of partners, t-4…t-3 .002 -.003 .158
(.06) (.13) (1.79) *
∆ Centrality, t-1…t .262 .007 .031 .007
(3.63) *** (1.10) (1.23) (.22)
∆ Centrality, t-2…t-1 .561 .017 -.045 -.003
(7.54) *** (2.33) ** (1.83) * (.10)
∆ Centrality, t-3…t-2 .464 .015 -.021 .034
(6.36) *** (2.10) * (.93) (1.07)
∆ Centrality, t-4…t-3 .428 -.010 -.040 .000
(5.98) *** (1.47) + (1.89) * (.00)
Mkt share of investments .082 -.018 -.001 -.003 -.053 -.037
(1.41) (.33) (.12) (.44) (2.59) ** (1.69) +
Capital under mgmt (log) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
(.91) (.44) (2.49) * (2.81) ** (2.00) * (1.01)
Firm age (log) -.501 -.162 -.033 -.032 -.171 -.028
(5.60) *** (1.72) + (2.94) ** (2.86) ** (6.31) *** (.70)
Firm located in CA? .092 .068 .002 .004 .025 -.086
(.76) (.57) (.14) (.29) (.66) (1.99) *
Firm located in MA? .076 .014 -.003 -.003 .040 .017
(.52) (.10) (.23) (.27) (.89) (.32)
Early stage % -.361 -.504 .048 .050 .229 .265
(1.07) (1.54) (1.61) (1.66) + (2.17) * (2.05) *
Later stage % -.194 -.119 -.037 -.039 -.651 -.541
(.52) (.33) (1.18) (1.22) (5.49) *** (3.99) ***
(Industry controls not shown)
 Constant 1.400 1.033 .097 .100 .616 .489
(4.56) *** (3.50) *** (2.71) ** (2.85) ** (5.96) *** (3.13) **
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald χ2-statistic 584.1 716.7 189.5 212.4 160.8 280.2
N 1269 1269 842 842 1269 1269
The results of our analyses indicate that prior positions tend to determine venture capital
firms’ subsequent positions in the syndication network. Thus, our results provide support
for Hypothesis 2b and the social structural view of the determinants of exchange in
venture capital syndication networks. In addition, Hypothesis 1 on the positive
relationship between centrality and subsequent performance is supported. The results
also indicate that causality runs from centrality to performance, not vice versa. Prior
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positions tend to determine the subsequent positions of venture capital firms. Position
centrality, in turn, reinforces performance, but with a longer time lag.
The acquisition of general partners, on the other hand, appears to act as a vehicle to
affect position. While position would otherwise seem to be a given, stable characteristic
of a venture capital firm, changes in the number of general partners can disrupt the
system. Firms that gain centrality also tend to gain general partners, and firms that gain
general partners tend to gain centrality. There is a feedback relationship between the two
variables. We argue that the feedback relationship may result from the introduction and
removal of the personal collaboration networks of the general partners when they enter or
leave a firm. While our data does not allow an explicit analysis of the partner-level
networks, the significant macro-level relationship between changes in the stock of
partners and firm position suggests that additions and reductions in the number of
general partners have a direct impact on the network position of the firm.
To further ensure the robustness of the results, we ran the same analyses using equal-
weighted IPO market shares instead of value-weighted ones, and ran the models on
several different periods. Despite the modifications, the results were qualitatively the
same as presented in this paper.
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper set out to examine how the network position and the performance of venture
capital firms are related to each other, whether position and performance reinforce each
other over time, and whether the social structure of the network or the observable quality
of resources is the dominant determinant of collaborative exchange. A large data set
composed of the investments by a set of U.S. venture capital firms over the period 1986 –
2000 was utilised in the analysis.
We formulated three hypotheses on the basis of the resource-based view and the social
structural view. The resource-based view of the firm predicts that venture capital firms
benefit from a central network position by enhancing their access to the resources of the
syndicate partners. As a result, previous central positions should be associated with above-
average current performance. Similarly, companies with an attractive resource base, or
resources that are complementary to the resources of other network firms, should be
attractive exchange partners. As track record acts as a signal of the quality of the firm’s
resources, above-average past performance should intensify resource exchange with the
focal firm. As a result, the focal firm may be able to improve its position centrality.
On the other hand, the social structural view predicts that organisations can benefit from
central network positions because a central position implies that the firm possesses
informational advantages and high social status. Informational advantages arise because
connectedness provides central firms with rich information on the quality of potential
exchange partners. High status acts as a signal of quality and makes organisations
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associated with the high-status actor desirable. Because of such effects, firms tend to
prefer exchanges with central firms, which tend to sustain their past positions in the co-
operative network. While the resource-based view stresses that the quality of the focal
firm’s resources determines the willingness of other firms to exchange with it, the social
structural argument is that the prior position of the focal firm is the major determinant of
tie formation. Thus, the past centrality of venture capital firms may determine their
subsequent centrality. Our longitudinal data set allowed us to test not only the
hypotheses but also causality in the hypothesised relationship between firm performance
and position.
The results of this paper demonstrate that network positions contribute to performance,
and that past positions constitute a dominant determinant of subsequent positions.
Firstly, past position centrality in the syndication network is positively related to the
subsequent performance of the firm. Past performance is also positively related to
subsequent performance. Secondly, past position centrality is positively related to
subsequent centrality, but past performance does not appear to be related to subsequent
position centrality in the syndication network. Even though well-performing peripheral
venture capital firms could signal that they possess high-quality resources, the centrality
of these firms does not seem to improve as a result of past performance alone. According
to our results, the performance and the position centrality of a venture capital firm are
positively interrelated, but causality runs from centrality to performance – not vice versa.
Our results also indicate that there exist a positive feedback loop among venture
capitalists that gain on general partners or gain on centrality. Changes in the “stock” of
general partners can disrupt existing network positions.
The results have several implications. On the theoretical side, this paper supports the
social structural view of interorganisational co-operative networks, and implies that a
firm’s position in co-operative networks has an impact on its performance. Interestingly,
we find that past centrality is a determinant of subsequent performance but that past
performance is not a determinant of subsequent position centrality. This suggests that
venture capital firms gain centrality by means other than signalling the quality of their
resources. Our results indicate that one such mechanism is related to changes in the
stock of general partners in the firm. Our initial suggestion is that the personal
collaborative networks of individual general partners expand the existing network of the
focal firm after the partners have joined the firm, thus improving the centrality of the
firm. Similarly, we suggest that the network of the firm loses dyads when a partner leaves
the firm, leading to a reduction in the centrality of the firm’s position in the overall
syndication network. While our data does not allow an explicit analysis of the personal
networks of the general partners, the significant feedback relationship between changes
in centrality and changes in the number of general partners suggests that general partners
have a direct impact on the position of the firm.
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On the practical side, the results of this paper provide some suggestions regarding
successful strategies for venture capital firms. It is evident that syndication is a valuable
vehicle for achieving a protected high-status position that tends to lead to above-average
performance. The strong tendency of sustaining prior positions additionally implies that
there may exist considerable barriers to success in the venture capital industry. It is
difficult for a peripheral newcomer to gain the same number of positive effects from
exchange relationships as central firms gain. Central positions are valuable and worth
sustaining. Newcomers might find it rewarding to seek such positions by actively building
exchange relationships through investment syndication, and by carefully building their
stock of general partners to integrate their personal networks to a firm network.
This paper has left some interesting questions open. Firstly, we have only provided a
starting point to examine which mechanisms can disrupt the existing network structure,
or why the dyads are initially formed as they are. One potential direction for future
research would be to examine the entry into and exit from the syndication network. As we
initially outline, the formation and the sustainability of the dyads seem to be associated
with the networks of the individual general partners rather than the venture capital firm
as an organisation. As our results initially suggest, the introduction of new general
partners and the exchange of general partners among the network firms may act as
exogenous and endogenous shocks to the network structure, and seem to have an effect
on the centrality of the firms. Further research could examine the networks of the
individual general partners in more detail to better understand the effects of such shocks.
Secondly, further research could still extend the testing and elaboration of the resource-
based and the social structural reasons for initiating syndicates and other collaborative
exchange relationships. While it is probably true that firms prefer to continue to use their
existing exchange relationships, and thus tend to protect existing positions, the stimulus
for initiating the first exchanges is likely to be attractive resources. Exchange relationships
are formed because firms want to exchange something. Knowledge about the extent of
resource exchange in collaborative relationships, and especially venture capital
syndicates, would shed light on the issue of initiating exchanges.
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